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ABSTRACT 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the reciprocal direct relationship 
between political regimes, political instability and economic growth. However, there is a 
lack of fit between the political and economic science especially when it comes to political 
determinants of economic growth. Thus, this thesis sheds further light on the question: To 
what extent do political regimes and their stability affects economic performance with 
reference to 20 Western European countries. A panel regression analysis is employed, by 
adopting multiple measures of government performance. The findings suggest that political 
regimes have an effect on economic growth and this effect is not directly dependent upon 
the broader governmental structure and political environment. 
This thesis further examines the puzzle of the nature between political instability and 
economic growth in Western Europe, by using both a more comprehensive measure of 
political instability than has previously been developed, and Greek growth cycles form 
1919 to 2008 as a case to explore the nature of the researched issue. The findings propose 
that the relationship between political instability (PI) and economic growth is parabolic and 
fragile. Furthermore, this thesis supports the intuition that political instability can slow 
economic growth through increasing uncertainty in economic policies. The results illustrate 
that economic growth and political instability are jointly determined and that governmental 
changes plays no significant role on economic growth (with exceptions in the case study), 
especially after extended spells of political stability. It appears that what matters is the 
longevity of the polity itself and the specific forms of political instability. Moreover, by 
using Greece as a case, this thesis shows that there is a strong negative link between 
political instability and the volatility of the economic outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Context and Background 
 
‘…A crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is 
concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it...’ 
Alesina and Rodrick, 1994:465.  
 
How to earn more and live better is the people’s main concern since the beginning of 
their existence. Therefore, their basic interest was invested in tracking economic growth. 
What is more interesting and important, though, is the link between the economic progress 
and the social attitudes through the established political institutions. 18
th
 century’s 
enlighten thinkers like Smith and Turgot (originator of the term and notion of laissez faire) 
placed the evolution of the economic activities at the centre of the human society which 
was evolving through its established political institutions. Scholars started to debate about 
the importance of the political structure as a society’s stabilizer which would prosper the 
economy.  However, the scholarly concern was divided into three main groups. One that 
supported the need for governmental security (and as a result the governmental control) 
over the economy as a tool for growth, another one which argue that any type of 
governmental control will result in a disastrous economy
1
 and a third group which argue 
that the political regimes do not matter for economic growth.  Every group provides 
empirical evidence towards what type of regime type should exist to accomplish the desired 
economic prosperity.  The results, though, guide to confusion and require a more profound 
                                                          
1
 E.g. Marxists, liberals, mercantilists, economic nationalists, etc.  
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research in the continuous search for the best possible political structure that enhances 
economic growth. 
Some economies have grown rapidly in recent decades, while others have languished, 
subject to a large portion of their populations to grinding poverty. In addition, even today 
basic virtues of any society, like democracy or dictatorship, tolerance or violence, oligarchy 
or widespread opportunity, constantly change. These economic diversities among countries 
constitute a fundamental research issue; the better the understanding of the economic 
growth process the bigger the ‘contribution to [the] human welfare’ (Temple, 1999:112) 
and the more successful the design of policies would be (Barro and Lee, 1994). Yet, which 
are the forces behind this wide variance in countries’ economic performance? According to 
Temple (1999) scholars did not show much of interest in socio-political discrepancies 
between countries. There are two reasons for this lack of interest: first, the lack of the data 
available and second, a lack of the appropriate interpretation of the theoretical literature 
(Temple, 1999). The result was to focus research on political and social factors only in the 
last few years (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Alesina et al., 1996; Brunetti, 1997; Fedderke and 
Klitgaard, 1998; etc). A fundamental question that started the debate of the politics –
economic growth -link was whether democracy and growth were incompatible objectives 
(Brunetti, 1997). As Gerschenktron put it ‘even a long democratic history does not 
necessarily immunize a country from becoming a democracy without democrats’ (1943:5).  
The world constantly faces economic and political changes: it evolves. Numerous 
countries have undergone from poor to developing, others remained poor (e.g. in the 
African continent) and a few experienced economic miracles (e.g. Asian countries such as 
China and Taiwan). The economic changes, all over the world, were achieved through the 
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welfare policies and the developmental priorities that governments set for their countries.  
After long research and debate it is well established and empirically suggestive that politics 
and economics are interrelated. Equally, Gourevitch (2008) highlighted the important, and 
at the same time, contradicting relationship between them. The reason is that politics affect 
the economic decisions in a country since economics is the base of a state’s decision –
making considerations and politics is a way to achieve them. Moreover, the overall 
economic performance of a state controls the durability of its political regime. This 
connection still remains in the centre of the scholarly debate since it is one of the more 
continuing relationships in the social sciences. Thus, to understand the way political 
regimes affect economic growth is fundamental for both theoretical and practical reasons. 
Not only is there an intrinsic value in knowing how politics affects development, but also it 
is crucial to understand the policy decisions under the above relationship. It is also essential 
to consider the degree of freedom that policymakers get when they seize power to govern 
(and sometimes the misuse of this power).  
To date, there has been little agreement on what are the linkages between economic 
growth and political indicators which may have an effect on growth. Everest –Philips states 
that ‘economic growth is a political process requiring effective political leadership, vision 
and sense of national purpose…’ (2008: iv). Prior literature suggests three reasons for 
inconsistencies in the political –economic growth debate: First, the discrepancies in the 
modeling assumptions, second, the selection bias and third the mistakenly accepted notion 
(from the economists’ viewpoint) that there is no well-developed theory of the genesis of 
democracy which resulted to differences in findings. This disagreement captivated the 
interest of this thesis.  
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Moreover, even though previous studies concluded that there is a profound connection 
between political regimes (and specifically democracy) and economic growth, far too little 
attention has been paid to local or national factors such as social structure, since economics 
were not dealing with national specificities (Gourevitch, 2008). It is, though, the social and 
the political structure which affects growth in the long –run. Thus, politics plays a 
fundamental role (as mentioned above), in the long run growth and institutions and 
regulations uphold a critical part of it. Consequently, in contemporary theory, the research 
of politics and in particular the regime type in relation to economic growth remains 
essential. Nevertheless, since the 1980s, there has been a flood of literature which deals 
with the growth of nations, catch-up, and technological transfers but only recently (the last 
15 years) political indicators were used to emphasize the importance and to measure the 
effectiveness of the political regimes into the economic spectrum. Thus, this literature is 
less developed with smaller number of empirical papers but remains divided into the 
economic literature and political literature.  
The research of economic growth originates mainly in three different theoretical 
explanations/ models. The first one is the neoclassical growth model which integrates 
convergence among different countries that compete for economic growth. The second one 
is the endogenous growth model which predicts country disparities; and the third one 
relates to the theory of economic development which takes a more historical perspective on 
the nation’s struggle for economic growth. In turn, the neoclassical model is based on the 
diminishing returns to capital and treats long-run growth as exogenous. Endogenous growth 
theory examines constant or increasing returns to capital and integrates the effects of the 
rapid technological changes. The development theory includes a wide variety of approaches 
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to economic growth such as technological change [Gerschenkron (1962), Abramovitz 
(1986), etc.], neo-institutional economics [North (1990), Eggertsson (1990), etc.] and 
theories of institutional sclerosis [Olson (1982)]. These three theoretical explanations are 
not incompatible and researchers follow often more than one category. For example, 
Abramovitz (1986) adopts the neoclassical growth model, but due to his historical analysis 
fits also into the third category.  
To sum up, this thesis modeling of economic growth and political regimes is a mix of 
all the above approaches. It explores whether the neoclassical model can explain the 
empirical finding in a number of developed countries. When the standard neoclassical 
model looks insufficient, this thesis extends it by using the notion from the developing 
approach, by taking into consideration the possibility of endogeneity of some regressors 
into the model. This work synthesizes previous approaches to give a better understanding 
of the effects of the political regimes and the social behavior on both the sources and the 
cycles of economic growth, with specific reference to Western European economies.  
Finally, by describing previous principal findings and by introducing and reviewing the 
effect of democracy on economic growth through previous research, this thesis will indicate 
a more thorough understanding of regimes. The analysis, in this thesis, is through the basic 
regime theories and by grouping them in a rational way which indicates the past 
perspectives, the modern perspectives and finally the current perspectives on a 
governmental status. In addition there will be a reference to the ‘key’ theorists who debated 
both democratic and undemocratic theories in order to present a clear perception of the 
political and economic areas in a state. The empirical debate follows in the next chapters.  
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1.2 Research objectives 
There are a number of different estimations related to the link between political regimes 
and their constraints and economic growth, which are divided adequately between positive, 
negative and no connection at all. Even though the empirical findings are contradicting and 
the literature devoted to the above relationship is huge, what stems out of it, is that the well 
defined link between the political and economic objectives.  
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the above relationship and shed light 
on what extend a regime’s stability and the policies implement under that regime affects the 
economic area in the Western European context which has been integrated, mostly, into an 
international and more generic context in the past research (the sample has been used as a 
part of all the countries of the world). A question which arises at this point is why choose 
Western Europe as a research area. First, Western European countries are considered as 
both political stable and developed countries. However, the Western civilization which 
sprang its wisdom all around the globe had its origins in backward and chaotic societies 
during the middle ages. Second, in the current era Western European countries from 
masters became peasants since rapid economic growth is observable mostly in the Asian 
Tigers like China and Taiwan and countries of less importance in the developing world: 
that leads to a need to investigate the Western Europe. Finally, with the current economic 
crisis it is crucial to clarify the actual situation between these two objectives (political 
regimes and economic growth) related to the developed Western European countries to 
draw policy recommendations.  
To sum up, the cultural background, the national institutions, the language and the 
religion varying across Western Europe. Additionally, the European countries differ widely 
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in their demographic and economic characteristics (e.g. Balkan countries like Greece are 
relatively less developed than countries like UK and France). While still not absolutely 
perfect, as the European countries are not identical, comparing the different areas of a 
region gave a much more homogeneous population to examine from the same continent 
(Europe) rather than a global sample of nations which made the findings more vigorous.  
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
This thesis provides evidences on the determinants and the channels through which 
political regimes affect the dynamics of economic growth. To do so a number of 
approaches are used to investigate the relationship between political regimes and any 
possible channels (i.e. political instability) and economic growth in Western Europe. Those 
include a political economics approach, a single equation regression which assembles the 
need (to correct for bias or overestimation in calculating the effects of political regimes on 
economic growth) for an instrumental variable model and a case study. The advantage of 
testing the above relationship in a single country is that historical and institutional 
irregularities typical of that country turn out to be useful in valuing the econometric results. 
However, generalizing the results which is the limitation of the single country testing are 
resolved by the previous chapters which investigate a group of developed countries.    
Finally, sociopolitical and institutional dynamics are examined in a geographical 
perspective (Western Europe), explicitly accounting for the spatial interactions between 
different regions in the form of spillovers and network externalities.  
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My intention is to provide a broad range of estimates of the direct and indirect effects 
of the relationship between political regimes, political instability and economic growth and 
highlight the importance of any political factors that affect their interaction with reference 
to Western European countries.  
To better understand the inclusion of the channel analysis (system of equations) I consider 
a neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
Y = A K
α
 L
β
                                                                 (1) 
Where Y is the output of an economy, A is the level of the technology, K is the physical 
capital, and L denotes the labor force. By differentiating (1) with respect to time we obtain 
the structural Solow model: 
   
                                                              (2)   
                                                                  
Where, the low-case letters refer to per worker quantities. We also added a list of both 
political and economic growth determinants to enrich the structural Solow model (e.g. 
macroeconomic policies) to allow for consideration of probable corresponding channels. In 
this thesis I estimate equation (2) in the context of controlling the political regime and 
stability which enable us to see if the Solow theory can still explain the growth effectively 
when the political impact is embedded in the growth process.  
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1.4 Thesis structure  
This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the research concept. 
This chapter describes the main idea of the thesis by clarifying the reasons to undergo into 
the current investigation and its contribution to the general knowledge.  
The second chapter examines theoretically the relationship between the political 
systems and its effects on people’s economic well being. This chapter identifies the main 
political regimes and introduces their main characteristics and concepts. Then it 
acknowledges the relationship between the different political systems and economic 
growth. The main reason for this investigation is to establish the theoretical political ground 
and the importance of ideological beliefs as an underlying force of economic growth.  
The third chapter examines the relationship between the political regimes and 
economic growth (by adopting the political perspective of the political regimes) with 
reference to 20 Western European and peripheral countries. The main argument in this 
chapter is related to the type of political regime which is ‘better’ or more effective in terms 
of wealthy creation. The findings support the fact that civilian regimes have a negative 
impact on the wealth creation because of the additional channel of political instability.  
The fourth chapter examines the puzzling character of the relationship between 
political instability and economic growth in Western Europe. To do so, firstly a 
measurement of political instability was constructed by following the political theory of 
violence (Gupta, 1990) to find that the character of the above relationship is both parabolic 
and fragile. The findings support that political instability can slow economic growth 
through the channel of increased uncertainty in economic policies and those governmental 
changes may lead to a positive change in economic growth.  
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The fifth chapter investigates the influence of political instability on long-run 
economic cycles between 1919 and 2008 with relevance to the historical context of Greece. 
The need to examine Greece as a case study was necessitated by the current economic 
critical situation in the country which shifted the world’s attention to the state of affairs that 
the institutional and economic regime faces. The current stability of the Euro requires us to 
investigate Greek institutions, governmental policies (i.e. governmental expenditure) and 
societal unrest as potential explanatory variables that led to the current critical 
socioeconomic situation. The findings show that two indicators play a key role in the 
current crucial situation: the excessive governmental spending on defense expenditure and 
the counter -cyclicality of public debt.   
Finally, the sixth chapter concludes this study by discussing its limitations and 
integrating policy recommendations.  
 
1.4 Main Contributions 
The main reasons for undergone with the current thesis are: first, to better understand 
the sources of growth which is crucial since growth leads to large differences in standards 
of living between countries over time. Second, even though the extent of the academic 
interest is broad and contradicting it contains overambitious recompenses
2
. A third reason 
is that not all countries have the same history, the same values, ideological beliefs and 
culture and that is a factor that many studies do not account, therefore generalization of 
findings are challengeable. Fourth, the rising living standards do not lie only in the tangible 
                                                          
2
 See for instance the work of Huntington, 1987; Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990; Olson, 1993; Jackman, 1993; 
Chan, 2002 and Feng, 2003; among others. 
24 
 
improvements (materials) that they bring on people’s lives but how those standards shape 
people’s socio-political character.  Thus, the way people think about economic growth and 
as a consequence their overtaken actions, is a matter of far broader importance.   
A main distinctive of this thesis is that it combines both politics and economics to 
research the regime-growth relationship. In short, this thesis uses the political theory to 
direct the empirical testing. For example, in order to create the political instability indexes 
(chapter 3 and 4) the usage of political theories e.g. for theory of violence and welfare of 
the groups, were used. Consequently, on the one hand, we have the economic theory which 
highlights the assumption of self utility maximization that might lead to wrong choices. On 
the other hand, the desire for group welfare exists which create a need to merge the 
economic assumptions with the people’s desire for higher welfare for the group they 
belong. The above combination throughout this thesis creates the ground of a better 
understanding of the regime –growth debate by incorporating both human behavior and 
their reactions (e.g. conflict, demonstrations, protests, etc.).    
Furthermore, this research uses not only the dichotomous variable (Polity2
3
 variable) to 
distinguish between democratic and dictatorial institutions but also alternative measures for 
the regime type (e.g. civilian regimes). The main reason is to expand the minimal notion of 
the democratic beliefs. Most of the previous literature refers to democratic procedures 
rather than substantial policies or other outcomes that might be viewed as democratic (e.g. 
scholars account only specific characteristics of the regime and the economy to characterize 
                                                          
3
 The polity2 variable from the Polity IV project provides a qualitative measure of democratic institutions, 
identified by the existence of the level of political participation, civil liberties and institutionalized constraints 
on the exercise of power by the executive.The POLITY2 variable has 21 categories, ranging from −10 (most 
autocratic) to +10 (most democratic), but divisions in this index is a bit unclear, especially since the 
POLITY2 index is a nonlinear summation of sub-indices intended to capture aspects of regime type. 
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it as democratic). This thesis uses the term civilian regimes to avoid stretching the 
definition of democracy as noted by Collier and Levitsky (1997) combining this with 
policies and outcomes which are generally accepted as democratic (e.g. elections or the 
existence of constitution and the legislative fairness). Figure 1.4.1 show the (broaden) 
democratic concept –or as it is known the ladder of generality4: 
 
Figure 1.4.1: The ladder of Generality- adapted by Collier and Levitsky, 1997 pp 436. 
Furthermore, democracy, as a political system has been researched more than other 
political regimes and the reason is that a democratic regime guards freedoms like individual 
and political rights, property rights, social prospects and transparency, it secures and 
protects people’s security, thus by its definition democracy must lead to growth (there are, 
thought, contradicting opinions about this issue which will be analyzed in the chapters 
below). Chan (2002) argues that scholars and politicians a priori conclude that the 
                                                          
4
 The Ladder of Generality (a, b, c, d, e and f denote accordingly the scholars that used the particular types of 
democracy: Booth, 1989; Collier and Collier, 1991; Petras and Leiva, 1994; Linz, 1994; Gasiorowski, 1990; 
Gastil, 1990). 
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democratic systems are better in promoting economic outcomes. On the other hand, 
scholars such as Remmer (1978) and Gandhi (2008), among others note that authoritarian 
regimes produce better economic growth since they are more stable and they follow 
political order. Furthermore, Islam (1999) argues that a democratic system is not a 
precondition to economic growth, since authoritarian systems may as well promote and 
boost growth in nations. Examples are countries such as China, Chile, Greece, and Spain 
which achieved outstanding economic performance under authoritarian and bureaucratic- 
authoritarian regimes
5
.  
Additionally, political indicators that capture governmental stability like political 
violence, and governmental changes, in the framework of a democratic regime, are used (in 
order to combine them with economic indicators) and to test findings from the previous 
literature when the sample is broken down to a specific region (as against of the whole 
globe). The above combination will give a clearer explanation of the impact and the effects 
that the political regimes and the policy making area have on the economic growth since 
there is still much to elaborate in the regime –growth debate (e.g. the resolution of the 
societal conflict).  
Thus, this thesis contributes to the regime-growth debate by taking into account first 
that there should be a much more careful research in the political arena and the regimes’ 
type and their effects on growth with respect to significant institutional concepts such as 
effective political parties and a country’s constitutional structure. The clarification of the 
                                                          
5
 ‘Bureaucratic authoritarianism’ is a totally different type of regime (different of authoritarianism) and it 
might be considered as a result of transformation of other types of authoritarianism. ‘The bureaucratic 
authoritarian state is, to a large extent,… a reaction to extended political activation of the popular sector’ with 
a significant increase in the technocratic role (O’Donnell, 1978:6). In other words, O’Donnell named the 
military regimes in Argentina as ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ to differentiate them from oligarchic and 
populist forms of authoritarian rule found in less developed countries. 
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above debate might contribute significantly to improving policies mainly in the developed 
Western European countries. The reason is principally historical since there are differences 
between the genesis of democracy and the free market (that happened almost 
simultaneously in the Western world) and their applicability in that region. Second, the 
need to clarify matters such as the academic contradicting results, the division between the 
economic and political perspective and the selection bias, in a systematic way by focusing 
on both the institutional concepts and policy outcomes by depending upon the European 
regional context. The importance this clarification lies to the policy implications of 
resolving political constraints such as societal conflict. To prevent conflict entails the 
interaction of both political theory and economic empirics by integrating also the political 
decisions. The essence of the above interaction is to offer warnings in Western European 
countries which even though they are relatively stable the need to be prepared to face 
possible distinct violence in a normative way is vital.   
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AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL REGIMES ON 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: A POLITICAL ECONOMIC GROWTH APPROACH 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will be introduced by its conclusions: the current existing political 
regimes belong somewhere in the in -between of a political continuum as it is described by 
Congleton (2001). Both democratic and dictatorial regimes, do not exist in their extreme 
format (figure 2.6.1), with the pure political meaning (e.g. an unrestricted leviathan 
executive) but rather systems like semi-democratic, parliament-democratic etc. or one party 
dictatorships exist. In those regimes the decision making process and governmental liability 
is divided to a branch of government headed by one person and another branch headed by a 
committee. That format is the neglected so called ‘king and council’ constitutional template 
(Congleton, 2001).  
In the 20
th
 century issues such as dictatorship and authoritarianism came into the 
scene since the Western world lived under the veil of the above regimes. It was that 
historical moment that the scholarly debate initiates, regarding the countries’ well being 
under specific political regimes, such as democracy and dictatorship, and any links between 
them. Researchers, politicians and a series of papers documented the fact that there is a 
close relationship between a country’s political regime and its development.  However, 
some parameters were left out of the debate, such as the political culture of a country, the 
political learning of a country’s people and specifically the country’s history. All the above 
in combination with a regime’s stability, determine a government’s ability to perform 
through collective actions. Additionally, some countries have attracted scholars’ interest 
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more than other e.g. the developing countries are always in the centre of the scholarly 
concern whilst the developed world is scarcely under research.  
Economic growth is a topic with many ups and downs in the history of economics. 
The debate of the relationship between political regimes and economic development goes 
back to the 1950s. Intellectuals and scholars all around the world tried to analyze and 
explain whether the economic development leads to a democratic regime or whether 
democratic countries have higher growth levels. Conventionally, many scholars such as 
Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1995), and Rustow (1970) among others, concluded that 
democracy is either a precondition to development or that a democratic regime follows the 
economic development. However, since the debate concerning the connection between 
development and political regimes circulated the last 50 years, many patterns and empirical 
investigation of the above connection has been established. 
This chapter addresses the above relationship in a different way by discussing what is 
politically theoretical important for a regime type to enhance or retard the economic growth 
by using the political economics approach. Thus, the core investigation of this chapter is to 
examine the relationship between the political systems and its effects on the economic well 
being from the political perspective. To do so, firstly the different regime types need to be 
identified. Then the relationship between the different political systems and economic 
growth will be acknowledged. The purpose of this classification is to develop qualitative 
expectations of how economic growth should be related to political systems. The analysis 
of the theoretical expectation will help us to clarify important variables that might affect the 
regime type / economic growth relationship (Britt, 1997). At this point some questions arise 
(even though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the existing extensive 
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literature). What is democracy? What are non-democratic regimes? What is development 
and where does it come from? What is the meaning of political and economic development 
and what is their relationship?  
 
2.2 Democracy 
Democracy is a common and popular word. People talk about democracy without 
sometimes to have a very clear idea about what exactly means. In fact, few words have 
been mistreated, during the last century, as the word democracy, (in particular from 
different perspectives and theoretical backgrounds). Terchek and Conte noted that 
democracy has a long history and ‘has undergone a series of critical reinterpretations … 
[which] have produced serious disagreements… and continue to fuel contentious debates’ 
(2001: xiv). Therefore, intellectuals all around the world have tried for many decades, to 
understand, define and analyze democracy. Furthermore, the debate has circulated among 
politicians who have tried to attach it to their actions, decisions and political agendas. 
Moreover, what is democracy? ‘The word democracy, or demokratia as the Greeks call it, 
stems from the Greeks and literally means ‘rule by the people’ (Birch, 1993:45). Literally it 
stems from the combination of two Greek words ‘demos’ which means people and kratos 
which means rule: a state ruled by its people. 
The notion of democracy was revived in 1100 C.E by the Italian city –states in the 
middle Ages and the Renaissance and then disappeared to reappear in the 18
th
 century. 
Since then it has been characterized by a series of struggles (for instance the French 
Revolution in 1789) and has provided the strength to express the peoples’ will. Democracy 
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is often what reverberates in people’s minds as they struggle for freedom and a better way 
of life.  
Today people talk about democracy and its applicability in a state’s sovereignty. 
According to Fotopoulos (2005) the meaning and the concepts of democracy have been 
distorted: liberal academics, theoreticians and politicians confused the modern concepts of 
democracy with its real meaning, which is the ‘rule by the people’. The concepts of 
democracy have been confused with the oligarchic representative system whereby the 
rulers are a small minority of individuals and democracy has barely any relation to the 
classical conception (Fotopoulos, 2005). 
  Nevertheless, for many decades scholars and theorists have made attempts to define 
democracy as a form of governance by adding quite a few adjectives at its meaning such as 
parliamentary, liberal, economic, industrial etc. perspectives which in turn creates the 
feeling that a number of different types of democracy exist (Fotopoulos, 2005). Thus, 
‘liberal theorists referred to ‘liberal’ or ‘representative’ democracy, social theorists referred 
to ‘economic’ or ‘industrial’ democracy and Leninists referred to ‘people’s democracies’’ 
(Fotopoulos, 2005:176).  
From Aristotle to the Oxford English Dictionary (1933) and Przeworski (1986) and 
Bauer (1957) among others, democracy has been described as the form of governance of a 
state ruled by its people and in which the sovereign power exists in the people and is not 
shifted in favour of any interest group or class. Thus, the concept of democracy has a 
meaning: the direct exercise of power by the people themselves excluding any form of 
ruling by minorities and institutionalising the equal involvement of all citizens in the 
political area. In addition, the word ‘people’ denotes all the citizens in a state without 
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exception and the word ‘rule’ means the public policies established by the process of voting 
whereby the rulers and representatives of the people are determined.        
Democracy is for that reason the freedom to express peoples’ will and to create laws to 
govern their own countries with their elected members. In ancient Athens, for instance, 
people used to gather in a place (agora) and express their will in front of an assembly by 
voting on every subject they had to decide about (even if it had to do with the legislation 
system).  However, democracy is something beyond the aforementioned. A government 
enacts laws and most countries have a constitution –the ultimate law– so as to establish and 
sustain balance and order in the state. Hence, democracy is not only a constitutional process 
of a legitimated system. Government consists only of the elected members of a nation. 
Apart from this, in a democratic system other essential groups participate, such as political 
and social parties and organizations and laws and the constitution and the parliaments and 
above all the people’s power to express their will.  
Schmitter and Karl (1996) argue that democracy is the ideal which its meaning should 
be distinguished carefully in the political systems analysis. They also denoted that the ideal 
of democracy was what motivated people to transform the political systems all over Europe 
from non -democratic to democratic.  Schmitter and Karl (1996) further argue that there are 
many types of democracy and their effects and practices vary. However, ‘the specific form 
[of] democracy takes is contingent upon a country’s socioeconomic conditions as well as its 
entrenched state structures and policy practices’ (Schmitter and Karl, 1996:50).  
Schmitter and Karl (1996) further researched the democratic notion from the 
institutional perspective that is they distinct democracy from the political actors behaviour 
and the methods they develop to access the principal public offices and institutions. The 
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main differences they present between democracy and other regime types are the way that 
the rulers come to power, the accountability for their actions and the people actions-demos.  
In other words, people –demos (–δήμος) is the key constituent to every democratic system. 
Furthermore, Dahl (1974) argues that there is not only one theory of democracy but 
many times scholars’ efforts to describe and define the world were insufficient. Democracy 
has been analysed from different points of view and ‘there are so many possible approaches 
to any social theory and in dealing with democracy a good case can be made … of these 
[different aspects or] possibilities’ (Dahl, 1974:1). It has been called a universal language 
or a set of values that people feel its importance (Amartya, 1999). However, beyond the 
pledge to rule by the majority or minorities, democracy is engaged in a controversial debate 
concerning initial purposes and scopes such as power, equality, liberty, justice and private 
interests. George F. Kenan (1978) (a key academic figure during the cold war) notices that 
democracy includes values and ideals that the Western countries carried in other parts of 
the world where they appeared as settlers. What democracy did for Western countries? 
Keane (2009) argues that many questions remained unanswered of the validity of 
democratic values in terms of enhancing development in the Western world. This thesis, 
investigates democracy in the Western states to test whether its values and ideals favoured 
the states that settled the grounds of democracy in the whole world.     
 
2.3 Totalitarian –Authoritarian regimes: Theories of forms of Government 
During the 20
th
 century the world has faced a series of extraordinary events with non-
democratic regimes to predominate it (throughout the world): from North America to 
Europe and Africa, totalitarian regimes existed, and democratic forces have challenged 
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authoritarian regimes on the left and on the right. The key role in the political spectrum has 
been played by military forces (Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2008). In some cases this 
trend led to the establishment of democratic governments (Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 
2008). In other cases the weakening of authoritarian regimes has promoted economic 
growth (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Stepan, 1988; Scott, 1995) and political influences 
of ultra-nationalists or religious -fundamentalist movements tried to enforce their own kind 
of authoritarianism (Mann, 2004).   
The term totalitarianism was, first, used in Italy in the 1920s by the Italian 
philosopher Gentile. The research which defines and documents totalitarianism is The 
Doctrine of Fascism written by Gentile in account of Mussolini in 1935. Totalitarianism 
was used to describe Fascism as a ‘total conception of life’ and it was used as ‘ad libitum’ 
by Mussolini in order to describe his modern system of Fascist government, which he 
termed as ‘lo stato totalitario’: ‘Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State—a synthesis 
and a unit inclusive of all values—interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a 
people’ (Mussolini, 1935:14). Furthermore, ‘the totalitarian movements have been called 
secret societies established in the daylight’ (Arendt, 1958:376).  
Nevertheless, it did not take long for opponents of Fascism and especially Mussolini, 
such as Turati and Kulischov, particularly those of a liberal persuasion, to adopt the term in 
their critiques of dictatorial political states (Di Scala, 1980). Yet it was not just a label that 
was applied to the Fascist regimes of Germany and Italy; the Communist Soviet Union was 
also given the name ‘totalitarian’. Additionally, the post –Mao era in China was described 
as communist totalitarianism (Guo, 2000). This has led to prolonged debate regarding 
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whether such a direct comparison between these Fascist and Communist regimes can be 
considered justifiable since they were significantly different. 
According to Brzezisnki (1956), there is a difference between old or traditional 
dictatorships and modern totalitarian dictatorships. The latter case, suits Hitler’s Germany, 
Mussolini’s Italy and Stalin’s Soviet Union; that is, the ‘total’ states of Soviet Union, 
Germany and Italy during the 1930s and 1940s were cases of modern dictatorships. 
Moreover, according to Johnson (1976) the Western society's first totalitarian 
civilization began with medieval Christianity. For the first time, such a broad ideology 
appeared and was forcibly compelled to everyone. Around the same time, most urban 
centres collapsed or drastically de-populated, leaving the overwhelming majority of the 
population as serfs, tied to the land for life.  
That medieval Christian totalitarian system was somehow unusual. Firstly, the 
Christian ideology did not focus on explaining the economic system; it was accepted as a 
given that most people would be serfs, rather than argued for as the most advantageous 
economic system. The totalitarianism of medieval Christian society therefore existed only 
partially on moral grounds (intellectual, cultural, and personal issues), and partially from 
absolute inactivity (in the economic area) (Johnson, 1976). Nevertheless, the individual 
freedom was practically non- existent, and the denial of his freedom was in large part an 
essential doctrine of the reigning ideology (Johnson, 1976). Secondly, the Christian 
totalitarianism co-existed with remarkable division of powers. The Church co-existed with 
the state, sharing power with it. Additionally, the absence of individual freedom together 
with a complete and compulsory ideology, may exemplify the medieval Christian society as 
totalitarian. 
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Many scholars involved to the totalitarian research and generated many diverse 
concepts (von Beyme, 1998). However, the main contribution to the totalitarian debate has 
been made by two German scholars, who are Arendt and Friedrich (von Beyme, 1998) (and 
a few years later Brzezinski). Arendt; 1951, Friedrich; 1954 and Friedrich and Brzezinski; 
1965 (who developed the classical totalitarian theories) have explained the birth of 
totalitarianism as something relatively new, a product of the modern age – and also as a 
direct result of the World War I. According to the above scholars, it became obvious that 
for a nation to be completely effective in the modern world it would have to organize all its 
resources towards the same uniting goals. Simultaneously, any technological advances (in 
relation to mass-communication etc.) used as the necessary tools to control the masses and 
they were available to be used by states that were looking for total control (Arendt, 1958). 
Arendt's book which published in 1951 was influenced by the overwhelming events 
during and after the World War II: mostly the rise of Nazi Germany and the terrible destiny 
of the Jews at its hands. Hence, there was the rise of Soviet Stalinism and its total 
destruction of millions of peasants. According to Arendt (1958), the above events were the 
total evil, and after those the Western civilization was broken down. The reason is that the 
world can no longer turn back to the traditional way of life, and ‘though we are saturated 
with experience and more competent at interpreting it than any century before, we cannot 
use any of it’ (1958: 434). Arendt (1958) noted that even the value of history of the 
Western civilization was in a total rejection from people since no traditional values were 
existed at that time. Moreover, she argued that these demonstrations of political evil could 
not be understood as expansions of Hitler’s or Stalin’s personal interests or as they 
followed already existing outlines (i.e. the racist theory that was talking about the 
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extinction of Jews). The above systems symbolized a completely 'novel form of 
government', one built upon terror and ideological propaganda (Arendt, 1958). As believed 
by Arendt, older dictatorships had used terror as a tool for reaching power.  
However, those modern totalitarian regimes showed little strategic rationality in their 
use of terror (Arendt, 1958). Therefore, as she described it, terror was an ending point for 
the people and especially the Jews. Furthermore, the Germans were based their ideology 
into older laws and historical theories so that to justify their terror and their beliefs such as 
the unavoidability of a war between the Arians and other 'degenerate' races (this was 
referred by philosophers such as Chamberlain and De Gobineau).   
Arendt tried to investigate the roots of modern totalitarianism.  According to Arendt 
(1958), the totalitarianism’s success rested upon the destruction of the ordered and stable 
environment in which people once lived. Thus, the totalitarian leaders rallied populations to 
do their will. The World War I, the Great Depression and the revolutionary conflicts in 
Europe, left people open to the spread of the totalitarian ideology: it was presented as an 
idea that would assign peoples’ misery, and indicate security against future dangers such as 
another war (Arendt, 1958).  
Totalitarian ideologies were presented as the answers to people’s problems and 
miseries. Moreover, those ideologies claimed that they discovered the way that past and 
present events (e.g. conflicts, wars, etc.) can be explained so as to secure any future threats 
(Arendt, 1958). Accordingly, the appeal that the totalitarian ideas had on European 
populations was enormous: people started believing on those ‘evil’ ideas in order to secure 
their liberty and any future war. Furthermore, the acceptance and the establishment of the 
totalitarian state were used by the bourgeoisie as an instrument by which to further its own 
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sectional interests (Arendt, 1958). This in turn led to legitimize political institutions for 
personal interests, and to degenerate values such as citizenship and deliberative consensus 
that had been the core values of democratic politics (Arendt, 1958). Thus, the rise of 
totalitarianism was to be implied in terms of personal interests that had damaged the 
conditions or a possibility for a feasible public life that could unite citizens, while 
simultaneously protecting their liberty and uniqueness (a condition that Arendt referred to 
as plurality) (Arendt, 1958). Arendt wanted to give a sense of the unique reality of 
totalitarianism, as a horrifying and utterly new form of government. In the centre of 
totalitarianism’s ideology rests the concept of the individual becoming an objective: 
‘Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, namely, through the state and a 
machinery of violence; thanks to its peculiar ideology and the role assigned to it in this 
apparatus of coercion, totalitarianism has discovered a means of dominating and terrorizing 
human beings from within’ (Arendt, 1958: 325). 
Another classical theory of totalitarianism was developed by Friedrich. In his book 
The Unique Character in Totalitarian Society in 1954 (with a modification in 1956 with 
Brzeniski). They developed their totalitarian theory during the Cold War and described the 
totalitarian states as ‘more inimical to human dignity than autocracies of the past’ 
(Friedrich and Brzeniski, 1956:303).  Friedrich set out a series of characteristics of 
totalitarianism which are known as ‘the six-point syndrome’. He claimed that 
totalitarianism was a new phenomenon and also that its characteristics could be applied 
both to the right wing and left wing types of political rule. The characteristics or the six-
point syndrome are the following: a) An official ideology, focused on a ‘perfect final state 
of mankind’; b) A single, hierarchically organised mass party – usually led by one man; c) 
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A monopoly of control by the party of all military weapons; d) A monopoly of control over 
all means of mass communication; e) A system of enforced police control using both 
physical and psychological powers; f) Central control and direction of the entire economy 
(Friedrich and Brzeniski, 1956:9f). According to the ‘six –point syndrome’ the totalitarian 
states of Hitler’s Germay, Mussolini’s Italy and Stalin’s Soviet Union were alike and ‘thus 
different categorically not only from liberal constitutional states but also from traditional 
dictatorships’ (Siegel, 1998:13).  
There is, though, another school of thought (scholars such as Karl Popper, 1943) that 
traced the history of totalitarianism back to Plato’s totalitarian Republic. Most totalitarian 
theories described totalitarianism as a new phenomenon which was the result of mass terror 
and modern technology i.e. Arendt, 1958. Popper argued that totalitarianism was an old 
concept and he traced it back to the thought of Plato and Aristotle and the Ancient Greek 
poleis-states. However, Popper (1943) was right about the origins of totalitarianism, even 
though he did not analyze his theory comprehensively: he did not know Greeks, he 
despised Hegel, and he was not well informed about the Marxist theory. Nevertheless, he 
concluded that ‘Plato’s totalitarianism may not have directly inspired modern fascists, but it 
influenced Hegel, the modern totalitarianism’s prophet’ (Hacohen, 2002: 393).   
Part of totalitarianism is authoritarianism. An uncontaminated type of political system is the 
authoritarian political system. It stems from the French word authorite which means power 
or right to force obedience. According to Linz an authoritarian regime is a political system 
with ‘limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, 
but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization 
except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small 
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group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’ 
(1964: 255). Authoritarianism is a closed system (measured by the political rights and the 
participation of the citizens of a country, in changing the system), with authoritative 
political positions open to either an individual or a few (elites) by virtue of birth or other 
qualified status, and based on customary law. Authoritarianism is an ideology which 
highlights the right to the government to rule without the citizenry’s content. Although, is a 
milder form of governance than totalitarianism, still it is opposed to any form of democratic 
liberalism. Groups are so long independent that they do not try or want to change the 
traditional position, and the elite's goals are concerned to preserve traditional positions. 
Furthermore, the centre in the authoritarian ideology are values like patriotism, nationalism, 
economic development, social justice among others without having any actual ideological 
content (like totalitarian regimes) except the ruler’s mentality (e.g. military elites, 
bureaucrats, technocrats, etc.). Authoritarian regimes lack in terms of ideology and in turn 
this lack limits their capacity to organize and control the people within the state (Linz, 
1975). The above lack directs to imitate dominant ideologies like dictatorship and 
democracy creating a heterogeneous character in regime’s ideology. The lack in terms of 
ideology the mimic character of those regimes and individual mentalities that are expressed 
through those regimes limited the scholarly interest (Linz, 1975).  
To sum up, totalitarian regimes is more brutal than authoritarian regimes: they create 
mass terror, genocide of entire people especially people they consider threat (e.g. Nazism 
Germany). Totalitarian regimes seek a total control in every societal system, economic, 
political etc. with regards to an ideology which is somehow like religion. Authoritarian 
regimes governed by one ruler or elite group with no utopian ideas and they seek people’s 
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loyalty based on moral grounds (ideological). They do use police force when they face 
rebellion oppositions but not as brutal as totalitarian regimes (e.g. ban strikes and protests). 
The main objective in authoritarian regimes is to secure power not to follow any ideology 
(e.g. authoritarian regimes exist both in left wing and right wing ideologies).   
 
2.4 Development and Regimes 
Development, along with the economic well being, has become an important objective 
for many nations. Some economies have grown rapidly in recent decades, while others have 
languished, subjecting a large portion of their populations to grinding poverty.  However, 
despite many attempts to achieve harmony between development and economic welfare, in 
reality, the economics and political regime cannot be so easily compartmentalised. As 
Malatesta noted, ‘every economic question of some importance automatically becomes a 
political question’ (1977:130-1). What explains this wide variance in economic 
performance between nations? Economists have as yet only explained part of the variance 
of the above relationship without identifying the form of that relationship
6
. Having 
recognized that half of the variance, research began to centre on political factors that affect 
the economic area in a country.  
At this point, a narrow definition of development is essential to be given. Ray noted that 
development ‘is surely the most important and perhaps the most complex of all economic 
issues’ (1998:3). For states and people, the development refers to progress or according to 
Ray to minimize the ‘economic inequality throughout the world’ (1998:3). It is the general 
                                                          
6
 i.e., Lipset (1959) describes as linear the form of the relationship between development and economic 
performance with Cutright (1963) to justify that form by testing it in an empirical way. 
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economic, social and cultural progress of a state. It is the development of the country and 
nation and furthermore the individual development. It includes economic, social and 
cultural development and also includes civilizations of various countries and nations.  
Therefore, for the developing countries, it is a vital responsibility to develop the 
economy, society and culture, to improve the living standard of people, to eliminate the 
hunger, poverty, and illnesses and to resolve the individual needs such as concerns for food, 
shelter, employment, education and medical treatment. However, development in a country 
has to be accounted in the international context because ‘inequality or wealth plays a 
central role in many development problems’ (Ray, 1998:5). Hence, ‘economic development 
[cannot] be identified, in a definitional sense, with the level or growth of per capita 
income… development is not just about income… is also the removal of poverty and under 
nutrition’ (Ray, 1998:8); therefore, it is a multidimensional issue.    
 Mill (1869), Lipset (1959), Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1995), and Rustow (1970) 
among others, argue that without parallel construction of democratic politics it is 
impossible to develop efficiently a nation’s economy, society or even culture. Even if the 
economic, social and cultural development is succeeded, it can neither be merged, nor 
guarantee an economic wellbeing, or even the society and its culture to continuously 
develop.  Meanwhile a nation’s main concern is to develop a democratic polity and 
promote the construction of democratic politics. However, there are historical evidences 
that democratic regimes not always promote economic growth (e.g., in Greece during the 
1967 military regime the economic well –being was outstanding, Franco’s Spain which had 
the highest economic growth in the world during his rule. Pinochet’s Chile which was 
economically dead under socialism had extremely developed later on. All the three 
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countries had economic freedoms and stability of property. They were politically 
authoritarian governments, but they were not keen to raise state deficits). Therefore, an 
interim conclusion is that democratic politics do not always promote economic 
development; not at least in every country of the world. The result would be citizens to 
revolve and their discontent is usually channeled through mass protest and violent unrest 
rather than through electoral endorsement, even if elections do formally take place. 
Governments tend to respond with a mix of violent oppression in an effort to restrain 
conflict. Nevertheless, there are some factors such as the national characteristics and needs 
of every country and sometimes the visions that the political leaders set which determine 
the economic, social and cultural well –being of the state.  
 
2.5 Power: The common bond  
Up until here, a short introduction of the underlying theory related to different types 
of regimes was presented. However, there is one concept which needs to be included and 
that is the common link between different types of regimes and their agendas regarding 
their citizenry. Different political regimes are determined by different ideologies, ideas and 
tactics. The common linkage between the political actors in any regime is their struggle for 
power.  
Every government under any regime type has to have the ability to perform either in a 
collective way (democracy) or individual way (autocracy, totalitarianism) and set rules, 
agendas and policies concerning the development or the future of the state. This ability to 
decide, perform, act and change is known as power. Power is another puzzle among 
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political scientists since there is not one definition to describe it. It means different things to 
different occasions. According to Wagner (1968), power is the ability to act either through 
individual decision for individual or collective acts (i.e. under totalitarian or authoritarian 
regimes) or collective decisions for individual or collective acts (under democratic 
regimes). Power can be determined also by the control of resources (i.e. wealth) which 
determines the ability of an individual or a group to influence the decision making area. 
The power of decision relates to the choices people have among a range or set of similes of 
a future we think is possible (Boulding, 1989). 
Simon (1968) describes power as an asymmetric relation between actors. Political 
regimes incorporate behavior expectations from one group to the other or from the group 
(i.e. citizenry) to the individual (governor of any type). According to the ideology formed 
under each regime, a political regime prescribes appropriate behavior roles to its 
participants (Simon, 1968). These behavioral roles include appropriate actions to restrict 
also any particular participant who absconds from the predetermined roles. However, one 
precondition is that the rest of the actors to behave according to their roles. If a large 
number of actors decide to constrain from the roles then the sanctions of the regime 
disappear (Simon, 1968). The political regime is stable when all the actors behave 
according to their expected roles and they support that. The regime becomes unstable when 
constrains happen and actors behave beyond their roles by creating disorder. Thus, the use 
of power is associated also with conflict and responsibility to solve it; power can balance 
actions or distort them by creating instability in the political environment.  
Power was unequally distributed since the beginning of civilization. The human 
societies had a tendency to be divided into a small group (i.e. the governors) of dominant 
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and influential people who were taking the decisions and a large group of relatively needy 
and powerless (i.e. the citizenry). As societies were developing, political institution were 
established to solve the inequality of distribution of power.  Boulding (1989) states that a 
characteristic of power is conflict since, beyond the above, in social systems (political 
systems).  A variety of option restrictions exist in some groups of people which are built on 
some decisions made of other people. Conflict arises when some groups shift those 
restrictions and reduce the power of other people or groups (Boulding, 1989). Resolution 
occurs with the establishment of agreed property lines between people or groups so that no 
group will reduce or increase levels of power by pushing or overlapping possibility borders 
in any extend (Boulding, 1989).    
Power is one of the key concerns in the Western beliefs about political phenomena. 
For political systems and its institutions the main idea is to ‘get things done’ in an effective 
way which sometimes that might cause oppositions and discontent. To solve such 
oppositions usage of force needed. Force, as a solution, creates instability and that 
destabilizes the balance of the political system bringing both economical and political 
constraints.   
 
2.6 Further discussion 
Ideology plays a fundamental role in the classification of different regime types. 
Ideology includes a society’s perception of the world and the goals they set. A society has 
both a government and an economy. Thus, the ideas and ideals of how society should be, 
are related to its freedoms and controls which further classify a country’s both political and 
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economic environment. A summary of the main regime types that analysed above can be 
seen in table 2.6.1: 
Table 2.6.1 
REGIME TYPES 
  Authoritarian Totalitarian Democratic 
 
Limitation on 
command structure 
 
NONE 
 
NONE 
 
YES-MANY 
Effective responsibility NONE SOME, party 
determined 
CONSIDERABLE 
Organization of 
command  
State 
Bureaucracy/military 
Individual leader 
YES YES  
PARTY 
CONTROLLED 
YES 
COLLECTIVE 
STATE AND 
STATE  
AGENCIES 
SUBORDINATE 
ELECTIVE 
Penetration of society 
of political organs 
YES EXTENSIVE LIMITED 
Mobilization for 
supports 
YES STRONG VARIABLE 
Official Ideology WEAK STRONG WEAK 
Parties WEAK SINGLE MANY 
Police, force, 
intimidation 
YES YES VARIES 
Individual rights 
(protection)  
in form 
in substance 
MAYBE 
 
QUESTIONABLE 
YES 
 
NONE 
YES 
 
YES, GENERALLY 
Source:  adapted by Professor’s Brown-Foster’s webpage available at: 
http://www.polisci.ccsu.edu/brown/ps104.htm 
 
Furthermore, part of a society’s ideology is freedom (political, individual etc.) and the level 
of a government’s control. The diagram below represents the different regimes in a scale 
with the extreme opposites at the ends of the continuum (ideals). Systems which their basic 
ideology is freedom are called democratic, and systems based on governmental control are 
called dictatorships. In today’s world most of the political systems lie in between this scale. 
Below are the scales recommended by Congleton (2001).  
 
48 
 
POLITICAL FREEDOM 
(DEMOCRACY) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLITICAL CONTROL 
(DICTATORSHIP) 
Figure 2.6.2: Political Scale 
  
Furthermore, part of a society’s existence is its economic system which classifies countries 
as developing and developed. Below is another scale, the economic one, which classifies 
governmental systems according to economic freedoms and controls. 
 
STATE CONTROL                                                                                             CAPITAL CONTROL 
(PUBLIC ENTERPRISE)                                                                                        (PRIVATE ENTERPRISE) 
SOCIALISM                                                                                                                CAPITALISM 
 
Figure 2.6.2: Economic Scale 
 
By adapting the above two scales together we get a framework of combinations between 
political and economic systems and its extremes. That is represented in the matrix below: 
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                                                     POLITICAL FREEDOM 
 
 
                                                    
                                           Democratic                    Democratic                   
                              Socialism e.g. Sweden             Capitalism   e.g. USA   
STATE                                                                                                                           CAPITAL                                                                                                                   
CONTROL                                                                                                           (INDIVIDUAL) 
                                 Communism                           Fascism                                     CONTROL 
                        
                        Dictatorial                                                            Dictatorial 
                                Socialism                                             Capitalism 
                                   e.g. Cuba                                         e.g. Egypt 
                                            POLITICAL CONTROL 
Figure 2.6.3: Matrix of Systems 
What is interesting from figure 2.6.3 is that we have not observed until now the extreme 
form between state control and political freedom. Maybe there lies the answer to the 
problematic economic situation that the world lives nowadays.   
However, the above types of systems, their ideology, and the organized society gave birth 
to one medium to converse. That medium is power.                                                                 
                                                                       Economic system 
Political system                  Power                 Social system  
                                                                       Pattern maintenance system  
Figure 2.6.4: Power   
e.g. 
USSR 
e.g. 
Hitler’s 
Germany 
Not 
observed 
e.g. 
Netherland
s 
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Conclusively, what stems from figure 2.6.4 is that power is what gives the strength in a 
political system or in a political regime to produce wealth and stabilize it. The capability to 
cause wealth is totally different from the wealth itself. If for example a person is wealthy in 
terms of monetary units but have no power to produce goods more valuable than he 
consumes then he eventually becomes poorer. If a person is poor but possesses the power to 
produce goods which are valuable then he becomes rich (Rynn, 2003). The above is also 
applicable to nations. The underlying force to create wealth is power which institutes both 
the capability to create wealth and to change or even to destroy a political system.   
 
2.7 Theoretical Identification  
There is a growing literature which follows the public choice approach of decision 
making in different regimes. This chapter will use the same approach to test the behavior of 
governments and the differences between democracies and dictatorships. However, the 
focus of this analysis is not to investigate the promotion of freedoms but rather to test if 
those regimes promote economic growth in their extreme form.  
To begin with, the different characteristics of the two extreme forms of government 
(democracy and dictatorship) will be summarized. Democracy can be defined according to 
Huber et al. (1993) by three essential features: a) freedom for the citizenry and fair 
elections, b) responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected representatives, c) guarantee 
of freedom of firm expansion and association. According to Friedrich and Brzezinski 
(1965) a totalitarian dictatorship is defined by six features: a) dominance of the official 
ideology, b) a single party led by one individual, c) police force and terrorism, d) monopoly 
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of the mass communication, e) monopoly of armaments and f) state control of the 
economy.  
As can be seen from the previous subchapter, the major difference between a 
democratic and dictatorial system is that dictatorships use repression as the main tool to 
stay in power and to secure the loyalty of their followers. Dictators impose restrictions on 
the rights of citizens, on the freedom of the press, restrictions on the rights of parties to 
exist or oppose discontent against the rulers, and citizens to demonstrate against the 
government. To achieve loyalty of their followers or to avoid problems caused by people 
difficult to repress, dictators, buy them off (the solution to the disorder).  On the other hand 
in a democratic regime, governments use clientistic policies to stay in power or to gain 
votes: that is known as pork barrel politics. Democratic regimes, though, set no restrictions 
to the people (at least not similar to dictators). However, restrictions create problems to 
rulers (in both the dictatorial and democratic systems) and that is the essence of the 
Dictator’s Dilemma (Wintrobe, 1990). The dictator’s dilemma is the problem that rulers 
face when they do not know how much support they have from the citizenry and any elite 
groups that exist in the society (they have information problems). This chapter considers 
that democratic rulers face the same dilemma as the benevolent dictators. Thus, the model 
applies to both extremes in the political continuum (figure 2.6.1). Both regimes (democracy 
–dictatorship) can be assumed that represent different solutions in terms of policy making 
in the same model. Thus, rulers have the same utility function, where the components are 
consumption (C) and power (π). By following Wintrobe (1990): 
                                       U = U (π, C)                                             (1) 
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Power is the desired bond (see above) either for personal interest (from the rulers 
perspective) or to promote development to the society as a whole (to promote the people’s 
interests). Combining (1) with constrains like money (especially money’s usage as a mean 
to gain power) enlightens the limits of a ruler’s power. One of the most common issues 
which relates to power, are the economic policies and misusage of governmental resources 
by the rulers so as to increase governmental revenues especially through high levels of 
taxation. Thus, constrains of power are both the cost of accumulative power and the ruler’s 
capacity to use their power to increase revenues. If the ruler finds ways to increase the 
governmental revenues without increasing the levels of taxation then people are happy 
because the state will increase the levels of economic growth and the people will remain 
loyal to the government. Thus, there is no limit for the ruler to remain in power. On line to 
Wintrobe’s (1990) recommendations, the above is represented as: 
                                B (π) = Pπ π (B-C) + C                             (2) 
Where B (π) represents the governmental budget as a function of power (π) where this 
power can be used through taxation, legislation, production of public goods and keeping the 
citizenry happy so as to gain their loyalty. The budget is spent thought governmental 
consumption, accumulative power, and some money is spent to gain power π (B-C); and Pπ 
is the price paid by rulers to gain power in monetary units (e.g. election campaigns). The 
solution to the above constrains, according to Wintrobe (1990), might be obtained by 
choosing π and C to maximize (1) subject to (2).  
That can be done by:                    
                                                                                 (3)      
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Where Uc/Uπ , represents the rulers preferences for power vs. consumption. Pπ (1-1/ε
π
) 
represents the marginal cost of accumulative power and επ = (∂π/∂Pπ) (Pπ/π) >0 is the 
elasticity of π with respect to its price (Wintrobe, 1990). Bπ shows the effects of the 
political power to the budgetary revenues. Sometimes the exercise of state power will 
increase revenues Bπ >0 (if power is used to provide public goods or raise/implement 
taxation) and other times Bπ <0 decrease revenues (e.g. suppressing regulations for 
businesses) (Windrobe, 1990). If Bπ is positive the ruler will tend to be oriented more 
towards power than consumption and vice versa (whether the total effect is positive or 
negative). Therefore, ‘what turns to be crucial …[are] the effects of … marginal 
intervention on economic growth’ (Wildrobe, 1990:8). 
However, accumulative power can be expressed though the voting selection (especially in 
democratic regimes): it is the power to rule and the support (loyalty) that people show to 
the rulers. Thus, in line with Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (2000), the marginal cost of 
accumulative power can be replaced with the voting power.  
                 Pπ (1-1/ε
π) = ωv Vπ                                                       (4) 
Where ωv represents the total voters power (power that voters give to rulers to rule by 
voting them-selecting them and supporting them) and Vπ represents the voters support. 
Furthermore, the voters support is given by: 
                Vπ =W (π) -b
παπ                                                          (5) 
Where W (π) is the total voters power and bπaπ measures the total transaction costs related 
to power; α measures the institutional environment; and bπ represents the average 
transaction costs
7
. The above confronts the difficulty and implications from the ruler’s 
                                                          
7
 For more see: Coase, 1960, 1989; North, 1990.  
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perspective to gather support from the citizenry and analogous information so as to increase 
their utility (Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 2000).  
All the above can be feasible if in each regime exist only one ruler (a single 
individual – e.g. a dictator) or an unrestricted parliament. The reality, though, shows that 
there is never one body that rules alone (neither in democratic regimes nor in dictatorial 
regimes). What exists is a bipolar method of governance where an individual (president, 
dictator, chief, king, president, etc.) and a parliament (or party, cabinet, or an elite group) 
rules. That is the ignored, from the previous literature, ‘king and council’ form of 
governance into which separation and division of the power is made with their policy 
making choices. The King and council form of governance is common in Europe since the 
medieval ages and especially in the 19
th
 century either when new nations gained their 
independence or when old nations reformed their old political assortment, e.g. Norway 
(1814), France (1814), Denmark (1849), Greece (1864), Italy (1861), Germany (1871) 
(Congleton, 2001).  According to Congleton (2001), this bipolar template of collective 
choice is more common mainly to non-political organizations like firms, military and 
church. However, very few rulers (either dictators or democratic leaders) throughout the 
history lacked either advisory council or an elected body like the parliament to either 
influence the ruler’s decisions or collectively decide. Furthermore, an advantage that the 
king
8
 and council format encompasses is that the council is well informed and that will 
reduce the transaction costs. The ruler will be therefore, well and unbiased informed and 
that will lead to relative merits in terms of chosen policies. That ruler will not make errors 
and he will make decisions which will maximize his utility.    
                                                          
8
 For an extensive discussion related to the ’king and council’ format see Congleton (2001).  
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However, in some cases the ruler can be manipulated by the council especially in 
areas in which he has no appropriate information and that ignorance will lead to systematic 
mistakes in policy choices. Much of the information that is publicly available is 
intentionally biased because individuals, especially those within government, often benefit 
from overstating their loyalty and performance. The problem can be solved by sharing and 
transferring the policy making power: a ruler might depend on his council’s advice in areas 
in which they are more expert than he but reducing their full authority to make decisions, or 
he may also transfer some policymaking power to the council as a method of motivating 
greater competition for positions on the advisory council by keeping always the veto power 
to himself as an alternative of misusing the given authority (e.g. barrel pork politics). Thus, 
a fundamental objective to the king and council form of governance is the policy interests 
between the ruler and the council not to differ since both bodies might have power over 
public policies. That sharing power and responsibilities reduce in the long run the cost of 
intra-polity conflicts in the society since it provides the institutional underlying forces to 
avoid such conflicts among the different groups. To sum up, the king and council model 
allows a large number of government types, from dictatorships to democracies, to be 
represented within a single conceptual framework. The king and council outline leads to 
reforms of governance which are results of collective decisions made by both rulers and 
parliaments. Thus, the information problem can be solved in an efficient way and the 
transaction costs will be diminished leading to maximization of the ruler’s utility. 
Furthermore, the king and council template can be easily adjusted through time, which 
allows it to be subject to changes, modifications, and improvement. That is to say, either 
any possible limitations or modifications allow it to be gradually perfected as a template for 
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government in the long run. These same limitations also allow it to serve as a very useful 
analytical framework for studying the evolution of the governmental systems. 
  
2.8 Existing arguments- A Survey 
The relationship between political regimes and economic growth was initially established 
by Lipset (1959) who examined how economic development might affect the political 
regimes (even though the debate goes back to Aristotle’s and Socrates time). The general 
conclusion was that economic growth and a nation’s prosperity and wealth stem from the 
combination of its productive power and the actions of its government. Since then, related 
research has flourished and outlined that the political environment/system plays an 
important role in economic growth (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Scully, 1988; Grier and 
Tullock, 1989; Lensink, Bo and Sterken, 1999; Lensink, 2001; Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008a; Acemoglu et al., 2008). The interaction between 
political and economic variables which affect people (with an affect from external actors) is 
illustrated in figure 2.8.1 originated in Frey and Eichenberger (1992): 
 
External 
Actors 
Aid, FDI, 
economic and 
political condi- 
tionality  
Groups 
Protest, unrest 
Economy 
Economic  
variables  
 
Goverment 
Economic  
and political 
measures 
 
Figure 2.8.1: Politico –Economic Relations. 
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Furthermore, a political system is a ‘self-contained entity’ which exists separate of the 
rest of the social life in a nation (Easton, 1957). That entity depends on inputs of various 
kinds which converted by the system into outputs and these outputs have costs both to the 
system and the environment that this system exists (Easton, 1957). The outputs are any 
important consequences that political regimes have on society and inputs are the demands 
and support that that interest groups and the citizens in general of a nation have shown to 
any political system
9
 (Easton, 1957).  
ENVIRONMENT 
 
              DEMANDS                                                                                      DECISIONS 
               SUPPORT                                                                                        POLICIES   
                                                                                                             ENVIRONMENT 
 
Figure 2.8.2: Primitive model of Political Systems- adapted from Easton (1957) pp 384. 
From the figure 2.8.2 above, ensues that the decisions and policies of a government 
depends on the demands of the people and their support to that government and that vary 
across countries according to the regional political system. Thus, a preliminary result which 
stems from the above is that the differences in the economies between countries may be 
partially associated with the differences of their political systems.   
                                                          
9
 The theory of systems was first developed by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1930s to simplify 
complex phenomena and make it more understandable for people. According to Bertalanffy a system is 
defined as a complex of elements in interaction in a meaningful way to accomplish an overall goal. 
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Economic growth is one of the most important characteristics in the modern world: 
the level of wealth is changing which in turn changes communities and societies as a 
whole. For example the world GDP per capita has increased six times from 1820 to 1992, 
from $695 to $5,145 (Maddison 1995). However, according to Temple (1998) the study of 
economic growth is a backwater in economics since a theory of capital has never been 
sufficiently developed and the most broadly accepted theory of economic growth is actually 
a non-theory of sustained growth and is based on the idea of diminishing returns. 
Two themes in the growth literature have got extensively attention: democracy or the 
regime type and political stability or the steadiness of the regime. Finding links between 
political regimes and economic growth among countries has been revived as a research 
topic in the last three decades. Few research issues in comparative politics and economic 
development studies have produced that much debate and scholarly concern. The result of 
this debate is the ‘broad and rather dispersed [existing] literature’ (Brunetti, 1997:163) and 
its contradictory results. However, a state’s economic growth is not a new concern in 
economic thought, since it goes back to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. Aristotle 
points out the importance of wealth as a factor which distinguishes the classification of 
regime types: ‘it is clear that the admixture of the two elements [wealth and virtue], that is 
to say, of the rich and poor, is to be called a polity or constitutional government’ (Aristotle, 
book four, Part VIII).  
Nevertheless, a characteristic that caught special attention, throughout the previous 
literature, was the stability of the political environment. At the most basic form, a political 
unstable environment, would increase uncertainty, by discouraging investment and in turn 
will hinder economic growth. Moreover, unlike dictatorships, democracies limit sovereign 
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prudence and political control and thereby more effectively promote economic growth. 
Thus, in the empirical spectrum variables such as political instability, political freedom and 
civil rights were included, as for a measure for political regimes, most of the empirical 
literature, uses democracy (a binary variable) or the level of a country’s democratization.  
To begin with, one must first define the concept of a political regime. Regime analysts 
(Jaguaribe, 1973; Linz, 1975; Anglade and Fortin, 1985; Calvert, 1987; Fishman, 1990; 
Munck, 1996; among others) define political regimes as the rules, whether formal or 
informal, which establish the number and type of actors who are authorized to get access at 
governmental positions and the methods to achieve it. In addition, the rules that are 
followed in the decision making area (by the government), the acceptance of these rules 
from the rest of political actors and the lack of refusal of these rules by any actor or interest 
group. Furthermore, a political regime has been analysed as a two dimensional concept – a 
procedural and a behavioural followed by secondary concepts –transitions and 
consolidations of regimes which serve to differentiate between problems of regime change 
and regime type (Munck, 1996). 
Both political scientists and economists have explored the link between political 
regimes and economic growth. However, they have often disagreed in their comparative 
findings. De Haan and Siermann (1995) noted that an explanation to the above issue lies on 
the relationship between a state’s political regime and its stage of economic growth.  On the 
one hand, political scientists have been interested in whether there are benefits of 
democracy or whether economic growth promotes democracy. Mixed results were the 
outcome of that research; Galenson, 1959; Huntington, 1968; Rao, 1984-5; argued that 
dictatorships are better promoters of economic growth through higher investment rates. 
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Haggard (1990) argue that dictatorships are better in terms of imports and trade in general, 
Hewlett (1980) argue that political stability can be obtained only under strict authoritarian 
regime (i.e. Brazil in 1960s) which stabilizes the economy.  
Furthermore, according to Feng (1996) three schools of thought exist in the study of 
democracy and growth. First, the conflict school which supports that democracy hinders 
economic growth, particularly in less developed countries (e.g., Johnson, 1964; Moore, 
1966; Gerschenkron, 1973; Huntington, 1987). Second the compatibility school of thought 
which argues that democracy enhances economic growth, (e.g., Smith, 1937; Hayek, 1944; 
Lipset, 1959; Friedman, 1961; Mises, 1981; Riker and Weimer, 1995). Finally, the 
skeptical school of thought exist which supports that there is no systematic relationship 
between democracy and economic development (e.g., Pye, 1966; McKinlay and Cohan, 
1975).   
Przeworski et al.’s (2000) understanding of economic well-being was in terms of 
economic growth rates, investment, productivity, population growth, birth and death rates 
and per capita income. They treated the relationship between economic growth and political 
regimes as a tricky one with no concrete links. Przeworski et al (2000) argue that the actual 
relation, between the regime type and growth, relies on the duration or the survival or the 
regime. According to Przeworski et al (2000), democracy is not a precondition to economic 
growth but growth helps democracies to survive for a longer period. The best predictor, -
whether a democratic regime will survive or not- is per capita income but even high per 
capita income does not guarantee that democracy will emerge in a country.  
Furthermore, Gerring et al (2005) noted that rich countries became rich under 
authoritarian regimes. Their findings show that the regime type and its effects on growth 
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depend on a country’s political historical experience: the political stock helps the regime 
type’s effects. 
Contrary to the above results, another group of researchers argue that democracy is a 
better promoter of growth since protection of civil and property rights can be obtained only 
under democracy. North (1990) and Olson (1999) argue that only a democratic government 
can achieve policies in the interest of the whole population. Furthermore, democracy 
enables the election of politicians since there is the possibility of voting thus politicians are 
accountable for their actions and policies.  
On the other hand, economists investigated whether democracy promotes economic 
growth. A number of empirical papers produced also mixed results (i.e. previous 
quantitative studies that were reviewed by Kurzman et al (2002) nineteen found positive 
relationship between democracy and growth, six found a negative one and ten stated no 
significant relationship). 
Scholars such as Friedman (1961), and Scully (1988), argue that democracies better 
promote growth since they provide political and civil freedoms and rights. In contrast, 
Kormedi and Meguire (1985), found a negative relationship between political freedom and 
growth and Barro (1994) note that more political freedom provides a greater role for 
interest groups in the legislative process thus hinders growth. Furthermore, Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995) give an overview of the evidence that democratic nations provide the 
necessary encouragements for economic improvement; Plumper and Martin (2003) discuss 
under a theoretical basis the relationship between the level of democracy and economic 
performance. Lensink, Hermes and Murinde (2000) find robust evidence that political risk 
may direct developing countries to capital fight which negatively affects economic growth 
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by removing essential capital from the national economy. Developing countries suffer 
particularly from poor governance and social and political instability; under these 
conditions the prospects for improved economic performance are relatively bleak.  
Nevertheless, most of the past studies (i.e Pourgerami (1988), London and Williams 
(1990), McMillan et al (1993), Bhalla (1994), Leblang (1997), among others) document the 
fact that a state’s political regime should be democratic in order to establish a strong 
economic performance (i.e. to be promoted through democratic institutions). However, the 
debate arrived at a dead end during the last two decades and a contradictory fact arose even 
though many countries are democratic: the democratic regimes ‘fail[ed] to support 
economic growth’ (Brunetti, 1997: 164). Maybe, a stronger veil would be better suited than 
the democratic one to manage and confront the rapid industrialization and economic 
growth. 
 
2.9 The end of Democracy? 
"A democracy is always temporary in nature; it simply cannot exist as a permanent 
form of government. A democracy will continue to exist up until the time that voters 
discover that they can vote themselves generous gifts from the public treasury. 
From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates who promise 
the most benefits from the public treasury, with the result that every democracy will 
finally collapse over loose fiscal policy, (which is) always followed by a 
dictatorship." 
"…The average age of the world's greatest civilizations from the beginning of 
history, has been about 200 years. During those 200 years, these nations always 
progressed through the following sequence: 
From bondage to spiritual faith; from spiritual faith to great courage; from 
courage to liberty; from liberty to abundance; from abundance to complacency; 
from complacency to apathy; from apathy to dependence; from dependence back 
into bondage…" 
‘Why Democracies Fail? December 9, 1951, page 12A, The Daily Oklahoman’ 
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Almost 250 years ago Alexander Tytler predicted the fall of democracy. Through the above 
sequence which is known as the ‘Tytler’s cycle’, he predicted the end of the democratic 
ideas.  According to Tytler democracies cannot survive beyond 200 years. Two of the 
major reasons that explain the democratic failure are: first, democracies generally progress 
through an initial period from repression to spiritual faith increasing to the point where the 
citizenry is completely reliant to the government to where they relapse back to repression. 
Second, once the democracy achieves prosperity, citizens vote their representatives 
according to the expected payback of generous rewards from the civic funds. Thus, the 
society lives in a vicious cycle starting with no freedoms and repression and ending up to 
where they started. Below is the Tytler cycle:  
 
Figure 2.9.1: The Tytler Cycle 
 
Since the time of Adam Smith peoples demands for redistribution of wealth were easier to 
cope in democratic nations. However, redistribution reduces wealth with a result of 
democratic nations to have slower growth rates than non-democratic ones (e.g. the example 
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of the Asian Tigers). According to previous research (Alessina and Rodric, 1994; Persson 
and Tabelini, 1994 among others) inequality hampers economic growth because a 
democratic government will relocate its resources from investment to consumption to 
hinder inequality and that will slow down growth. Olson (1982) metaphorically speaking, 
describes democracies as regimes with sclerosis since eventually interest groups will 
misuse political activities to gain rents and that will reduce growth. Nordhaus (1975) 
highlights that the democratic competition among politicians leads to manipulation of 
growth rates to size power which eventually destroys the economy and sometimes the 
effects are irreversible.  In short, many scholars developed explanations to clarify the 
destructive effects of democracy on economic growth.  
 Furthermore, Popper described democracy as the political system which ‘comes and 
go in the course of history’ (1945: 12). The above illustration highlights the fact that the 
democratic systems are not able to be permanent. Popper (1945) argues, in order to explain 
the reason behind the temporary format of democracy, that the main reason is that 
democracy is forced to copy the totalitarian methods so as to fight it and eventually 
becomes totalitarian itself.   
 However, the entire above arguments look like prophecies with black future 
predictions. The truth is that prophecies are entirely beyond the scope of a scientific 
method. People’s attitude and the development of the civilization is based on the need to 
either follow a leader or become the leader with a passive attitude sometimes to forces, 
personal or anonymous that rules the society (Popper, 1945). The stability and the 
resolution of conflicts can happen peacefully only under the democratic rule. Democracies 
provide the institutional framework that permits to reform without violence and deals with 
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political affairs in a reasonable way. Democracy does not exist and never existed is the 
general conclusion by the previous philosophical debates. A lot of debate and so much 
research though, for something that does not exist. Democracy, as a form of government 
was judged by many and as stems from above the evidences is always ambiguous.  
However, the democratic institutional format is not what someone needs to investigate and 
analyze but rather the ‘tyranny of the petty officials’ as Popper (1945) put it. The main 
topic which many times remain out of the research is not what democracy is but how a state 
is been governed and what is the behavior of the state’s rulers.  
   
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
In the 1980s, the public choice theory expanded thematically to other issues such as 
the conditions under which a state promotes growth. The analysis of the institutional 
formation and the growth theory became of great importance resulting to the birth of 
political economics or new political economics (Grochová and Kouba, 2010). Whether the 
political regime type plays any role on economic growth has been an interesting research 
topic for many years. That topic was not only discussed within the new political economics 
research but it debated among economists as well. The importance of the above relationship 
was particularly topical because of the geopolitical changes that were connected with the 
break-up of the former Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall and with follow-up in political 
and socio-economic transformation of Eastern European countries. 
 However, the previous literature showed serious bottlenecks as to whether there are 
positive, negative or no effects of political regimes on economic growth and vice versa. 
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Beyond the methodological problems, which were highlighted above, in the previous 
literature the inconclusiveness of the above relationship might lie also to the restriction of 
the research within contemporary economics.  This chapter analysed the political features 
of the above debate by following the political economics approach.  
A well documented finding that beyond any possible explanation that has been given 
in the past, concerning economic growth, is that the differences in the wealth of nations 
may also lie on the variation and the quality of the governmental economic policies. Even 
though a lot have been written about democracy, its notion, and its effects, the problem 
with it does not stem from the democratic ideology or the ideals that represents but rather 
the misusage of the democratic institutions from its followers for personal interests or their 
desire for power. Historically, that was always the problem: it is not about the symbol of 
democracy as a form of government but rather how democratic representatives used its 
concepts to promote individual interests and strain responsibilities. Thus, the ambiguous 
concept is that of misruling and exploitation of democracy and not democracy per se.  A 
solution to the problem might be given by the neglected public choice models, the king and 
council format of government which divides the policymaking authority between a king 
(chief, president, dictator, etc.) with a council (council of wise men, cabinet, parliament, 
etc.). As for the black prophecies related to the end of democracy that is for the future to 
prove whether they are true.  
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THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL REGIMES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A LONGITUDINAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
What is the effect of political regime type on economic growth in a country? Few 
questions in the post Cold War era have engaged politicians, policy makers and economists 
with such intensity except the empirical evidence appear to be ambivalent. In particular, 
which regime better promotes economic well-being is still ambiguous. Some scholars
10
 
argue that authoritarian rule is more conducive to economic development than democracy. 
The example of East Asia is often mentioned, with tight control of the labor force, 
prioritization of long term savings and investment over current consumption, and resistance 
to the strains and pressures of different interest groups. Others argue
11
, instead, that 
democratic rule is a prerequisite for economic growth because it secures property, political 
and individual rights, enhances civil participation, redistributes economic resources and 
fosters governmental transparency. The differing opinions might well reflect the fact that 
there are different kinds of democracy, and that the impact of political regimes on 
economic growth is different in the long run than in the short run.  With the multitude of 
findings in a continuous debate, the median findings are null results.
12
 Consequently, the 
question about the relationship between political regimes and economic growth remains a 
                                                          
10 See for example Dick, 1974; Olson, 1982; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005; Yang, 2006; (among 
others).  
11
 See for example Barkhart and Beck, 1994; Rodric, 2000; among others.  
12 The relevant literature has been reviewed by Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Kurzman et al, 2002; etc. The 
above reviews conclude in their findings that there is almost the same amount of studies which either favours 
democratic or authoritarian regimes as promoter of economic growth.  
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riddle; does regime type matter for growth and if it does, which regime type better 
promotes economic growth? The result of the above debate is the wide existing literature 
and its contradictory outcomes. What is the actual relationship between political regimes 
and economic growth with regards to the countries in this study? The answer forms the 
main objective of the current chapter. Furthermore too little attention was paid to national 
factors such as social structure and the implementing governmental policies
13
, since 
economics were not dealing with national specificities (Gourevitch, 2008). It is, though, the 
social and the political structure which affects growth in the long –run. Consequently, in 
contemporary theory, the research of politics and in particular the regime type per se in 
comparison to economic growth is essential.  
This thesis adopts the political perspective of a political regime (analysed in the 
introduction chapter). Thus, political regimes are the rules, whether formal or informal, 
which establish the number and type of actors who are authorized to get access at 
governmental positions and the methods to achieve it. In addition, the rules that are 
followed in the decision making area (by the government), the acceptance of these rules 
from the rest of political actors and the lack of refusal of these rules by any actor or interest 
group. A political regime has been analysed as a two dimensional concept – a procedural 
and a behavioural – followed by secondary concepts such as transitions and consolidations 
of regimes which serve to differentiate between problems of regime change and regime 
type (Munck, 1996). Here, it is the procedural type perspective (i.e. stable or unstable, 
legislative or not, etc.) that it will be followed to investigate its impact on economic 
                                                          
13
 When a government is on power they get the opportunity to change or establish the social and economic 
policies. According to Miljkovic and Rimal (2008), the above policies are compatible with the government’s 
interests, views and values and in turn that strategy influences the social welfare.  
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growth.  On line with the previous research, the current one sheds further light on the 
existing debate of regime/growth analysis, dealing especially with the effects of the 
political regimes per se on economic growth in 20 Western European countries
14
. 
Additionally, insights will be given, on the way that the above impact is structured by 
making an argument of what type of political regime is ‘better’ (since it is still an ongoing 
debate concerning the regime effect on growth
15
). What distinguishes this chapter from 
previous studies in the area, are the variables employed (especially the regime type), the 
notion of the political system (regimes per se), the sample used (European and peripheral 
countries) and the methodology applied (fixed effects estimation). In particular, the above 
relationship will be examined by adopting, firstly, multiple measures of government 
performance
16
. Secondly, alternative measures of regime types will be used, in addition to 
the variable that most researchers used in the past, the Polity2
17
 index. The structure of the 
rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the following part discusses the existing studies 
and arguments, following by the methodology employed and finally, the findings and 
conclusions. 
 
3.2 Existing Arguments  
A numerous studies exist, concerning political regimes and economic growth which 
support either positive, negative or no relationship at all between the above. Both political 
                                                          
14
 The countries that included in this chapter are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany 
(West Germany before the 1990), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom.  
15
 Przeworski and Limongi state that ‘all we can offer at this moment are some educated guesses’ (1993: 64). 
16
 E.g. Gerring et al. (2005) examined the regime type but used democracy as a stock variable which 
according to the same authors it measures the time that a country is autonomous.   
17
 The Polity2 variable from the Polity IV project-Polity IV data set - is the most common measure of a 
country’s political regime. 
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scientists and economists have been interested in whether there are benefits of democracy 
or whether economic growth promotes democracy and not the other way round. Mixed 
results were the outcome of that research.  
Huntington (1968) and Rao (1984) argue that dictatorships promote economic growth 
through higher investment rates. Haggard (1990) argues that dictatorships are better in 
terms of imports and trade in general. Hewlett (1980) suggests that political stability can be 
obtained only under strict authoritarian regime (i.e. Brazil in 1960s) which in turn stabilizes 
the economy. De Haan and Siermann (1995) note that further explanations to the above 
issue lie on the relationship between a state’s political regime and its stage of economic 
growth. It is better for one to concentrate on specific policies and the institutional activities 
that govern both the private and the public decision making areas. Subsequently, they 
conducted a sensitivity analysis and conclude that irrespective of a significant relationship 
between two variables the link between democracy and economic growth is not robust. 
Przeworski et al. (2000) measures the economic well being by means of economic 
growth rates, investment, productivity, population growth, birth and death rates and per 
capita income. They argue that a mutual relationship exists, between the regime type and 
growth, and that relationship depends on the duration or the survival of the regime. 
According to Przeworski et al (2000), democracy is not a precondition for economic 
growth but, rather, growth might help democracies to survive for a longer period. The best 
indicator to predict a democracy’s survival is per capita income but even high per capita 
income does not guarantee that democracy will emerge in a country. Furthermore, Gerring 
et al (2005) note that rich countries became rich under authoritarian regimes. Their findings 
show that the regime type and its effects to growth depend on a country’s political 
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historical experience: the political stock helps the regime type’s effects. Contrary to the 
above results, another group of researchers argues that democracy fosters growth since the 
protection of civil and property rights can be ensured only under democracy. North (1990) 
and Olson (2000) thus argue that only a democratic government would implement policies 
in the interest of the whole population. Friedman (1962), and Scully (1988), similarly, 
argue that democracies better promote growth since they provide political and civil 
freedoms and rights. 
The empirical evidence, on the relationship between democracy and growth, is mixed: 
in a review study made by Kurzman et al (2002), nineteen studies found a positive 
relationship, six found a negative one and ten stated no significant relationship). Kormendi 
and Meguire (1985), find a negative relationship between political freedom and growth. 
Barro (1994) notes that when political freedom exists in the political system and that 
freedom is promoted through the legislative process then the levels of growth are increased. 
Furthermore, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) give an overview of the evidence that 
democratic nations provide the necessary encouragements for economic improvement. 
Lensink et al. (2000) suggest that political risk may cause capital fight in developing 
countries which negatively affects economic growth by removing essential capital from the 
national economy. Developing countries suffering particularly from poor governance and 
socio-political instability; under these conditions the prospects for improved economic 
performance are relatively bleak. Observing the mixture of the past empirical results, Sloan 
and Tedin (1987) note that the divergences stem from weaknesses in methodology. Those 
weaknesses, according to Sloan and Tedin, are related to the investigation ‘at only a narrow 
range of policies’ (1987, p.99). Person and Tabellini (1992) state that growth can be 
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understood through governmental policies; in other words, economic growth is the outcome 
of the governmental policies and governmental intervention across countries and time. 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) argue that political regimes affect growth through their 
stances on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of 
dictators. Moreover, Brunetti (1997) surveyed the existing literature of the above 
relationship and highlights the importance of governmental stability, political violence and 
policy volatility (beyond democracy as a unique parameter to measure regimes) in order to 
measure the impact and the stability of political regimes on economic growth. 
Nevertheless, despite the continuous debate and the mixture of the existing findings, it is 
now generally recognised, that political and governance structures can play a leading role 
in economic performance. 
3.3 Data and Methodology  
3.3.1 Model specification 
The relationship between political regimes and economic growth can be tested in many 
ways. As a starting point of analysis, this chapter will use the panel regression framework. 
An important advantage of using panel data is that it allows controlling for individual 
(unobserved) effects (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). 
A panel has the form: Xit,           i=1,2,3..., N ;     t=1,2,3...T  
Where i denote entities (e.g. countries, companies, etc.) and t denotes time (e.g. months, 
years, etc).  A general panel data regression model can be: 
yit = α + β' Xit + uit                                      (1) 
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For (1) and its exact structure different assumptions can be made. Two important models 
though are the fixed effects (FE) model and the random effects (RE) model. The fixed 
effect model represented, according to Hsiao (2003), as: 
yit = α + β' Xit + uit                                      (2) 
     uit = μi + νit                                                (3) 
Where a is the intercept vector and it capture any combination of time-invariant variables 
that have been omitted (known or unknown); Xit contains K regressors for unit i at time t;  
vector β contains K regression coefficients to be estimated; μi indicate the individual –
specific, time –invariant effects (for example in a panel of countries this could include 
climate). The basic assumption
18
 of the FE model according to Green (1992) is:  
E(εit) = 0,   Cov(εit , εjt ) = 0,    Var(εit) =  E(ε
2
it) = σ
2
e  
The RE model is represented according to Green (1992), as: 
Yit =  + β' Xit + ui + it                                           (4) 
With assumptions  
E (ui)= 0 and Var(ui) = u
2
  
Cov( it, ui) = 0  
Var( it + ui) =  
2
 + u
2
  =  
2
  
Corr( it + ui, is + ui) =  =  u
2
/(
2
 + u
2
) 
That is: 
 μi  ~ i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
μ)  and νit ~ i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
ν)  which denotes that the two error components 
are independent from each other.  
To choose the appropriate model (FE vs RE) the Hausman Test should be contacted where 
the null hypothesis is that the chosen model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed 
                                                          
18
 Under that assumption the OLS estimator can be used to obtain BLUE parameter estimates.  
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effects (Greene, 2008). It essentially tests whether the errors (ui) are correlated with the 
regressors, and the null hypothesis is they are not. 
In the current chapter, the Hausman Test rejects the null hypothesis of random effects, 
therefore, the FE model is the appropriate model to use in the current chapter’ s empirical 
analysis (table 3.4.1). 
 A country’s political institutions may affect almost all factors that contribute to growth 
(determinants of growth i.e. investment, regulation, technology etc.) through their policies, 
which limits the theoretical field of vision.  In fact, there has been a shift over the last two 
decades from an exclusive focus on physical capital, towards factors such as human capital, 
social capital, and institutions, the last of which might be referred to as political capital 
which reinforces this conclusion (Grier and Munger, 2006). Since government policy 
directly affects the above factors, it stands to reason that regime type might have important 
effects on aggregate growth. The methodology integrated here measures the marginal 
impact of political regime, by estimating panel regressions with the regime type variables
19
. 
Alongside other explanatory variables included, through fixed effects
20
 estimations. Biased 
results in previous literature regressions stem mostly from country specific effects and 
historical factors and that seems to influence both economic and political development 
(Pinho and Madaleno, 2009).   The main variables used in the empirical analysis are: GDP 
growth rates (annual data
21
) as the dependent variable, considering it as an objective 
measurement for a country’s economic performance. The set of the independent variables 
                                                          
19
  Polity2 as level for democracy will be used for robustness check.   
20
 Fixed effects will remove any bias in results if there is such a case in the sample chosen.  
21
 Previous research used both annual data and averages. This chapter uses annual data by following the 
recommendations made by Attanasio et al. (2000) who state that conventional averaging lead to a loss of 
observation among other reasons. 
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(also in annual data) includes: school enrolment
22
 as a proxy for the underlying human 
capital (we use the average years of schooling of population as has been suggested by 
Cohen and Soto, 2007), population growth rate, openness to trade (as a proxy for the 
importance of international factors to economic activities), inflation rate, governmental 
expenditures (general government expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product), 
and investment rates. Finally, into the analysis the initial level of GDP is included as a 
measure of economic development. The above variable is used to capture the convergence 
effect. In addition, by following Gupta’s (1990) classification, two indexes which capture 
the two main categories of political instability
23
 (similar indexes have been used by 
Alessina and Perroti, 1994; Brunetti, 1997; and Fedderke, 1998), will be included. Firstly, 
riots, political demonstrations, and general strikes, assassinations governmental crises, 
guerrilla warfare, coup d’états and purges, will be used, to capture the violent form of 
political instability. Secondly, governmental crisis, constitutional changes, cabinet changes 
and elections, will be used, to capture the nonviolent governmental turnover (durability and 
stability of a political regime). The type of political regime is been measured as a scale 
variable with 1 for the civilian regimes, 2 for military-civilian regimes and 3 for military 
regimes; the data are been taken from Banks International.  In short, both economic and 
political indicators, which were found to be significant determinants of economic growth in 
previous studies, will be combined so as to examine the link between political regime and 
economic growth in Western Europe. Furthermore, the economic data are from the Penn 
World Tables, the data for inflation are from the World Development Indicators, the 
                                                          
22
 i.e. Bils and Klenow, 1996; Barro, 1996; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Person and Tabelini, 1991b; 
Cohen and Soto, 2007; etc. 
23
 This research follows both the social unrest view of political stability and the legitimacy of the political 
system view. For more see Sanders (1981). 
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average years of Schooling are from Cohen and Soto (2001) and the political indicators are 
from Banks International (2008). To examine the effect of the different political regimes on 
economic growth the estimation model can be expressed as follows
24
: 
 
                  (5)                                                                                                                     
 
Where i indexes countries and t years; a is the constant term; git denotes the growth rate in 
real GDP per capita of a country i at time t; gt-1 denotes the logarithm of GDPt-1, pit denotes 
the logarithm of population, sit denotes the logarithm of governmental expenditures, giit 
indicates the logarithm of governmental investment, tit indicates the logarithm of trade 
openness, rit stands for the inflation rates, zit denotes the average years of schooling, bit 
denotes the index for Political instability and hit stands for Governmental changes 
(constructed by PCA: assassinations, general strikes, constitutional changes and legislative 
elections were used alternatively for robustness check in models II and III); mit indicates 
the Regime type variable which is a dummy with values of 1 for civilian regimes and 0 
otherwise (and polity2 used in regressions III and IV for robustness test); εit is the error 
term that captures random shocks on growth over the years; and β, γ, θ, κ, λ, ξ, π, φ, ψ, ω, 
are the coefficients. The above specification combines major neoclassical determinants of 
growth with political variables. Furthermore, in the data set, there are 20 countries
25
 over 
the period of 1950-2004. 
                                                          
24
 De Haan (2007) notices that economic theory does not provide any standard guidance in order to choose the 
appropriate empirical growth model. This means that growth theories are unlimited which means that the 
validity of one theoretical model does not mean the falsity of another.   
25 This chapter will limit the research to 20 European countries which will help firstly with the missing data 
problem (i.e oil-exported countries have only available data referred to 1980 prices which does not reflect the 
prices in earlier years, post communistic countries only have date since 1990) and secondly, to control the 
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3.3.2 Construction of the series  
The series were constructed based on the Hall and Jones (1999) approach which is based on 
the Cobb-Douglas approach for the decomposition of output. According to Hall and Jones 
(1999) the production of Y output is been given by: 
Yi= Ki
α
 (ΑiΗi)
 1-α 
                                                                                                 (6) 
Where K denotes the stock of physical capital, A is a labour –augmenting measure for 
productivity, and H is the amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production. 
Finally, the factor share α is assumed to be constant across countries. 
The series of the stock of physical capital K, are constructed based on Aisen and Veiga 
(2010) and is given by: 
Kt =It + (1-δ) Kt-1                                                                                                   (7) 
Where It is real aggregate investment in at time t, and δ is the depreciation rate.  
The amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production, Hi, is given by: 
Hi = e
φ(si)
Li                                                                                                         (8) 
Where si : the average years of schooling in the population over 25 years old (which was 
taken from Cohen and Soto, 2006). Li is the number of workers (labor force in use). φ (.) is 
the returns to schooling. These returns to schooling are based on microeconomic evidence 
reported in Hall and Jones (1999) and assumed equal across countries. The above equation 
(1) can be rewritten as: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
discrepancies in economic growth levels that exist between countries (and continents). Thus, the focus on 
Western countries is being based mostly on a homogeneous sample (i.e. a group of relatively rich countries 
with almost generally similar levels of income per capita) but still heterogeneous sample, in terms of culture 
and history.  The observations/countries should be drawn from a single population otherwise the statistical 
basis upon which researchers draw inferences may be in doubt (Levine and Zervos, 1993). Eventually, 
Western Europe considered being a democratic and political stable area which motivated this research to 
check the robustness of those claims.  
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yi = ( Ki/Yi) 
α/1-α
 hi Ai                                                                                               (9)   
where h = H/L is human capital per worker.  
 Equation (4) further can be expressed as: 
y = kα (Ah) 1-α                                                                                                    (10) 
Where y is real GDP per capita, k denotes the stock of physical capital per capita, A is TFP, 
and h is the amount of human capital per capita. (5) can be expressed further in growth 
rates as:  Δyi = αΔki + (1-α)ΔAi + (1-α)Δhi                                                                                                (11) 
 
3.3.3 Panel Unit root Tests 
Before continue into the results, a last test
26
 should be done concerning the presence of unit 
roots in the data (non-stationarity).  
Pesaran (2007) recommends a method to eliminate the influence of cross-sectional 
dependence, which involves augmenting standard ADF regressions with the cross-section 
averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series which enables us to 
account for heterogeneous cross section dependence in a novel way. 
By following Pesaran (2007), we run a pesaran test which presumes that all series are non-
stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that only a fraction of the series 
in the panel is stationary. Pesaran’s test for cross –section dependence performed shown 
that p=0.000 which rejects the null hypothesis (Ho: cross-section independence). 
  Other panel unit root tests like The Fisher test, developed by Maddala and Wu 
(1999) as an improvement of the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test, runs individual tests but 
                                                          
26
 The panel unit root test was conducted also for the data in chapter IV and the results can be found in 
appendix VI.  
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then combines their significance with a Fisher test. Hence, it does not require a balanced 
data. The Fisher test of Maddala and Wu (1999) and the IPS test of Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) are directly comparable. Furthermore, Banerjee et al. (2005), note that in the 
presence of cross-section dependence, first-generation tests tend to have serious size 
distortions and therefore perform poorly. The above often directs to the over-rejection of 
the null hypothesis (unit root) when the sources of non-stationarity are common across 
individuals. Some cross-sectional dependence tests include Pesaran (2004) and a Breusch-
Pagan LM statistic (for T>N) (second generation tests). The Pesaran (2007) test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis in 11 indicators in the following two chapters which might be due 
to using linear unit root tests
27.  That is true since by using the Maddala and Wu’s (1999) 
Fisher test the variables are stationary
28
. 
Furthermore, the t-bar statistic (CIPS) can only be computed for balanced panels. For 
unbalanced panels, the modified Z test can be reported. In our case, we always reject
29
 the 
null hypothesis of unit root. Therefore we conclude that there is no unit root in our panel
30
. 
Results are shown in appendix VI.   
Finally, a few other tests were proposed for panel data (e.g. by Maddala and Wu 
(1999) Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) known as first 
generation tests). However, the above tests fit only balanced data with the same number of 
observations per unit (with the exception of Maddala and Wu (1999)) which does not apply 
in the case of these chapters.  
                                                          
27
 In general, the evidence from panel unit root tests with cross dependence are inconclusive. 
28
 Another possibility might be the presence of structural breaks in some of the series which might lead to 
misinterpreat the mean stationarity with structural breaks, as a unit root. The above should be taken into 
account in future research and panel unit root tests should be incorporated.  
29
 In the case where we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the panel unit roots in the levels of the variables, 
then cointegration panel tests need to be preformed. This is a pre-condition for panel cointegration test. 
30
 The same conclusion applies in chapter IV.  
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3.4 Estimation of the model 
The political variables included in the current analysis reflect both the violent and the 
non violent changes in a political environment (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Brunetti, 1997; 
Fedderke, 1998; Campos and Karanasos, 2008). To avoid the presence of multicollinearity 
principal
 31
 components analysis was contacted which is a statistical technique that linearly 
transforms a broad set of variables correlated with each other into a smaller set of 
uncorrelated and linearly independent variables
32
. The components that stem from PCA 
were selected so that to satisfy two conditions: firstly, the components are orthogonal 
(uncorrelated) and secondly, the first component absorbs and accounts for the maximum 
possible amount of the total variation in the set of the variables the second component 
absorbs the maximum of the remaining variation, and so on
33
.The new
34
 variable (we 
denote it political instability -regime threatening political instability) includes indicators 
that capture violent forms of political protest and social aggression. However, a significant 
disadvantage of PCA components is that the interpretation of the analysis (especially the 
explanation of the coefficients of the PCA components) might be more difficult since we 
are no longer working with the original variables and there might be an effect by their 
‘scaling’. A simple way to avoid the above problem and at the same time to carry out a 
sensitivity test is to check some of the original variables (we have chosen assassinations, 
legislative elections, general strikes, constitutional changes for the current tests) and their 
                                                          
31
 The indicators used for constructing the indexes of political instability are one of the characteristics that 
make this chapter differ from the rest of the previous literature. 
32
 PCA analysis is shown in Appendix II.  
33
 According to Jackson (1991) a ‘rule of thumb’ based on correlations is to observe the screeplot after 
conducting PCA, and accept the components with eigenvalues bigger than 1 (which are worth interpreting) 
34
 Sensitivity analysis has been obtained in order to check if the original variables (the ones that have been 
used in constructing the indexes of political instability) change the results or not and the results were the 
same. 
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effects on economic growth. The selection of the above variables follows the 
recommendations done by Campos and Karanasos (2008). The analysis is carried out as 
fixed-effects panel regression, based on the outcome of the Hausman Test. A significant 
result which appears is that both regime type 1 (=civilian regimes) and polity2 variable 
have negative coefficients, once fixed effects are considered, and the level of GDP per 
capita is included into the analysis. Therefore, the results point out that there is a causal 
relationship between political regimes and economic growth. The results are presented in 
Table 3.4.1.  
To begin with, government expenditures (i.e. on production of public goods such as 
public infrastructure, education etc.) are contributing positive to economic growth. This 
positive effect is in line with the previous literature
35
. The positive significant effect of 
governmental expenditure denotes the quality and productive activities that governments 
formulate through their policies.  Investment has also a positive effect on growth and that 
makes the results consistent with the previous literature
36
 . However, in the current case, the 
above effect is insignificant. Openness to trade
37
 positively and strongly affects growth. 
Finally, there is a positive and insignificant correlation between the population growth rates 
and economic growth when the human capita proxy is not included into the regression, 
although this effect is at best marginally significant. The human capital proxy, average 
years of schooling, has an insignificant and positive impact on economic growth (consistent 
with Cohen and Soto, 2001, and Psacharopoulos, 2001). Most of the past literature reports 
positive effects of the average years of schooling on economic growth. However, the above 
                                                          
35
 See Folster, and Henrekson, 2001; Barro, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Gwardney et al, 1998.  
36
 See Ghali, 1998; Afonso and Furseri, 2008 among others. 
37
 Exports plus imports divided by GDP denotes the impact of globalization.  
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effects are insignificant. That means that the effects of democratization are not been 
obtained through human capital. Moreover, the initial level of GDP per capita is used in 
accordance with the b-convergence hypothesis
38
. The negative and significant coefficient of 
GDP per capita supports the income convergence hypothesis among the sample countries
39
. 
In addition to straight usage of proxies there also have been employed principal 
components as a mean to discover unobserved common factors in the analysis such as 
instability. Political instability indicators such as riots, strikes, assassinations and 
antigovernment demonstrations were reported by previous researchers and the current one, 
that have a negative effect on growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Brunetti, 1997; Campos 
and Karanasos, 2008). The Political instability disrupts economic activities in less 
productive actions by relocating resources to military or other non economic productive 
sources. However, the impacts of both violent and non violent political instability 
indicators remain insignificant for the current sample. The main reason for the insignificant 
effect of political instability is that the investigating countries had sound macroeconomic 
policies and invigorating institutions that withstood the impact of instability. The fact that 
the non violent political instability remains significant and negative is consistent with the 
negative effect of civilian regime on growth. The possible explanation lies to the fact non-
violent instability may be rooted mainly in government corruption or dissatisfaction over 
the impact of economic reforms and market-based modernization, remuneration and 
productivity.  
 
                                                          
38
 See Solow 1956; Barro, 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; among others. 
39
 Actually the conditional convergence hypothesis is satisfied in this chapter, in which countries with lower 
starting initial GDP relative to the long run or the steady state position, have faster levels of economic well 
being.  
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Table 3.4.1 
 Estimation Results -Western Europe 1950-2004 
Dependent variable 
gi 
1 
(civilian regime) 
2 
(civilian regime) 
3 
(polity2) 
4 
(polity2) 
g t-1 
 
-5.12 
(-4.43)* 
-4.95 
(-4.36)* 
-4.89 
(-4.35)* 
-5.05 
(-4.38)* 
pit 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.15 
(1.03) 
0.18 
(1.23) 
0.18 
(1.25) 
sit 
 
0.15 
(2.27)* 
0.15 
(2.26)* 
0.09 
(1.35) 
0.09 
(1.38) 
giit 
 
0.03 
(0.70) 
0.032 
(0.76) 
0.03 
(0.61) 
0.026 
(0.62) 
tit 
 
2.1 
(2.38)* 
2.15 
(2.44)* 
0.23 
(2.44)* 
2.20 
(2.43)* 
rit 
 -0.73 
(-5.13)* 
-0.71 
(-5.04)* 
-0.72 
(-5.20)* 
-0.72 
(-5.19)* 
zit 
 
1.70 
(0.71) 
1.40 
(0.61) 
1.68 
(0.78) 
1.87 
(0.83) 
bit 
 
-0.12 
(-1.06)   
-0.13 
(-1.15) 
hit 
 
-0.15 
(-1.39)   
-0.16 
(-1.47) 
AS 
 
-0.07 
(-0.64) 
-0.04 
(-0.36)  
GST 
 
-0.14 
(-0.93) 
-0.14 
(-0.93)  
CC 
 
-2.02 
(-2.00)* 
-2.01 
(-1.98)*  
LE 
 
-0.34 
(-1.48) 
-0.30 
(-1.31)  
mit 
 
-0.32 
(-2.35)* 
-2.67 
(-2.86)*   
POLITY2 
  
-0.15 
(-3.64)* 
-0.14 
(-3.52)* 
R
2
 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 
Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 
N 614 614 535 614 
*=5% significant   **= 1% significant ; z-values shown in parenthesis  
Economic variables are in natural logs. Δ=logt-logt-1 
yit = α + β Xit + uit; - Eu = 0 and varu = σ2 (uit =μi +νit ) (i = 1….20; t = 1…… 55) with all μi are 
fixed unknown values 
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As far as the impact that the regime type has on economic growth (direct effect of 
institutions), it is worth noticing, that the impact of the civilian regimes, on growth, is 
significant at 5% level and negative. This contrast with the previous literature which finds 
(especially Feng, 1995, who researched a sample of Latin American countries) that civilian 
regime tends to achieve higher economic growth rates. According to Feng (1995), a civilian 
government is in a better position to promote economic growth (i.e. by protecting property 
rights and civil liberties) than a military government.  Remmer (1990) finds that growth 
rates under democracy were higher than under autocracy, though the relationship is not 
statistically significant. Results show (tables 1) that once we control for fixed effects, 
democracy (civilian regimes and polity2) are negative to economic growth or else, 
democratic regimes slow economic growth. In models III and IV, the regime type 1 which 
captures civilian regime types was replaced by ‘polity2’, which is a combined variable40 
(ranging from -10 for fully autocratic to +10 fully democratic regimes). Table 1
41
 shows the 
results. Polity2’s coefficient is statistically significant and has a negative effect on 
economic growth which supports the previous results on civilian regimes. As has been 
stated above, the reason may be that governments subject to the electoral constraint are 
more likely to follow inefficient policies such as inadequate tax system, higher government 
                                                          
40 We cannot describe polity2 better that the codebook so we quote from it: ‘[polity2]… modifies the 
combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or ‘‘fix,’’ to convert instances of 
‘‘standardized authority scores’’ (i.e.,266, 277, and 288) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, 
210 to 110). The values have been converted according to the following rule set: 266 Cases of foreign 
‘‘interruption’’ are treated as ‘‘system missing.’’ 277 Cases of ‘‘interregnum’’ or anarchy, are converted to a 
‘‘neutral’’ Polity score of ‘‘0.’’ 288 Cases of ‘‘transition’’ are prorated across the span of the transition. (. . .) 
Ongoing (288) transitions in the most recent year (. . .) are converted to system missing values. Transitions 
(288) following a year of independence, interruption (266), or interregnum (277) are prorated from the value 
0 (Polity IV 2007, p.16). 
41
 Results have been obtained by considering dictatorial and military regimes and those show that actually non 
democratic regimes favour economic growth. Those results are available upon request.  
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consumption and accumulation of external depts. The above policies in turn affect 
adversely the long –run economic growth.  
The coefficient estimated for investment (sum of private and governmental), openness 
to trade, governmental expenditure, inflation and average years of schooling, indicators 
remain similar to and consistent with the previous results. The difference is that the effect 
of the governmental expenditure becomes insignificant. The indicators assassinations, 
general strikes, and elections are also negative and statistically insignificant which means 
that any attempt to revolt or show dissatisfaction against the governmental policies do not 
influence the economic performance. The only indicator which affects economic growth on 
the long run is ‘constitutional changes’ which denotes that the adoption of inefficient 
changes in the constitutional setting hampers economic growth. 
Conclusively, political regimes’ functioning (stable/unstable) affects economic growth, 
especially if measures of social instability (general strikes -non-violent) are taken into 
consideration. The non –violent political instability determines the functioning of the 
regime a great deal as has been mentioned above. Firstly, the lower the growth rate in a 
country the less possible it is to face irregular governmental changes since in most of these 
countries the legal system and socio-economic institutions are not well established 
(Miljokovic and Rimal, 2008). Secondly, the dissatisfaction of the citizens can be shown 
with non violent ways of demonstration and this in turn will lead to deteriorate growth. 
Since, a part of people’s constitutional/civil rights are the demonstration of any 
dissatisfaction against their government and their policies that leads to the exercise of these 
rights which decline the growth rates. Surprisingly, though, the functioning of the regime 
plays no role in Western Europe.  
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3.5 Concluding Remarks  
The role regime type plays in shaping economic growth has been an important research 
topic for the last five decades.  However, there is little consensus in the literature as to 
whether there are positive, negative or no effects at all. This chapter sheds some light on 
this debate by re-examining the direct effect of the political regime type on economic 
growth by taking into consideration the stability of those regimes. Beyond any possible 
explanation given in the past, the differences in the wealth of nations may also lie in the 
variation of socio-political instability among nations or the quality of the institutions that 
exist. Such socio-political instability generates uncertainties in a governmental system 
which in turn destabilizes its effectiveness. 
Since the empirical model controls for fixed effects, the trend in European countries 
show that democratic regimes decrease the national income per capita. Moreover, when the 
initial GDP per capita is integrated into the analysis, the results show that there is a causal 
relationship between democracy and income. The above is consistent with the previous 
literature (Rodrik, 1997; Gerring et al., 2005, among others). However, the causality runs 
one way, from economic growth to the regime type (that has been found after conducting 
the Granger causality test
42
). Even though, the causality issues have been addressed and 
lags have been included in the model, the results
43
 remained the same as above (table 1). 
Moreover, the empirical results corroborate the significance of regime type per se in 
explaining economic growth as the regime type affects negatively economic growth and 
that effect has no connection with the citizens’ discontent. It is generally accepted that 
political instability slows down economic growth which in a democratic state implies that 
                                                          
42
 The results for the granger test are available upon request.  
43
 The results are available upon request. 
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in order for governments to preserve their positions (duration) they should first develop the 
socio-economic interests of their citizens. Governments should adopt institutions which 
will initiate resolutions for any kind of civilian dissatisfaction.  
Furthermore, in the long run, a nation in order to improve its economic growth 
prospects should reduce any political uncertainty, construct policy consensus and reduce 
the government consumption. Political instability, violent or not, imposes limits on 
economic progress in general. Hence, governments which remain in office for a long period 
of time face pressures by interest groups which lead to adoption of policies that do not 
maximize social welfare (Olson, 1982). Thus, governmental changes increase the 
probability to establish constructive economic policies (i.e. long term governmental 
investment plans, reduction of taxation etc). Given the fact that the sample includes only 
European countries, which are considered politically stable and with high levels of income, 
the explanation buttresses the fact that in such a political environment it might take longer 
for democratic regimes to influence economic growth, since political institutions change 
very slowly. Democracy is a comfort to be enjoyed only by countries rich enough to afford 
it. Western European countries are rich enough and democratic at the same time. The issue 
that still remains puzzling is whether the democratic institutions survive in this region 
because of the high levels of income or not. Future research is required to that direction.   
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POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SOME FURTHER 
EVIDENCE FROM WESTERN EUROPE 
 
 ‘…Poor performance of the economy would lead to a focus on distributional issues 
and political instability; political instability would generate poor economic 
performance…’ 
 (Dennis C. Mueller, 1982: 159) 
4.1 Introduction 
What is the nature of the relationship between political instability and economic 
growth? This question has been the topic of continuous debate among economists, political 
scientists and politicians. It is widely accepted that there is a strong relationship between a 
country’s growth scheme and its political system since an economy is one of the 
subsystems (substitutes/ instances or levels) that combine the political system
44
. Both 
authoritarianism and democracy have a dependable influence on the speed of development 
in any country with politicians to dominate the fate of nations in many ways (i.e., the 
political decisions politicians adopt especially when they are in power). The economic 
growth scheme is the outcome of its political system
45
, which, in turn also determines its 
success or failure. 
Economic growth and its public improvement signify the welfare and success of a 
country’s economy and the political stability indicates the wellbeing of its political system. 
By looking at a country’s economy and politics a question which occurs is in relation to the 
role of its political institutions (in this chapter the political system substantiates a country’s 
                                                          
44
 More in the analysis of political system see: Poulanzas, 1974; Easton 1979; Easton, 1981.  
45
 That is the ‘destabilizing growth hypothesis’ (Peldam, 1996:171). 
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institutions) in the country’s economic well being. The essence of the above question lies to 
the type of the political institutions (democracy or dictatorship) which will determine its 
economic growth.  Thus, a generic view is that political stability of any form of government 
has to engage the stable understanding of the political essence of that form of government. 
Political instability (PI) is described by economists as a serious strife harmful to economic 
performance by limiting policymakers’ outlook which might lead to short term 
macroeconomic policies. Therefore, the political stability of a government does not mean, 
necessarily, the stability of the power of any civilian elected to rule any way he wants. 
The findings of previous studies suggest that economic growth and political instability 
are profoundly interrelated. On the one hand, the uncertainty associated with an unstable 
political environment may reduce investment (e.g., Schneider and Frey, 1985; Rodrik, 
1989; Barro, 1991a, b) or cause high levels of inflation (e. g. Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini, 1992) and as a result, decrease growth. On the other hand, poor economic 
performance may cause the government to fail (especially if the government is incompetent 
or corrupt) which in turn leads to political unrest.This chapter examines the relationship 
between political instability and economic growth in Western Europe
46
. It considers a 
number of controversial questions in the existing studies, such as the direction of causality 
and the measurement of political instability. On the direction of causality, this chapter 
considers two hypotheses, firstly, whether political instability affects economic growth 
negatively and secondly, whether the relationship between political instability and 
economic growth is in fact bidirectional. The data are from 20 countries across Western 
                                                          
46
 The sample of countries chosen are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West 
Germany before the 1990), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom.  
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Europe
47
 from 1950-2004. As for the measurement of political instability, this chapter 
provides an index
48
 of PI by combining multiple indicators that can be used to study the 
above relationship. In figure 4.1.1, the different violent dimensions of political instability 
are presented. 
 
Political instability (violence) 
 
 
     Violence against the 
regime 
(collective rebellion) 
 
 
     Violence by the regime 
 
 
 
                  Violence within 
the regime 
                 (elite violence) 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.1: Dimensions of Political Instability- adapted from Gupta (1990) pp 194. 
The indicators which used to create the index are measuring political instability along a 
number of different violent dimensions. Hence, principal components analysis is applied to 
                                                          
47
 The previous relevant literature deals only with developed countries which is a drawback in terms of 
generalizing any results to the whole world.  
48
 The index will explain more than a pattern of political instability by covering the whole field of violent PI 
and non violent or else governmental changes as they are proposed in the current chapter.  
Internal War 
Political executions 
Coups d’état  Attempted coups 
d’état  
Riots 
Political 
Strikes 
Political 
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Deaths  
Anomic 
violence 
Armed attacks Assassinations 
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build a measure of political instability that can be used as an alternative to the measures 
used in previous research. 
Political instability is a multidimensional concept that is difficult to be precisely 
captured with one variable. For instance, Zureiqat (2005) used only the polity2 
/democratization level indicator as a proxy for political instability. Furthermore, other 
research focused on examining the impact of political instability on economic growth in a 
heterogeneous group of countries. In contrast, this chapter extends the previous literature 
by developing a more advantageous index of political instability and investigates its 
application in the Western Europe
49
. Western Europe is an interesting region to study since 
it is considered to be both stable and wealthy (thus no unusually continual problems with 
instability). In addition, focusing on a small sample
50
 helps avoid potential problems with 
pooling data from a large set of very different countries
51
.  
The majority of the empirical literature related with the interactions between the 
political instability and economic growth is relatively recent, mainly because of an earlier 
lack of data on political instability. However, it is worth mentioning that this relationship 
attracted some attention already quite a few decades ago. Kuznets (1966), for instance, 
notes that low levels of economic growth can be expected under conditions of political 
disorder and especially in the wake of regime changes. Some of the studies which 
                                                          
49
 This chapter uses what Przeworski and Teyne(1970) describe as ‘most similar systems design’ or what 
Narol (1968) calls ‘concomitant variation’. This type of design opt the sample with as many similarities and 
as many features as possible (i.e. Western Europe with common values, ideas and history). That sample then 
constitute the best sample for comparative investigation.   
50 Following the recommendations made by Alptekin (2009: 24) ‘…research is necessary to investigate 
homogenous samples at regional or country level’. Additionally, the sample has been chosen according to the 
level of GDP in the sample countries. The research investigates the effects of political instability in Western 
European countries which considered been both political stable and developed.  
51
 Grier and Tullock (1989) and Block (2001) explain the importance of testing small number of countries 
into the same equation. 
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examined the relationship between the political instability and economic growth suggest a 
dual effect of political instability on the economic growth: a direct (e.g., Barro, 1991a, b; 
Levine and Renelt, 1992) and indirect one, with the later occurring through the adverse 
effect of political instability on the determinants of growth such as saving or investment 
(e.g., Barro, 1991a, b; Schneider and Frey, 1985), or through the so called ‘brain drain’52 
(e.g., Adebayo, 1985; Kwasi, 1992 etc). Another basic concern of this chapter is the 
direction of causality: whether a stable political environment leads to economic success or 
whether economic development forms the foundations of political stability.  
The primary result of this chapter is in support of the bi-directional causal argument, 
concerning the relationship between economic growth and political instability. Both a 
change tendency in a government and the political regime type reduce growth and in turn a 
low growth rate increases the tendency of a government change.   
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 discusses what political instability 
implies in the context of economic development. Section 3 reviews the theoretical 
framework and the previous literature on the relationship between political instability and 
economic growth. Section 4 discusses the theoretical models underlying this relationship 
and gives a description of the data used in this study. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results, and, finally, section 5 concludes this study and provides recommendations for 
further research. 
                                                          
52
 ‘Brain drain’ is the phenomenon of the ‘dramatic migration… of specialized human capital from 
developing [unstable] countries to the technological advanced [and more stable politically] countries’ 
(Adebayo, 1985: 37).  
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4.2 The puzzle of Political Instability 
 The research of the relationship between political instability and economic growth deals 
with two major issues. The first one relates with how to define political instability. Robock 
(1971) argues that PI is a phenomenon which depends on how it is defined. The second 
issue relates with the relationship between economic growth and political instability. Does 
economic growth lead to political stability or vice versa or the two phenomena happen 
simultaneously? To answer the above, research highlights two contradictory reacts. The 
first one notes that a boom in the economy generates high income for citizens which lead 
them to approve the government and that results to a stable political environment (good 
growth hypothesis) (Paldam, 1996). A second retort was that economic growth formulates a 
series of constrains such as complex changes in society and in turn changes and 
dissatisfaction of the political environment which leads to political instability (destabilizing 
growth hypothesis) (Paldam, 1996).  
 This chapter attempts to define the situation under which political instability result in 
increased political uncertainty in terms of constraints on economic growth and as extend in 
economic development. Political instability is a major source of constrains, changes and 
violence and as a result political uncertainty increases, which can handicap governmental 
ability in introducing economic policy for growth promotion.  
Kobrin (1977) asserts the significance of the condition under which political events 
result in constrains and destabilization of the political environment. However, not all 
political events or irregular changes in government result in constrains. Both Ake (1974) 
and Drew (1974) argue that PI relates to the behavior of the political actors in terms of 
realization, recognition and non violation of their interactional limits in a political 
96 
 
environment: PI is the notion of role expectations (Kobrin, 1977).  Furthermore, some 
violent political events might have different significance in different countries. For 
example, a coup d’état in one country might mean violent transfer of power and 
destabilization of the political environment whilst in another country it is a way of change 
the flow of events (i.e. military regimes in Greece). The above is a result of the political 
culture and history of a country.  
Any kind of destabilization or violent establishment of role expectations creates 
uncertainty in the political and socio-economic environment. Uncertainty, in turn, creates a 
situation that the economic outcomes cannot be predicted because of novelties. 
Modernization involves a complex pattern of socio-economic and political novelties. It 
involves the breakdown of traditional structures and changes in the society. According to 
Kobrin (1977) political modernization include the rationalization or centralization of 
power, the expansion of political perception to new social groups and the development of 
new political institutions. Modernization conveys changes which result on socio-economic 
and political novelties that increase uncertainty. Sometimes those novelties not even the 
government cannot affect or stop i.e. riots or antigovernment demonstrations which can 
disrupt the government itself. The government needs to limit violence and novelties but 
then again the problem of who governs turns up. If the governor is not subject to 
restrictions then it impounds the property of individuals. The above creates more 
dissatisfaction leading to political disorder and uncertainty which might change the regime 
in an unexpected way.  
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To sum up, political instability should not be considered a homogenous
53
 entity. Its 
form of expression matters a great deal especially in terms of uncertainty in the political 
and socio-economic environment.  
  
4.3 Existing Arguments  
Whilst researchers have from long documented the fact that there is a clear relationship 
between political instability and economic growth, the empirical understanding of this 
relationship remains inadequate. The previous literature is divided along many dimensions 
(the most prominent is reviewed below). Furthermore, there is a little agreement on the 
definitional and conceptual explanation of political instability and the empirical 
examination (e.g., direction of causality and the type of the data that can be used) over the 
past years. Another caution which needs to be taken is not to explicate political instability 
as an incident on its own but as a concept which determines the durability of a political 
system. So the question which still is debatable is whether political instability affects 
economic growth. In order to give a clear answer to the above question, we need first to 
integrate into our research one variable which captures all the dimensions of the 
governmental change (see figure 4.1.1 above).Secondly, we need to define political 
instability with its multidimentionality
54
. By following Alesina et al.’s (1992) study, this 
chapter identifies political instability
55
 as the tendency of the change in the executive (head 
                                                          
53
 That is the reason that PCA was chosen instead of factor analysis.  
54
 This chapter introduces an index of PI that captures a degree of uncertainty by including factors which 
imply the probability of regime change in an unexpected way. 
55
 Basic assumption is the internal novelties that lead to disruption and probable uncertainty.  
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of a state) either with constitutional or unconstitutional ways
56
. Political instability affects 
growth but that effect depends on the dimensions of it and those dimensions vary between 
the empirical literature (i.e. Pin (2009) reports 4 dimensions of PI; Morrison and Stevenson 
(1971) report 3 dimensions of PI, Sanders (1981) reports 2 dimensions of PI, etc.)  
The empirical research, in turn, is divided into many dimensions. The first fraction, in 
the previous literature, argues that political instability affects economic growth (either by 
causing slower or faster rates) (Campos and Nugent (2000)). The second one argues that 
economic growth causes political instability (Zablotsky (1996)), while a third one states 
that causality runs both ways (Alesina et al. (1992),).  In addition, the empirical research is 
also been divided according to different measurements of political instability that 
researchers have used. The previous research, also, varies with respect to the samples/ 
countries that different researchers study: i.e.  Alesina, et al. (1992) looked at a panel of 
113 countries, while Campos, Nugent and Robinson (1999) looked at countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa
57
. Both Alesina, et al. (1992) and de Haan and Siermann 
(1996), state that political instability causes slower economic development. Hence, both 
papers use GDP per capita (growth rates) as the dependent variable and government 
changes (one essential dimension) to measure political instability. The main difference 
between the two papers is in the way they count government changes. On the one hand, 
Alesina et al. (1992) average the government changes for each country over several years. 
Alesina et al.’s (1992) findings show that when there is a high rate of government changes 
then economic growth is significantly slow and vice versa.  On the other hand, De Haan 
                                                          
56
 In other words, PI (Political Instability) is the unsteadiness in governments, regime changes and the 
insecurity that the society receives out of these changes, in a nation or in a region.  
57 An advantage of a region-specific research is that it permits to use measures of political instability which fit 
in every region. 
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and Sierman (1996) use a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the number of 
government changes shifts exceeds seven and 1 otherwise (for the years 1963-1988 and a 
set of 97 countries). Their findings, thought, are questionable. The usage of a dual variable 
which determines differences in political instability within a large group of countries is 
inadequate. The above, is the results from different political ideals and cultural 
discrepancies among different continents, and that is possibly why De Haan and Sierman 
(1996) found an insignificant relationship between political instability and economic 
growth (with the exception of Africa).  Into the first school of thought, Campos and Nugent 
(2000) and Goldsmith (1987) test political instability against the economic well being (the 
growth rates of gross domestic product). Campos and Nugent (2000) constructed their own 
measures of political instability (by using indices to distinguish between mild and severe 
instability), whilst, Goldsmith (1987) uses a similar methodology with the difference that 
he included changes in stability between two different time periods. Moreover, Goldsmith 
(1987)  divided his chosen sample into four groups firstly, the Constantly Stable (countries 
that were stable in all time periods), Chronically Unstable (countries that were unstable in 
all time periods), Stabilizing (countries that became more stable in the later time period), 
and Destabilizing (countries that became less stable in the later time period, compared to 
earlier one). Both Campos and Nugent (2000) and Goldsmith (1987) found no statistically 
significant relationship between political instability and economic growth in the sample of 
countries they were investigated. Though, Campos and Nugent (2000) found a significant 
negative relationship between political instability and economic growth only in the African 
continent. 
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The second school of thought reports that economic growth causes political stability or 
instability according to its rates. Zablotsky (1996) proposed that slow economic growth 
causes political instability. He measured PI as the probability of occurrence of military 
coup d’états. His findings were consistent with his research question.  
The third dimension of the previous literature (as mentioned above), argues that 
causality in the relationship between political instability and economic growth runs both 
ways. Alesina et al. (1992) used a simultaneous equation model to address the issue of 
endogeneity. They also use the dimension of changes in the government to measure PI and 
tested it against GDP per capita, cabinet changes and a dummy variable to measure the 
democratic and nondemocratic countries. Alesina et al. (1992) concluded that economic 
growth and political instability are not only related but they are both endogenous, which 
means that neither of them can be taken as predetermined. Conclusively, they support the 
fact that the relationship runs both ways between PI and economic growth. 
On line to the last fraction in the previous literature, Gyinmah –Brempong and Traynor 
(1999) explore the relationship between political instability and economic growth in Least 
Developed Countries (LDC). They use the technique addressed by Alesina et al. (1992) but 
a broader measure of political instability than them, by including the channel of investment, 
to investigate the above relationship in Sub –Saharan African nations.  Their findings 
support the fact that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between political instability 
and economic growth. Beyond schools of thought into the literature, Kirmanoglu (2003) 
investigate the causality issue between political instability and economic growth (by using 
Granger -causality tests). Kirmanoglu (2003) includes an index of political freedom as his 
main measurement. In his findings there was no empirical significant relationship between 
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political instability and economic growth in 14 out of the 19 countries that he examined. 
Only in two countries Kirmanoglou (2003) reports that political stability actually increases 
economic growth whilst for the other countries (remaining 3), he reports that the causality 
runs in the opposite way (economic growth brings stability in a country. 
Additionally, Blanco and Grier (2009) investigate the essential sources of political 
instability in 18 Latin American countries from 1971-2000. They examine whether regime 
type, regime durability, factionalism, income inequality, ethnic diversity, ethnic 
discrimination, regional overflow effects, urban growth and other macroeconomic variables 
matter for instability. Their findings can be summarized as follows: firstly, democracy has a 
significant negative effect on instability that is robust to several alternative specifications; 
secondly, factionalized political systems experience higher instability; then, income 
inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and urban growth have important nonlinear effects on 
instability; and finally, among the macroeconomic variables they investigate, only openness 
to trade has a significant negative effect on instability. With the assumption of the one 
directional causality, Jong –A –Ping (2009) investigates the effects of political instability 
(by dividing it into 4 dimensions) on the long run economic growth, in 98 countries from 
1984-2003. His findings show that the different dimensions of political instability have 
different effects on economic growth. In addition, he examines the extent to which the 
different dimensions of political instability have on economic growth. He notes that 
political instability differs regionally. This study highlights the fact that political instability 
is a multidimensional phenomenon and that is how it should be treated by the researchers.  
To sum up, in the previous research, beyond differences in models, methodology, 
variations in the direction of causality and the measurement of political instability, one 
102 
 
expectation is apparent: there is a relationship between political instability and economic 
growth although this expectation has not been clear by empirical evidences in the context 
of the interrelation between the aforementioned variables. This failure motivates this study 
to further quantitatively investigate the issue.  
 
4.4 Method to approach the research 
When political instability and economic growth variables are interrelated with each 
other it is likely that estimation with the OLS will be biased. The problem of the 
endogeneity will be attempted to be solved by following Newey (1987).  With the 
aforementioned problem in mind an instrumental variable is constructed to replace the 
actual measure (index) of political instability in estimation in order to control of the effect 
of endogeneity. Furthermore, we use a set of instruments for the instrumental variable of 
political instability (equation 4), primarily on the basis on considerations advanced by 
Alesina and Perotti (1996), and Easterly (2007), and related to concepts brought forward in 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and by following Peldam’s (1996) 
recommendations of the four dimensions of political instability (PI). Then, the predicted 
values from this regression are used as an instrumental variable in our regressions (referred 
as ). 
Moreover, most empirical literature, on the effects of political instability on economic 
variables has used cross-sections of country-level data. Using a cross-section of countries, 
Alesina and Perotti (1996), and Venieris and Gupta (1986), note that political instability has 
a negative effect on investment and savings. Also by using a cross-section of countries, 
Alesina et al. (1996), Barro (1991), and Mauro (1995) argue that political instability has a 
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negative effect on economic growth. Furthermore, Alesina et al. (1992) highlights the 
possibility of joint endogeneity between political instability and economic growth and state 
that any researcher, who studies the above relationship, should take this into consideration. 
A question which arises at this point is whether political instability and economic growth 
have a reverse causation since political instability is not only a cause but also a result of 
economic variations, including growth, (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2001). Here, by 
following the general recommendations of Alesina et al. (1992), Gyimah –Brempong and 
Traynor (1999) and Blanco and Grier (2009), among others, an IV model estimation 
technique will be applied to test our expectation that political instability impacts economic 
growth at the presence of possible endogenous interaction between the two variables. Our 
estimation model is set as follows  
 
    
                                (1) 
Where i indexes countries and t years; a is the constant term; git denotes the growth rate in 
real GDP per capita of a country i at time t;, sit denotes governmental expenditures, iit 
indicates the governmental investment; tit indicates the trade openness; rit stands for the 
inflation rates; lit indicates the employement rates; bit denotes the index for Political 
instability by following Gupta (1990); and hit stands for Governmental changes 
(constructed by PCA: assassinations, general strikes, constitutional changes and legislative 
elections were used alternatively for robustness check in models II and III); mit indicates 
the Regime type ( polity2 indicator); εit is the error term that captures random shocks on 
growth over the years; and θ, κ, λ, ξ, φ, ψ, ω, are the coefficients. 
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In estimation bit (Political Instability) is replaced by its instrumental variable of    in 
order to avoid endogenous effect on regression. The  is constructed on the basis of 
following instruments that are exogenous related to PI, which are defense, the party 
fractionalization index, head of state, effective executive, ethnic fractionalization index and 
effective legislature (the definitions of those variables are in Appendix I).  
 
4.5 Data 
This chapter measures political instability from its predicted values ( ) and a more 
complete measure (index) of governmental changes, in order to capture its different forms 
throughout different political events (as aforementioned above). Thus, it constructs indexes 
of governmental changes by using data from the Cross National Time Series Data (Banks 
(2008)), the Quality of Government Dataset (2009), and the Social Policy Dataset (2008). 
Moreover, according to Badiou (2005) a political event is an episode that describes, fixes, 
shapes, breaks and transforms a state’s situation and power.  Here, it is essential to mention 
that political events are indeed highly correlated to each other in that, firstly, they belong to 
the same causal chain of the fundamental origins that describe a political system in a 
country. Secondly, according to Marchart (2007) the correlation between the political 
events is the kind of relation which refers to multidimensional and multidirectional 
connections between the elements/events in the political system. Conclusively, the 
relationship between economic growth and political instability is both puzzling and 
complex and empirical findings vary a lot among different regions. Since there are many 
different types of instability, this chapter begins by constructing one measure of PI out of 
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three categories/indexes of instability by following Gupta (1991) and Blanco and Grier 
(2007) analysis for the measurement of political instability (see Appendix II for Principal 
Components Analysis-PCA analysis). The predicted values of PI (equation 4) constructed 
by following by following Peldam (1996) revealing both citizens’ dissatisfaction from the 
political system and its representatives; the governmental changes index includes non –
violent political events. Then the principal components analysis
58
 is used, to construct the 
index. The above allows all the different measures of the instability to be embodied in one 
variable (Jollife, 2002). Moreover, the different components (which capture different 
political events) are highly unstable political measures resulting to highly correlation 
among them. Thus the above variables are being standardized
59
 after constructing one 
variable out of many (out of an index of variables which has been described above
60
) 
through PCA (principal components analysis
61
). The idea behind PCA is to construct a 
more comprehensive and weighting representative measure of political instability which 
maximizes the relationship between itself and the individual political events. In other 
words, PCA generates a compound variable which has the highest possible correlations 
with the individual types of political instability. The components that stem from PCA are 
normalized variables which mean that the principal components are standardized z scores. 
In particular, PCA estimates ‘weight-age’ by normalizing the given variables Xj. In line to 
Armstrong (2009) that is:  
                                                          
58 As the political events (events that create a political unstable environment) are highly correlated to each 
other (based on the ‘funnel of causality’ analysed by Campbell et al (1960)), the result, from adding the 
variables individually in the same regression, is multicollinearity. The method of principal components allows 
the original data to choose the weights of the various events, so that the variation of the events is then 
maximized. 
59
 ‘What we want to see are means of 0 and standard deviations of 1’ (Armstrong, 2009:1).  
60
 In the political instability index have been included both serious events which cause governmental stability 
such as coups and revolutions and less serious events such as demonstrations.  
61
 The full version of PCA analysis is been presented into the Appendix II.  
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F1 = a1 N(X1) +a2 N(X2)+…………+ak N (Xn)……………..                                     (2) 
Where, aj = weights or Eigen vectors estimated by method of principle components and this 
vector is associated with the Eigen value of first principle component; and F1 the PCA 
Index. 
N(Xj) = Normalized Xj variable.                                            . 
Thus, PCA constructs a new set of variables from the given set of variables, which will be 
pair wise uncorrelated and of which the first will have maximum possible variance and the 
second the maximum possible variance among those uncorrelated with the first, and so 
forth. However, in this study only the first principle component is considered/used to 
construct the index of political instability. This method maximizes the variance of new 
variable for the proper choice of coefficients. The results from PCA are presented in 
Appendix II and the components that have been chosen absorb the biggest percentages of 
the total variation
62
.  
For the economic variables concerned, in explaining growth, the choice will be made by 
following the recommendations made by Bleaney and Nishiyama (2000), Levine and 
Renelt (1991), Sachs and Warner (1997) (who reviewed the existing literature and 
compared different variables). Those are government expenditures as part of consumption, 
governmental investment, inflation, employment rates and openness to international trade, 
which are all included in the main model. The dependent variable is the GDP growth rate.  
Then, the set of the exogenous variables are: firstly, the employment growth suggested by 
the previous research (i.e. Solow, 1956; Boltho and Glyn, 1995; Pandalino and Vivarelli, 
1997; Walterskirchen, 1999; etc.) to measure the employment impact on economic growth 
                                                          
62
 Armstrong D. (2009) explains the rules of f how to choose the right components in PCA and what shall we 
check in screeplots (eigenvalues >1 which is been followed as a rule of thumb).   
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(the labor according to Solow, 1956). The result which stems from the previous research is 
that high employment leads to growth. Then, a set of economic explanatory variables will 
consist of employment growth, openness to trade (as a proxy for the importance of 
international factors to economic activities), inflation rate, governmental consumption 
(general government expenditure), and investment.  
In relation to the instruments to be employed, according to Paldam (1996), variables 
such as ethnic fractionalisation (by Annett, 2001; Ellingsen, 2000; and Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004)), effective legislature, defense expenditure, the party fractionalization index, 
effective executive and head of state will be used. The above are relevant to the political 
instability and they will be used as exogenous instruments to predict PI and this predicted 
PI will be used as the exogenous variable in the equation (1).  
In this chapter, the data
63
 for economic variables are from Penn World Tables, the data 
for inflation obtained from the World Development Indicators, the employment rates are 
from Labor Statistics Database
64
. The panel consists of data for 20 European countries, 
covering a period of 55 years, over 1950-2004. The choice of the sample countries and 
period coverage, were constrained by both the availability and completeness of data and the 
interest researching the European context. The Western Europe is one of the most 
prominent areas (in terms of wealth) and the most stable (in terms of governmental 
stability) compared it with other regions around the world. In addition, from the table 4.1 
on the descriptive statistics (appendix III), it can be inferred that governmental and defense 
                                                          
63
 The data are stationary in levels. The panel unit root test is explained in chapter 3 and the results are in 
Appendix VI.  
64 Summary statistics of the data are presented in the appendix III.   
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expenditure, openness to trade, party fractionalization index and inflation, show high 
deviation from the mean. That can be explained due to disparities among countries in the 
sample (inclusion of developing countries used in the data, i.e. some Balkan countries).  
  
4.6 Estimation of the Model 
In this section we estimate an IV estimator model to account both economic growth 
and political instability (PI) as endogenous variables (by further using the compound 
measure of the PI as discussed above). Unless otherwise noted, all of the variables are 
measured in a yearly frequency
65
. That means that for each country, both economic and 
political variables are measured as their individual mean annual values over the testing 
period (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 1996; Fosu, 1992; Barro, 1991). 
To begin with, all regressions are estimated using the IV estimator to address the 
endogenous problem of interaction between growth and political instability in estimation. 
The IV estimator relies on the quality of instruments, known as ‘good instruments’66, to 
reveal their efficiency of estimation. A rule of thumb followed is that the instruments need 
to be exogenous and the instruments are employed to estimate an instrumental variable to 
replace the corresponding or concerning variable that is endogenous. This will ensure that 
our estimation or tests will not be biased. In the equation (3) below, it shows how the 
predicted values of political instability are constructed for estimations in Table 4.6.2.  
 
                                                          
65
 As has been used by Alessina et al (1996), Barro (1991) and Fosu (1992; 2001). 
66 ‘Good instruments should be both relevant and valid: correlated with the endogenous repressors and at the 
same time orthogonal to the errors’ (Baum and Schaffer, 2003: 2).  
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67
=-0.3545003+5.61*defense +0.0001145*party_francionalization_index - 
                                  (0.77)                 (1.92) 
1.371315*head_of_state+2.091536*effective_executive+0.832866*ethic_franctionalizatin_in 
(-8.42)                              (7.21)                                        (0.80) 
dex -0.859649*effective_legislature                                                                                    (3) 
      (-3.82)  
 
Based on Adkins and Hill (2008) (Hausman Test) to test endogenous relationship, the 
GDP growth rates are regressed against the actual PI and the predicted PI, to test if they 
have any statistical difference in explain GDP.  The null hypothesis is ‘No difference’ if the 
endogenous relationship does not exist. This test is presented in table 4.6.1 below, showing 
that the null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Table 4.6.1 
HAUSMAN TEST 
(ENDOGENEITY TEST) 
git Coef. Std. Err. z 
bit -.1241483 .101404 -1.22 
 -.0000174 3.20e-06 -5.42 
_cons 4.163991 .2314629 17.99 
R
2 
= 0.06        N= 498 
Note: git= α+βbit +θ +vit           (4) 
 
Having controlled the endogenous impact on estimation of the relationship between 
GDP and PI, the estimated results are presenting in table 4.6.2. 
                                                          
67
 Political instability is been represented as a function of the defence expenditures, the type of the head of 
each state, the effective executive of the state, the legislative selection process, the party fractionalization 
index, the ethnic fractionalization index. Z values are included in the parentheses.    
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Table 4.6.2 
RESULTS
68
 OF ESTIMATION (equation 1) 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1950-2004 
 
Dependent variable 
git 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
-9.71 
(-5.23)* 
-8.87 
(-4.86)* 
-9.39 
(-4.63) 
-9.18 
(-4.95)* 
sit 
-4.20 
(-0.87)    
iit 
17.94 
(16.41)* 
18.07 
(16.66)* 
18.01 
(16.49)* 
17.96 
(16.47)* 
tit 
-0.02 
(-3.09)* 
-0.01 
(-2.14)*   
rit 
-0.10 
(-4.13)* 
-0.10 
(-4. 37)* 
-0.09 
(-4.15)* 
-0.09 
(-4.22)* 
lit 
62.84 
(7.05)* 
60.60 
(6.93)* 
56.09 
(6.56)* 
56.61 
(6.65)* 
hit 
0.04 
(0.48) 
0.04 
(0.53)   
Polity2it  
-0.06 
(-1.73)** 
-0.10 
(-2.76)* 
-0.10 
(-2.98)* 
t80it    
-0.0002 
(-0.05)  
t81it     
-0.002 
(-0.83) 
Prob > chi2             
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R
2
 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 
Hausman Test 0.2563 0.1803 0.1797 0.3811 
Number of 
Observations 530 498 465 465 
Sargan Test  
11.159 
P=0.457 
11.421 
P=0.349 
11.067 
P=0.386 
11.056 
P=0.324 
F-Test  
41.74 
P=0.00 
40.13 
P=0.00 
41.41 
P=0.00 
41.32 
P=0.00 
 
*=5% significant   **= 1% significant t-values shown in parenthesis 
[Note: the instrumental variable  is placed in estimations as replacement of actual bit  ] 
   (equation 1) 
 
                                                          
68
 The long run effects can be tested in future research by contacting a dynamin regression estimator which is 
based on a two step procedure. For more see Mark et al. (2005). The current chapter invastigates the short 
term effect of the relationship between economic growth and PI.  
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As shown in table 4.6.2, our estimation finds that inflation has a significant negative 
effect on economic growth which is consistent with evidences given by Gokal (2004). For 
government expenditure, it is non –significant for its impact on GDP. The negative impact 
of government consumption on GDP was evidenced by the previous literature (Landau, 
1983; Baro, 1991; Gwardney et al, 1998; Fölster and Henerkson, 2000), although the 
impact is not confirmed in our estimation of Western European sample countries since 
there is an insignificant effect in the current analysis.  
In contrast, investment and employment rates have a positive significant effect on 
economic growth which makes it consistent with the findings of the previous literature 
(Barro, 1991;1996; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, among others). 
Openness to trade shows mix
69
 results in the past literature with findings to indicate 
positive, negative and no effect at all on economic growth. The above mixed findings result 
mainly due to different measures of openness to trade (poor data quality and endogeneity of 
trade openness create mostly mixed results), or the variety of trade directions/policies 
followed by different countries (Edwards, 1993).  
Openness to trade (exports plus imports divided by GDP), here, has negative 
coefficients (Table 4.6.2, models I and II) and the explanation rests, mainly, on the 
dependency theory which highlights the fact that an economy which is been influenced by 
foreigners is not developed (Amin, 1974). Another explanation might lie to the fact that 
foreign trade might create a problem of the crowding effect on domestic producers, in an 
economy in the long run which would affect GDP growth adversely. Furthermore, since 
this chapter tests the impact of institutional factors such as political instability on economic 
                                                          
69
 See Edwards (1993) and Lopez (2005) for the detailed survey of the literature.  
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growth, openness to trade turns negative due to governmental incapability to resolve 
effectively the societal conflict. That is consistent with the previous literature (i.e. Aghion, 
Howitt and Mayor-Foulkes (2005), Borrmann, Busse and Neuhaus (2006), Dollar and 
Kraay (2003), Freund and Bolaky (2007), etc., who note that institutional quality is the 
driver of economic development and trade is its catalyst). 
For robustness test, in regressions 3 and 4, the openness to trade has been replaced by 
two variables open80 and open81 (dummies). The creation of the two dummies above, was 
to capture the 1980s savings and loans crisis that spread from Latin America to Europe (and 
the rest of the world), by causing a failure to the import substitution policies. The findings 
show (table 4.6.2 regr. 3 and 4) that both open80 and open81 become insignificant which 
means that there is no effect of trade on economic growth in the sample of countries used 
for the period researched. However, the governmental changes excluded from both 
regressions since that variable turns democracy as non-significant on growth, with open80 
or open81 in the same regression. According to Cavalo (2008) the more open to trade a 
country is, the more exposed it becomes to international dangers. The years under study 
cover major shocks of the 20
th
 century such as the cold war and the oil crisis among others 
which affected severely Western Europe. Protectionism became a key policy for Europe 
which led governments to intervene both into the market and in trade. The above policies 
resulted in a negative impact in economic growth in the long run.        
By controlling the interact effect between GDP and PI, our estimation finds that the 
predicted values of political instability have a significant negative impact on economic 
growth. The above is the result of unorthodox or repressive governmental policies which 
113 
 
lead to bad economic performance, and in return that bad performance affects the stability 
of the regime.  
A basic assumption is that the prerequisite for a polity to thrive is stability, in terms of 
effective governance (decision making) and institutionalized procedures (Hurwitz, 1973). 
The people of a state must be able to count on the government’s functional continuance and 
in the efficient production and distribution of public goods and services. When states are 
unable to adequately produce and distribute goods and services, then ‘governments lose 
legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in 
the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens’ (Rotberg 2003: 1). How will 
people act when they deem their governments are illegitimate? Will they demand for a new 
government into the office (legitimate elections through anti-government demonstrations)? 
Will they revolve like that of the Bolsheviks, the French Revolution, or the current 
revolution in Egypt and Bahrain?  The probability for violence and conflict is high and, 
therefore, the analysis of government’s ability and its sovereignty to meet the citizen’s 
needs is vital. 
Another important finding is the regime type plays a key role only to the first situation 
which means that regime type affects economic growth through the channel of political 
instability (under civilian regimes –where human and political rights allow citizens to 
present freely their discontent to the governmental policies) whilst there is not such a case 
in the political instability equation. That is true when the political arena is dominated by 
traditional elite groups or individuals who control the party system, exercise political 
pressure, direct voters through clientism or vote buying, apply force and even 
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assassinations. The above is a consistent finding with Blanco and Grier (2009) that state 
that countries with long democratic regimes are more unstable than otherwise.   
Since the importance of ethnic fractionalization is embedded in our instrumental 
variable of the PI, our finding of the PI negatively related to GDP growth implies that the 
more proportion to the division within society could affect economic growth more 
adversely in the long run.  Easterly and Levine (1997) focus on finding what cause low 
growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. They report that ethnic fractionalization is linked with 
low rates of schooling, underdeveloped financial institutions, deformed foreign exchange 
markets, high government deficits, and poor institutional quality which lead to social unrest 
and political instability. Alesina, et al. (1999) declare that more ethnically diverse regions 
are associated with higher spending and deficits per capita, and lower spending shares on 
public goods such as education. Ethnic differences will here be considered as a possible 
explanation of high concentration levels of influence and persistence of internal conflict
70
. 
The findings show, that ethnic fractionalization affects negatively growth, because the 
higher ethnic fractionalization
71
 leads to the higher instability. Differences in national 
identities, as a notion, are very important social phenomena and it that motives internal 
conflicts around the world. The above relationship has also been evidenced this chapter, 
conclusively, political stability is expected to be correlated with homogenous societies in 
Western Europe.  
                                                          
70
 Andriole and Hopple (1984) highlight the fact that both violence and any kind of social unrest stems from 
‘normal’ domestic violence such as ethnic and religious differences in a country.   
71
 As religious fractionalization is not considered the religious conflicts per se but rather the religious 
divisions, defined as different religious relationships, which makes conflicts more violent, and at the same 
time make it harder for aggressive believers to establish intergroup trust, making conflicts more extended. 
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As for the party fractionalization, that predicts the instrumental variable of PI 
positively significant, the negative impact of the predicted PI on GDP indicates that more 
political fractions could handicap a country’s governability to promote GDP growth in the 
long run. Furthermore, the effectiveness of law and order measured by the effective 
legislature that is negatively related to the predicted PI shows that the better the legal 
system can be conducive to growth through enhancement of political stability in the long 
run.  
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter investigates the relationship between political stability and economic 
growth among European economies. The above examination, though, leads in a question: If 
there is a relationship between the two variables above, to what extent does political 
stability affects economic growth? In the context of the European experience, these 
questions are quite motivating. In the light of the increasing interest in this issue (mostly in 
terms of causality and which way the causality runs) this chapter sheds some light on the 
ongoing debate - the relationship between political instability and economic growth - by 
exploring the above relationship in the Western European region.  
Most of the past theoretical research that has been discussed in the literature review 
implies that less political instability (measured by many different stability/instability 
indicators) leads to more economic growth. Another school of thought noted that bad 
economic policies which lead to bad economic performance ultimately lead to an unstable 
political environment.  A third school of thought noted that there is a joint relationship 
between political instability and economic growth. However, the insights that can be drawn 
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by controlling for the effects of different political regimes/ political environments on a 
nation’s economy, is that the puzzling relationship is a two way path.  
Following the econometric estimation method of the instrumental regressors (IV) 
model employed by this chapter, the hypothesis of endogeneity (joint causality) has been 
examined between political instability and economic growth, something that a single 
equation model cannot illuminate. Hence, the IV regressors model is applied to the 
investigation of both the direct and indirect (as has been stated above) channels through 
which political instability affects growth.   
The effects of political instability on economic growth are measured with those 
variables which have shown their explanatory power to the PI in our estimation. Among 
those are the ethnic and religious diversities in countries. According to Annett (2001), a 
society which is being separated through ethnic or religious groups is unsteady. The 
imbalance and instability caused by ethnic and religious discrepancies make political 
instability endogenous.  
A key finding is that there is an inter-causal relationship between political instability 
and economic growth and there exists joint endogeneity between these two indicators. 
Furthermore, our study identifies that more political party fractions will handicap 
government’s ability to pursue growth strategies for the economy in the long run. This 
evidence suggests that if democracy is developed through more fractional political 
influences then this could create more political uncertainty for future changes and 
development by destabilizing growth. Our argument is consistent with Goldstone et al. 
(2004), Schwartzman (2005) and Blanco and Grier (2009). They argue that one major 
effect of the democratic system is its inefficiency in the decision making area. This 
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inefficiency can, also, weaken business competitiveness and productivity, via the slow 
decision –making process and diversifying resources from production to democratic 
politics, such as lobbies, consultation, debating, etc. the slow productivity brings slow 
growth which in turn might create citizens–rebellion-behavior.  
Long lived democracies have a higher probability of experiencing instability than 
equally long lived autocracies. The key to economic performance is the ‘good governance’. 
In the long lived democracies’ case, the character of political competition between parties 
or interest groups becomes corrupted with a clientele character, driven by personal 
interests. Additionally, the elected chief executives are controlled, in many cases, by 
financial or legal promises and deals with other elite groups in the society. Thus, personal 
interests are included in the decision making arena which are driven by opportunity leaders.    
And this is actually the case for most of the Western European countries, considered 
to be long lived democracies.  
Future research is required to check the political system itself on long lived 
democracies. 
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POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE GREEK 
ECONOMIC CYCLES IN THE 20
TH
 CENTURY 
 
‘Greece is caught in the struggle between the West and the East, and …the Greeks are 
not merely fighting their own battle…’  
CIA Released Documents -Current Situation in Greece (ORE 28-48) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The current economic critical situation in Greece has shifted the world’s attention to 
the state of affairs that the institutional and economic regime encompasses. The current 
joint IMF-EU-ECB 110 billion emergency loan to Greece that has come under strict 
conditions evokes past experiences and academic interest. The Greek institutions are 
alleged to be unable to control the above situation, given that economic growth is 
significantly deteriorating.  
Greece’s72 historical experience has been very different from other Western European 
countries, both in terms of political events, cultural development and policy reforms. Clogg 
notes that ‘Greece’s heritage of … several centuries of Ottoman rule have left their 
distinctive legacy on the development of Greek economy and society’ (1979: vii). During 
the 20
th
 century, Greece as a developing nation, which just came out of poverty, tried to 
overcome the economic problems that it was facing. However, Greece was facing the future 
by looking at it ‘forward economically and backward politically’ (Carey and Carey, 1968: 
vii). After World War II, and especially after the civil war of 1944-1949, Greece tried to 
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 Carey and Carey describe modern Greece as ‘a country of basic contradiction… [one] which is more than 
the remains of bygone greatness’ (1968:vii). 
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heal its wounds socially and even more urgently economically. Various political setbacks 
and military events such as the defeat of the Greek Army in Asia Minor in 1922, the losses, 
the killing and starvation during the World War II and the civil
73
 war afterwards, have 
racked Greece throughout the 20
th
 century. The result was the enormous economic 
destruction of Greece in terms of both infrastructure and man power. 
The above events placed Greece amongst the poorest and most bankrupt countries in 
Europe with a chaotic economic position during the first half of the 20
th
 century. The main 
reasons, are as follows: firstly, the disaster that World War II caused in Greece since the 
army absorbed most of the Greek wealth in order to be preserved (Drakatos, 1997), 
secondly, the productive manpower has been significantly decreased, because of the war 
and most economic production units that (such as factories, agriculture units etc.) were 
destroyed (Drakatos, 1997). Thus, in an attempt to cover its needs, Greece had to borrow 
money in a significant scale relative to GDP, from other countries and foreign banks during 
the 1950s
74
 and onwards.  
 As far as the Greek political scheme is concerned, the main characteristic were the 
vivid political turnover i.e. different political regimes –like monarchy, dictatorships, semi-
democracy and democracy – which succeeded one another. In addition, foreign born kings 
ruled in Greece, along side corrupt politicians, and five military dictatorships that were 
established in 1912 (and has continued). The policies and decisions which came as an 
outcome from the above political arena influenced key political economy issues such as the 
allocation of governmental resources (spending). The above in turn was one of the main 
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 During the civil war the Greeks of the left and the right have begun to fight each other in order to gain 
control of the government. 
74
 After World War II Greece were funded by USA in terms of aid for reconstruction for about 20 years. 
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concerns of Greeks who tried to overcome Greece’s economic under-development just 
before World War II.  
This chapter examines the relationship between political instability and the short term 
movements (fluctuations of the economy) of economic growth (measured by the economic 
growth cycles) in Greece throughout the 20
th
 century. The measurement and analysis of 
cycles characterize a very important subject for the light they may throw on (a) the level 
and variability of growth, and (b) the sources of economic instability. Greece75 has been 
chosen as a case study because its relevance feeds into current events which affect the Euro 
area as a whole. The current stability of the Euro requires us to investigate Greek 
institutions, governmental policies (i.e. governmental expenditure) and societal unrest as 
potential explanatory variables that led to the current critical socioeconomic situation. 
However, Bollen and Jackman (1989) note that ascertaining similarities amongst case 
studies that occur in a different historical context must be implement in a context –specific 
case. Therefore, the choice of Greece allows the use of country- specific characteristics to 
draw important conclusions regarding the effect of political instability on a country’s well 
being. Case studies are believed to be the natural way to confirm or disprove the results 
given by cross -country studies (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).  Therefore, are political 
events captured?   
According to Gupta (1990) and Alessina et al. (1992) and Leblang and Bernhard (2000) 
two indexes, one of political instability and one of governmental changes, should be 
constructed as an index of violent political instability or of governmental changes
76
 based 
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 Greece in terms of research is classed among the PIGS that currently threatened the stability of Euro. 
76
 The index of governmental changes captures the non violent instability of the polity and is related to the 
policies and choices made of the government which affects directly the economic arena.  
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on time –series data. The general conclusion that stems from the past is that political 
instability severely affects economic booms and busts. However, as has been stated by 
Asteriou and Price (2001) the problem is that cross –country studies assign only one value 
to political instability in each country in a sample. Their approach categorizes different 
countries within the sample as more or less unstable compared to the rest countries in the 
same sample. Therefore, the above approach does not provide country specific information 
about events that influence the economic arena e.g. in Greece the high boost in growth rates 
during the 1960s, and especially during the military regime in 1967, was not incorporated 
in their analysis. This chapter addresses these deficiencies by examining events specific to 
Greece.  
The rest of the chapter is constructed as follows. Section 2 covers a short historical 
background of both political and economic events in Greece. Section 3 reviews the existing 
arguments. Section 4 discusses the empirical model underlying the Greek case, and gives 
an explanation of data and measurements used. Section 5 presents the empirical results and, 
finally and section 6 concludes this chapter. 
 
5.2 The Greek Phenomenon –An Epigrammatic Political and Economic Background 
 
 ‘…Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity’ 
(Kirk and Raven 1957:413) 
The Ancient Greek spirit established the ground for both economic and political 
thinking. According to Ancient Greek philosophers, i.e. Aristotle, Democritus, Pythagoras 
etc., the explanation of both economic and political phenomena lies in the observation and 
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rationalization of human behavior. On the one hand the existence of various human wants, 
needs and desires cause economic phenomena
77
 (e.g. the division of labor) and on the other 
hand the fulfillment of human expectations sets the ground of the political actors. The 
balance between the rationalization and the expectations in line with the notion of 
happiness (in terms of economic flourishing and development) and soreness (in terms of 
being poor) were the principles
78
 that ancient Greek though inherited to the modern world.  
Even some ancient Greeks were preaching
79
 virtues such as rationalization and 
modesty, contemporary Greeks in a majority demonstrate the opposite. Over the last 100 
years Greece has been healing its wounds from wars (revolution against the Ottoman 
Empire, World War I and II, civil war), economic destruction and a vivid political turmoil. 
It is a well established fact that political instability and the political environment are linked 
with the economic and fiscal environment in a country. Below we will present economic 
and fiscal events and we will try to understand the general political historical context 
around them and investigate their links related to the social unrest in Greece and the 
unstable environment that existed. 
Furthermore, the investigation of the Greek economy for almost 100 years
80
 discovers 
the impact of the past into the present (since the economic problems are almost similar to 
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 For more see Diels (1954).  
78
 An individual should always appraise his economic actions and behaviour through the rational of ‘the limit 
between the beneficial and the non-beneficial’ (Diels 1954:188).  
79 For example Democritus79 was against overconsumption and waste of goods with ethical behaviour and 
control of wealth (Kanellopoulos 1985).  
80 The period under study has been chosen so as to examine the past, which especially for Greece, is crucial 
since that leads to a better understanding of the reasons behind the Greek economic and political instability 
that exist  since Greece’s emergence as an independent nation. A short term analysis is inadequate for a 
comprehensible contemplation on the nature and the extent of the Greek economic plight.  Thus, a long term 
systematic examination of the Greek political regime evolution and its impact on economic growth is 
essential since it lacks in the current literature.   
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the ones that Greece was facing in the previous century). According to Alogoskoufis (1995) 
the Greek economy is of particular interest to the researchers who seek evidences from 
changes that occur when the political or economic state of affairs change. The current 
situation of Greece demands a radical change and that requires some investigation.  
The Greek economy can be portrayed by ‘economic cycles’. For example, after the 
World War II, the ‘reconstruction’ of the economy was initially followed by the 
‘preparation’ for economic development and policies for economic development in the 
1950s and the 1960s followed by higher rates of economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s 
and then came a reversal in the growth rates in the 1980s leading to a weakening of the 
Greek economy in the 1990s. The above introduces a big economic cycle (Drakatos, 1997).   
Following its establishment as a sovereign state in 1830’s, Greece did not manage to 
achieve either economic growth or political stability. Greece’s ability to overcome the 
chaos, that four centuries of Ottoman rule caused, in both its economy and society, was 
limited and severely forced the process of economic modification. The consecutive 
victories of the Greeks against the Turks until 1824 were based on a profound desire to 
discard the Ottoman oppression. However, Greece’s endeavor could not be fully successful 
without financial assistance. Financially, so far, most actions were based on private 
offerings from rich Greeks of the Diaspora or ship-owners of certain islands, e.g. Hydra, 
Spetse, Psara, as well as from extra taxation. Nevertheless, a modem nation could not only 
exist with ‘gifts’ or non-existent resources, thus the prospect of obtaining a loan from 
abroad appeared inevitable (Dertilis, 1980). Many bankers became interested such as the 
Rothschild House, Jacques Lafitte and the Behrendos & Co. The external funding was also 
a kind of political manipulation since foreign forces were trying to interfere in the Greek 
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political scheme. Nevertheless, Britain succeeds to hold two loans that are known as the 
Independence Loans (Dertilis, 1980). Table 2.1 shows a summary of the foreign loans: 
 
Table 5.2.1 
SUMMARY OF FOREIGN LOANS – GREECE 1879-1914 
 1824-1825 1879-1893 1898-1914 
Number of contracted loans 2 9 8 
Total nominal value(millions of £) 2.8 26 28 
Average effective interest rate (%) 5.5 6.1 4.5 
Debt per capita (%)  12.8 13.3 
Source: adapted from: Ali Coşkun Tunçer, p.2 (available at: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/seminars/TuncerMar10.pdf) 
 
However, to test the effects of financial institutions on Greek economic growth is not 
the focus of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to refer to the effects of public debt 
(especially foreign/external debt) on political instability (debt as a % of GDP measures a 
country’s banking system which is among the basics institutions that promote growth 
through the channel of monetary stability and investment). Previous
81
 literature reports that 
political instability negatively affects loans in some countries, since loaning is used mainly 
to finance military expenditure for either security reasons (e.g. external threats) or internal 
turnouts (e.g. violent social unrest). Wars and civil conflict create instability in a country 
which in turn might cause episodes of sovereign default by affecting adversely a country’s 
productivity. A government in order to balance the unstable political environment and the 
social insurrections, finances military expenses by diversifying part of its budget towards it. 
Thus, this chapter investigates the effects of political instability on Greek economic growth 
cycles in the content of financial stability.  
                                                          
81
 See for example Roe and Siegel (2011), Hatchondo et al. (2007) among others. 
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As shown in table 5.2.1, the history of Greek sovereign borrowing started with the 
independence loans of 1824 and 1825, amounting to £2.8 million in total (Kofas, 1981). 
The two loans that were negotiated in 1824 and 1825 and were advanced in exchange for 
the Greek governmental consent that Greece would be sited under the guardian of England 
(Dertilis, 1980). 
The table 5.2.1 further illustrates that the entire 19th century became the period of 
foreign loans, and bankers who fought for the control of new countries like Greece and 
Latin America (Dertilis, 1980). At the time of the acknowledgment of Greek Independence 
by Europe in 1830, scholars at that era, note that bankers will start their control and that 
was a reality (Dertilis, 1980). Greek economy was totally underdeveloped until the end of 
19
th
 century with bankers and foreign powers to fight for controlling a bankrupt state. 
However, Greece did not have enough sources to make any repayments of the loans. An 
agreement between the Greek government and bondholders was finally concluded in 
September 1878, which was followed by an era of rapid debt expansion (Andreades, 1906). 
This recorded the first crisis in debt repayment in Greek history. After the 1878 resolution 
to the debt repayment  crisis, Greece contracted  9 loans, £26 million in total (See Table 
5.2.1), most underwritten by French deposit banks, i.e. the Comptoir National d’Escompte, 
the Société Générale and the Crédit Lyonnais, and British banks i.e. Hambros of London, 
who acted as intermediaries between potential lenders and Greek government (Andreades, 
1906). Table 5.2.2 shows the loans adopted by Greece from 1824-1935.  
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Table 5.2.2 
FOREIGN LOANS GREECE 1824-1935 
YEAR LOAN INTEREST 
RATE 
NOTES 
1824 £0.8 million 5%  
1825 £2 million 6%  
1826 Debt repudiation  Unilateral suspension of loan servicing payments 
1832 60 million drachmas 5% Gesture of goodwill by the Protecting forces in view of 
advent of the monarchy 
1843 Debt repudiation  Unilateral suspension of servicing of the 1832 loan 
1856 Imposition of international 
financial control 
 Non –recognition of the loan by the Greek monarchy 
1864 Debt compromise  Final settlement of the 1832 loan 
1879 60 million gold FF 6% Final settlement of the 1824-25 loans 
1879 £1.2 million 5%  
 
1880 
 
60 million gold FF 
 
6% 
The national bank of Greece contracted a foreign lottery 
loan in metallic currency, at high interest rate, on behalf 
of the Greek government.  
1880 120 million gold FF 5%  
1883 10 million gold FF 5%  
1884 170 million gold FF 5%  
1887 91 million gold FF 4%  
1889 111 million gold FF 4%  
 
1890 
 
80 million gold FF 
 
5% 
International monetary turmoil. The loan was particularly 
covered (53 million drachmas). The credit standing of the 
Greek state decreased. 
 
1892 
 
Foreign markets’ distrust of 
Greek state 
 Mr. Law (economic attaché of the English embassy) and 
Mr. Roux (economic attaché of the French embassy) 
made a report on the Greek economic situation. They 
were fully supported by the Greek government, which 
envisaged the agreement on a new foreign loan. 
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1893 
 
Debt repudiation 
 The Law report, which depicted favourably the Greek 
economy, was published, whereas the Roux report, which 
pointed out to the loss of the Greek State’s solvency, was 
never published. The government was unable to contract 
a new foreign loan. Unilateral refusal to pay 
amortisation. Repayment (in gold) of only 30 per cent of 
the interest on due foreign loans, as well as repayment (in 
banknotes) of 50 per cent of due interest. 
1894 Negotiations  Deadlock. Unsuccessful effort to issue a capitalisation 
loan (interest coupons falling due would be paid off by 
means of bonds). 
1895-
96 
New negotiations   
1898 Debt compromise 150 
million gold FF 
2.5% The system of tax collection and management was 
audited by creditors 
1902 44 million drachmas 4%  
1906 20 million gold FF   
1907 20 million drachmas 5%  
1910 110 million gold FF 4%  
1914 335 million gold FF 5% Credit that the Allied Powers agreed to extend after the 
end of the war. In the meantime, the country should issue 
paper money of equal value. However, these credits were 
not actually released, and thus severe exchange rate 
fluctuations occurred. 
1918 850 million gold FF   
1924 £10 million 7% Refugee loan 
1927 £9 million 6% Stabilization loan 
1928 £4 million 6% Public works loan 
1932 Debt repudiation  Unilateral suspension of amortisation payments for the 
external debt. 
1935 Debt compromise  World War II suspended all payments 
FF: Loan contracted in gold with a consortium of banks (the National Bank of Greece, the Bank of Epirus and Thessaly, the Bank of 
Industrial Credit and the Bank of Constantinople) for interest and amortisation payments on the outstanding external debt. 
Source: adapted from: Lazaretou (1999), pp.18-19. 
Greece, as mentioned above, started to loan in order to finance national projects of 
infrastructure and development and military expenses. Foreign creditors were willing to 
loan to Greece since it was a new established state and could use any help as could get. The 
problem started with the independence loans. Greece’s inability to repay the Independence 
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loans damaged the country’s reputation as a borrower and kept her out of the European 
capital markets for many years. Thus, higher national expenditure on the repayment of 
national debt and its financing through more foreign borrowing caused higher interest rates 
and budget deficits (Lazaretou, 1999).  The above led to repayment crisis which in turn 
harmed Greece’s reputation as a borrower and the country was soon over indebted.  
Table 5.2.3 
ASSESMENT OF GREECE’S CREDITWORTHINESS 
Before 
1879 
Greece was unable to have access to international capital markets. A short-term domestic debt 
was issued at a very high rate (8%). 
1879 Greece rebuilt its reputation in the international capital markets after a debt compromise was 
reached for previous foreign loans. 
1880-84 Efforts for the drachma to join Latin Monetary Union. Long-term foreign borrowing from the 
money markets of Western Europe on favorable terms (5%). Improvement of borrowing terms 
in the domestic money market: the interest rate was cut to 6-7% and loan maturities were 
extended. 
1886-89 Foreign investors’ expectations that the drachma would return to the gold standard. Borrowing 
from abroad at a low interest rate (4 %), with a small or no guarantee. 
1890-97 Greece’s creditworthiness tottered. Foreign creditors were unwilling to lend the country. 
1898 Debt renegotiation. Successful implementation of a long-term stabilization program with the 
assistance of foreign creditors. 
1899-1909 Borrowing from abroad at a low interest rate (4%). Bonds of domestic loans became tradable in 
the domestic money market. Bond lottery at par value. 
1910-14 Greece’s creditworthiness improved. Possibility to borrow from abroad, owing to a war 
emergency, at a low rate (4-5%). 
1915-22 International capital markets were unwilling to lend Greece, owing to the wartime turmoil, the 
post-war political and monetary instability in the country, and the pendency of Greece’s national 
defense debts. As of 1920, unwillingness of the domestic market as well to grant loans to the 
Greek government. Continuous issuance of short-term Treasury bills (at 6%), short term loans 
from the National Bank of Greece, and money issuance. 
1923-25 End of the war. Fiscal adjustment and short-term domestic debt stabilization efforts. The 
country’s creditworthiness improved. Conclusion of a new foreign loan (at 7%). 
1926-27 Stabilization program. The country rebuilt its reputation. Agreement on a new foreign loan at a 
low rate (6%), conditional upon the drachma’s entry in the international monetary system and 
the imposition of fiscal discipline. 
1944-62 $224.2 millions. Part of USA’s aid to Greece.   
Source: adapted from Lazaretou, (1999), pp.22 and Ferris (1986), pp. 148.  
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Above, is the table which reviews Greece’s creditworthiness. The debt crisis started in 
Greece in 1826 (see table 5.2.2) even though the country was not an independent state yet. 
The struggle against the Ottoman Empire was ongoing in 1826 and quite a few Great 
powers (e.g England and France) were showing interest on the new forthcoming state. With 
an insignificant tax base and no institutions to gather money, the Greek non-state was 
facing bankruptcy even before her independence from the Ottoman rule. Interestingly, 
Greece never even took half of that loan which is known as the Greek loan scandal and yet 
the country had to repay it (Rosen, 1992). However, in the very same year the 10.500 
inhabitants started leaving Messolonghi town after a year’s Turkish siege with very few of 
them to survives. 1843 was another significant year (table 5.2.2). Another debt crisis 
appeared. King Otto took a huge amount of money to repay older loans, to support the 
standing Bavarian army and a big proportion was repayment to the Sultan as compensation 
for lost territories. The fiscal instability resulted in debt crisis in 1843 that caused a military 
revolution led by Colonel Dimitrios Kallergis yielding the popular demand for a new 
constitution and a Greek Orthodox king. 1893 was marked with Trikoupis (prime minister 
of Greece at that era) proclamation of bankruptcy. He stated to the parliament ‘... 
gentlemen we are bankrupt’ (Vergopoulos, 1977). Another repayment crisis in 1893 
followed by high national expenditure for infrastructure this time, and military expenses in 
order to fight for Crete’s independence and reunion with Greece a few years later (Kofas, 
1989). The political unstable environment with many social demonstrations and unrest in 
general highlight the above year. Furthermore, associated with debt crisis, the Great 
Depression was very bad both economically and politically for Greece. The high 
unemployment rates resulted in high social unrest especially with the excess of manpower 
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caused by the refugees from the Asia Minor War. Furthermore, the effects of the Great 
Depression led to an unsuccessful coup in 1933 and another one in 1935. The political 
impasse of that era enabled General Metaxas to prevail King George to rule by what is 
known as the ‘Regime of 4th of August’.  Once again the army compromises the debt in 
Greece. From the above stems that the unstable political environment was related with the 
unstable and highly indebted economic environment and the huge fiscal holes in Greece. 
This alone creates the urge for the investigation of the social unrest related to debt and their 
effects on economic cycles in Greece.  
Additionally, due to its location which is situated between West and East, Greece is 
particularly keen on defense expenditure since it is placed in a highly unstable region 
(Veremis, 1982). It is among the European countries that are situated in the volatile 
Balkan
82
 area. It faces military threats from Turkey
83
, for centuries, which leads to high 
defense expenditure (the highest among European countries and the NATO -5.6% of GDP, 
during the decade 1990s-2000 compared to 3.5% in NATO
84
) (Dunne and Nikolaidou, 
2001). Thus, the continuous clashes and frictions with Turkey create security uncertainty 
which lead to high levels of defense spending
85
. Both countries come out to be betrothed in 
an arms pursuit which becomes rougher after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. 
Furthermore, the Greek economy is very weak since its establishment as an independent 
state and the extra difficulties that arose from the Greek participation in the European and 
                                                          
82 The unstable security situation in Balkans (i.e. the collapse of Yugoslavia and the civil war, successive 
disputes with Albania and FYRUM) which stem from a recent upsurge of nationalism and ethnic conflict in 
the last decades (Kollias, 1994). 
83
 Even though the Greek-Turkish quarrel dates back centuries, Greece (despite her economic problems) is 
forced to continue to assign a big proportion of her national expenditure in defence expenses. 
84
 In contrast to the USA, where the defence spending is less than 4% of GDP, Greece as a small country has 
relatively higher military expenditure overall (see table 2.3). 
85
 For more see: Constas 1991; Tsitsopoulos and Veremis 1991; Ifestos and Platias, 1992. 
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Monetary Union –EMU. However, many of the loans that adopted by the Greek 
government mainly financed military needs as mentioned. Table 5.2.4, below proves the 
high governmental spending regarding the defense expenditure.  
 
Table  5.2.4 
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE GREECE 1965-2008 
YEARS As a % of GDP YEARS As a % of GDP 
1960 4.9 1990 5.9 
1961 4.2 1991 2.1 
1962 4.0 1992 2.4 
1963 3.9 1993 3.2 
1964 3.6 1994 3.7 
1965 3.5 1995 3.5 
1966 3.7 1996 2.4 
1967 4.5 1997 3.2 
1968 4.8 1998 3.7 
1969 4.9 1999 3.5 
1970 4.9 2000 4.4 
1971 4.9 2001 3.4 
1972 4.7 2002 3.2 
1973 4.2 2003 2.6 
1974 4.3 2004 2.7 
1975 6.8 2005 2.9 
1976 6.9 2006 4.5 
1977 7.0 2007 4.5 
1978 6.7 2008 2.0 
1979 6.3   
1980 5.7   
1981 7.0   
1982 6.8   
1983 6.8   
1984 7.1   
1985 7.0   
1986 6.2   
1987 6.3   
1988 6.4   
1989 5.7   
Source: adapted SIPRI yearbooks different years.  
 
In contrast to the USA, where the defense spending is less than 4% of GDP, Greece as a 
small country has relatively higher military expenditure overall (see table 5.2.4). In addition 
133 
 
to the high military spending, the political turmoil and rapid governmental changes reduced 
the business confidence and the productive capability that can create tax revenues for the 
country. The deterioration of tax revenues generation capability plus high military spending 
made the country more difficult in serving her foreign debt liabilities, in particular at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century and until the World War II.  Additionally, despite the large 
foreign donations, by the United Nations, inflation
86
 remained a key policy concern, at the 
same period, since it was making government expenditure inelastic and the public 
administration incapable of reforming the economic area. 
After World War II and the civil war, the 1952 constitution, declared Greece a 
parliamentary democracy with a monarchy, which followed by a decade of domination by 
rightwing parties. A short period of irregular governments resulted in a constitutional crisis 
over the role of the military in 1965 and the political instability resulted in the military coup of 
21 April 1967. The period from 1949 to mid 1970s is known as the Greek economic miracle. A 
number of events and policies created the term economic miracle. The US aid to Greece 
followed by the Marshall Plan, which was used mainly to accelerate the Greek GNP (Stathakis, 
1994).  Furthermore, the economic policies followed Zolotas plans, governor of the Central 
Bank at that era (e.g. the government to forward to the market imports of goods and materials), 
new monetary parity plans, the Central Bank started selling gold sovereigns to keep public 
faith, huge reconstruction projects and development of tourism, to name a few (Stathakis, 
1990). After the miracle though more problems arose since the government from the 1980s and 
on relied on foreign loans once more to cover pre-election clientistic promises. 
                                                          
86 Some of the years of the period 1914-1923 were characterized by high inflation rates. More specifically in 1918 the 
General cost of living index rose by 134.62%, in 1916 by 35.90%, in 1922 by 59.80% and in 1923 by 85.69%. On the 
other hand in 1919 the said index dropped by 11. 75%. See Annual Statistical Yearbooks of Greece of years 1930 and 
1936. 
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The past influences the present and sometimes affects the future. That was the case for 
Greece during the 20
th
 century. The period under study (1919-2008), for Greece was tense 
both politically and economically: foreign born kings, corrupt politicians, individual 
bourgeoisies and elites, different political regimes succeeded one another, World War II, 
civil war, economic bankruptcy, debt, the ‘Revolution of the Generals’, and in the next 
decades (restoration of democracy in 1974) a democratic state with vast economic 
problems
87
. 
The above indicate that the Greek case is a political and economic ‘phenomenon’ by 
itself and the events and policies behind each government during the 20
th
 century 
characterizes this uniqueness.   
 
5.3 Existing Arguments 
 
Greece entered the 20
th
 century with a large number of problems both in the territorial 
and political area. The role of the government was that of the intermediate between 
landlords and peasants and at the same time it was chasing laisse –faire policies for both the 
above (Feris, 1986). Hence, Greece like other Balkan countries became totally depended on 
the ‘Great Powers’ for loans and investment from the late 19th century and onwards. Thus, 
any kind of economic development, in the Balkans generally, during the first decades of the 
20
th
 century, was slowed down by lack of capital, communications, public infrastructure, 
product competition, etc (Close, 2002). In Greece, particularly, any kind of public 
infrastructure was built by foreign firms and funded by foreign capital. The result was that 
                                                          
87
 Alogoskoufis describes Greece as ‘… [a] 'success story' .. [with a] 'problem[atic] economy'…’ (1995:150).  
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any kind of foreign investment in Greece was serving economic and political foreign 
interests. Moreover, since Greece was a poor agrarian economy, it lacked resources for 
heavy industrial production. Additionally, heavy bureaucracy and heavy burden on 
retaining large size of  army resulted in the public debt rose to very high levels from the 
late 19
th
 century until the 1930s
88
 (Close, 2002).   
Over the past century the Greek economy had periods both of low and high economic 
growth. The post-war Greece has been gradually altered from an agricultural economy to 
become one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. After a rapid increase on the 
economic growth rates which started in the mid 50s and continued until the mid 70s (the 
years that followed the end of the civil war, with a governmental interaction which started 
in 1946 and until the resignation of the military regime in 1974) the growth rate of GDP 
slowed to only 1.5 percent annually in the period after 1974 and until mid 90s (Madison, 
1995).  
The poor economic performance was attributed mostly to weakening economic policies 
in the period after 1974 and particularly during the 1980s. Beginning in 1974 the Greek 
government ran huge and constant budget deficits (i.e. 5% during the 1970s, 16.4% during 
the 1980s) and the monetary policy fuelled a sharp increase in political instability and 
inflation
89
 (Bosworth and Kollintzas, 2001). Table 3.1 shows the data for external loans 
after the reconstruction of democracy. 
Furthermore, political instability is a multidimensional indicator which is difficult to be 
measured and defined. Political instability includes instability and changes in regimes, 
                                                          
88
 The governmental debt in Greece was 25.4% of the total current state revenues in 1883, 25.7% in 1910, 
26.2% in 1922 and almost 33% in 1932 (Ferris, 1986: 66).  
89
 According to CPI the inflation rates in Greece were: 5.455% in 1965, -1,667% in 1967, 12,903% in 1974, 
26,291% in 1980 and fell into 22,884% in 1990.  
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governmental policies, and social unrest in a nation.  However, there is a growing literature 
arguing that political instability affects economic growth by affecting government 
expenditure, investment, political decisions etc
90
. Hence, political instability affects the 
stability of the governments, political regimes and the people themselves in a nation. In its 
turn the above unstable political environment, affects the availability of features of 
production (i.e. human capital, investment, etc) (Asteriou and Siriopoulos, 2000).  
A large literature documented the effects of political instability on economic choices by 
using different indicators to measure instability. On the one hand, Barro (1991; 1996), 
Levine and Zervos (1996), Easterly and Levine (1992) among others used individual 
indicators of political instability in cross –country regressions (i.e. the number of coups or 
assassinations etc) with economic growth as the dependent variable.  On the other hand, 
Hibbs (1973), Gupta (1990), Campos and Karanasos (2008) and others constructed indices 
which summarized data according to the political violence and social unrest concepts.   
Here one of the main focuses is on the effects of political instability, as a channel of the 
political regimes per se, on economic cycles in Greece. The effects of political instability 
and as an extension the effect of political regimes on economic growth in Greece, has been 
examined by two other papers (Alexakis and Petrakis, 1991; and Asteriou and Siriopoulos, 
2000). The main difference is that, the above papers examined the effect of political 
instability on the capital market in Greece.  
Alexakis and Petrakis (1991) examine the influence of socio -political instability on the 
ASE (Athens Stock Exchange) by using two indicators,1) the number of working hours that 
has been lost due to strikes and 2) the degree of participation of left –wing representatives 
                                                          
90
 See for example Stern, 1989; Alesina et al, 1996; among others. 
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in the Greek Parliament. However, their analysis was rather limited in terms of the political 
instability index they used, since many dimensions of political events were not included in 
that index.  
Asteriou and Siriopoulos (2000) use a more complete index of political instability by 
including various phenomena of political unrest in order to capture their effects on the 
fluctuations of the ASE general index. The above paper examines empirically the 
relationship between political instability, stock market development and economic growth. 
Furthermore, they investigated the fluctuations of the ASE share price and how this index is 
being influenced by political instability. Their findings support the fact that political 
instability affects negative both economic growth and the development of stock market in 
Greece. Asteriou and Siriopoulos (2000), support that, a reduction of political instability 
will increase the economic stability and consequently will decrease the degree of 
investment’s uncertainty. In turn, the above will increase the degree of risky investments in 
industry rather than investment in housing and land.   
Furthermore, Alogoskoufis (1995) metaphorically represents the Greek economy after 
the restoration of democracy in 1974 as the ‘two faces of Janus’91. The economic situation 
in that era is been characterized by fractures and discrepancies in economic trends. For the 
twenty years up to 1974, Greece encompassed high growth rates and low inflation; and for 
the twenty years thereafter, the economy declined (high debt rates, public sector deficits) 
and inflation became extremely high. Alogoskoufis (1995) argues that the above changes 
result mainly from the political transition (restoration of democracy in 1974), with a 
subsequent decline in political and economic institutions. The decline of the political and 
                                                          
91
 Janus was a two-faced Roman God which represented the beginning and end in any form (i.e. life and 
death). 
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economic institutions, results from the notion of the democratic regime (restoration of 
democracy) which appeared haphazardly, and along with further political events (such as 
the dichotomy of Cyprus, the first oil shock and high levels of social unrest, Alogoskoufis; 
1995). Then, the government was following planned policies in order to avoid repression or 
to prepare the country for the opportunities which would stem from Greece’s entrance in 
EU (EC at that time) (Alogoskoufis, 1995). The government evolved in the social conflict 
of income redistribution and since its main objective was the re-election it was following 
weak policies in terms of taxes and mainly about the protection of property rights 
(Alogoskoufis, 1995).  The public demand for a big state on line to the desire of income 
redistribution, led to large increases in government spending and business taxes 
(Alogoskoufis, 1995).  
The empirical research centered on business cycles in Greece is not very extended and 
it is concentrated mostly on Real Business Cycles (RBC) models to investigate the output 
fluctuations. To begin with, Christodoulakis et al. (1993) contacted a comparison study of 
the cyclical behaviour of the Greek economy related to other EU economies. In their study 
they use quarterly and annual data since 1960 and a RBC model. Christodoulakis et al. 
(1993) highlighted that similarities exist in the business cycles in Greece and the other EU 
countries. Their conclusion show that the integration of the Greek economy within the EU 
under homogeneous institutions and policies it is not be a problem as far as business cycle 
is concerned.  
Kaskarelis (1993) and Karasawoglou and Katrakilidis (1993) examine the monetary 
policies, such as budget deficits and inflation, over business cycles in Greece. The results 
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show that monetary policies, especially the ones which are related to governmental deficits 
are explaining a big proportion of the output fluctuations. 
Kollintzas and Vassilatos (1996) research the post-war Greek economy, especially the 
effects of fiscal policy and transfers from abroad, by using a RBC model. The authors 
concluded that government consumption, output and the productivity of factors of 
production have an adverse relationship. Conversely, an increase in government investment 
affects positive output growth and higher productivity. The above directed the authors to 
conclude that increases in governmental consumption, foreign transfers and domestic 
transfers in the post-1973 era in Greece led to decreases of the Greek economic 
performance.  
Furthermore, Apergis and Panethimitakis (2007) investigate the behavior of basic 
macroeconomic variables of the Greek Economy in respect to the business cycle over the 
period 1960-2003. Their findings show that consumption fluctuate procyclically like real 
wages. The same conclusions held when payments were made for policy regime changes. 
Finally, they highlighted the fact that real shocks drive the Greek economy, which means 
that demand policies are ineffective.  
In short, the previous literature on the Greek economy supports the fact that the 
governmental policies (e.g. high governmental consumption) were the drovers of people’s 
revolt which in turn hindered economic growth.  
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5.4 Data and Method of Approach 
One of the few undoubted facts in the literature is the strong correlation between a 
country’s economic performance and the political arena through the channel of political 
and financial stability. However, this chapter uses GDP cycle
92
 (the difference between real 
GDP and its trend is the cyclical component of GDP
93
) as the dependent variable 
(explanation of the construction of the GDP cyclical component is below).  
The used data
94
 set was constructed from several different sources. The data on 
population and per capita GDP are from Maddison (The World Economy –OECD), 
government expenditure, imports and exports per capita, the number of revolutions and 
coups, and the number of political assassinations, etc (see the summary statistics below) are 
from Bank 2009, and the data for debt is from the National Statistic Service of Greece 
(Statistical Yearbooks different volumes) and the inflation is from the International 
Historical Statistics Europe 1750-2000. The definitions of these variables can be found in 
Appendix I. 
Krienhaous (2004) notes that over a thousand papers exist and hundreds of different 
control variables have been used to explain economic growth. The political data used in this 
research have been chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, political instability has a negative 
effect on the decision making process of a government and secondly, political instability 
introduces uncertainty to the economic environment
95
. The economic variables used are 
also are particularly important in order to capture the governmental functions of the Greek 
                                                          
92 As economic cycles this chapter adopts the definition highlighted by Michaelidis et al. (2007), according to 
which business/economic cycles are considered as deviation cycles, i.e. fluctuations around a trend. 
93 Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter has been used to determine the trend of GDP. The trend component solves 
the following: Tt =1 + 0.1t.  
94
 The graphs of the various variables are in Appendix IV. 
95
 See Barro, 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1992; Alesina et al, 1996, among others. 
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economy overall (according to the availability of the data). Thus, the economic variables 
included in the regression are: population growth rates as a proxy for the underlying human 
capital, government expenditures as a proxy for governmental investment, inflation, and 
openness to international trade as a proxy for the importance of international factors to 
economic activities. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.4.1 below: 
 
 
The above table derives from the data themselves. It describes the basic features in the 
study. The full data set covers one country -Greece over the sample period 1919 to 2008. 
Table 5.4.1 
Descriptive statistics of Key Variables (after the interpolation) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
GDP growth rates 90 0.0279 0.058 -0.160 0.128 
Population growth rates 90 0.007 0.007863 -0.037 0.029 
Regime type1(civilian) 90 0.833 0.374766 0 1 
Openness to trade growth rates 89 0.069 0.197 -0.544 0.78 
Party fractionalization index 90 5465.367 1913.47 0 8253 
National expenditure 90 139288.4 207744 537 726303 
Inflation growth rates 58 0.0026 0.156 -0.38 0.87 
Assassinations  89 0.168 0.406 0 2 
Debt  growth rates 78 0.080 0.093 -0.154 0.23 
General strikes 89 0.258 0.699 0 5 
Guerrilla warfare  89 0.281 1.454 0 13 
Governmental crises 89 0.461 0.784 0 3 
Purges  89 0.483 1.046 0 5 
Riots  89 0.405 0.974 0 6 
Revolutions  89 0.191 0.520 0 3 
Antigovernment demonstrations 89 0.337 0.690 0 4 
Coup d’état  83 0.072 0.261 0 1 
Constitutional changes 90 0.111 0.350 0 2 
Legislative elections 90 0.333 0.497 0 2 
Cabinet changes 90 0.877 1.120 0 7 
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Since the data are records taken through time, missing observation is a common problem
96
. 
The most common methods to fill in the missing values are: time –series decomposition97, 
least squares approximation
98
 and numerical interpolation
99
. Due to missing observations, 
among some variables this research used the numerical interpolation
100
 to fill in the missing 
values in order to facilitate a more comprehensive analysis
101
. The above way obtains linear 
specific interpolation and extrapolation of the missing values, so as the analysis will not 
lose observations. This has been done by interpolating the variables with missing data 
(incomplete series) by filling in the gaps along with the time dimension which is actually 
the measurement through which, the variables with missing values, show changes.   
In addition, from the table 5.4.1 on descriptive statistics above, it can be inferred that 
the standard deviation in trade, defense, national expenditure, and party fractionalization 
index, show high deviation from the mean. That can be explained due to political shocks 
during the years in the sample (World War II, Civil War, and Cold War) or due to missing 
values in the above variables.   
Furthermore, the political instability indexes (such as political instability, and 
governmental changes, which are created by employing PCA and used in the analysis 
below) include variables that are shown in Appendix II. The indexes are being 
                                                          
96
 The missing observation problem might occur because of lost records or mistakes or just no data available 
at all which is the case for Greece.  
97
 For more see West, 1997; McGuckin, Sarnowitz and Ozyildirim, 2001.  
98
 This stems by calculating the sum of the squares of the residuals. For more see: Vanicek and Wells, 1972; 
Knol and Ten Berge, 1989; Björck, 1996; Wasito, 2003.  
99
 For more see: Terry, Bee and Kumar, 1986; Shih, 1998; Fung, 2006.   
100
 About the allowed percentage of missing values to fill, Bennett, 2001 referred at the 10% of the time series 
and Peng et al, 2006 at the 20% and Wright, 1998:3 refers that ‘the best percentage of each data set should be 
developed’. For more information see:  Steven and Glombitza, 1972; Damsleth, 1980; Hillmer, Bell, and 
Tiao, 1983; and Harvey, 1989; Solow et al., 2003. For deleting the period of missing values Schlomer et al 
(2010) highlight the fact that deletion of missing data should not be followed. An exception can be considered 
the case where the missing values are <1% according to McKnight et al, 2007. 
101
 Specifically this research used the Stata command: ipolate y year, gen (y1) epolate.  
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standardized
102
 after constructing one variable out of many (out of an index of variables 
which has been described above) through PCA (principal components analysis). PCA 
generates a compound variable which has the highest possible correlations with the 
individual types of political instability. The results from PCA are presented in Appendix 
III
103
.  
Furthermore, a cycle, which stems from kyklos, is a Greek origin word which 
symbolizes a sporadically repeated sequence or recurrence of events. The identification of 
cycles is one way researchers are able to identify patterns in data. Since events in general 
recur over and over again with regularity (i.e. seasons), researchers developed the ability to 
plan for the future or forecast. A widespread exhilaration feeling appeared in the 1960s, 
among scholars and politicians, that economic crises and business cycles could be cured in 
Greece. Nevertheless, the poor economic performance in the mid 1970s in Greece changed 
the interest towards the business cycle theory, and the efficiency of economic policies 
proved inadequate during the 1980s (Michaelidis et al., 2007). A period of renewed interest 
in business cycles theory started in the 1990s which shifted the academic interest on the 
role of productivity and technological change for the broadcast of shocks (Kaskarelis 
1993). 
The depended variable used in the current study is the economic cycle. To extract it the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) was used. The linear, HP-filter
104
 approach is a widely 
used method through which the long-term trend of a series is obtained using only actual 
                                                          
102
 ‘What we want to see are means of 0 and standard deviations of 1’ (Armstrong, 2009:1).  
103
 Armstrong D. (2009) explains the rules of how to choose the right components in PCA and what shall we 
check in screeplots.   
104
 Many studies used HP-filter for different purposes. See for example: e.g. Danthine and Girardin, 1989; 
Blackburn and Ravn, 1992; Backus and Kehoe, 1992; Fiorito and Kollintzas, 1994; Belegri-Roboli and 
Michaelides 2007, among others. 
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data. Then the trend is attaining by minimizing the fluctuations of the actual data around it. 
According to Baum the HP filter removes a smooth trend τt from a time series xt by solving 
the minimazion equation with respect to Τt:  
       min ((T t+1 − Tt) − (Tt – Tt−1)
2]                                        (1) 
Where the coefficient λ105>0 determines the smoothness of the long term trend. Below is 
the cyclical component for Greece. 
 
  Figure 5.4.1: GDP Cyclical component in Greece 1919 -2008. 
 
To investigate the relationship between the economic cycle and political instability this 
study employs the following function:   
                    
  GDP_CYCLEt = f (Xt, PIt, GC,EUt,REGTt)               (2) 
 
Where: GDP_CYCLEt is the difference between the real GDP and its trend throughout the 
years; Xt denotes a set of economic variables that determine economic growth at time t. 
                                                          
105
 The parameter λ controls the smoothness of the variance series and thus the volatility of the cycle. 
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Those are: trade openness (TOt), population growth rates (POPt), national expenditure 
(GEt), inflation (I), debt growth rates (Dt);  all telephone entries , including cellular to proxy 
infrastructure (PHONt);  PIt is the socio –political instability indexes constructed for 
Greece; GCt is the index for changes in government caused by non-violent turmoil; EUt 
denotes a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 from the year Greece joined EU and 
onwards and 0 otherwise; REGTt is a dummy takes 1 for the civilian regime type in Greece 
in the period under study, and 0 otherwise; the model also includes the error term to capture 
random shocks on growth over the past. The model estimation starts with the analysis of 
the order of integration of each variable by using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. 
The ADF test is based on the following regression: 
                 
  ΔΥt =α+bt+ρΥt-1+ i ΔΥt-1 +εt                                                      (3) 
 
Where Yt is a variable concerning stationarity; Δ is the first difference operator, t is time 
and εt is the error term. (a) If b≠0 and ρ = -1 implies a trend stationary (TS) model; (b) If 
b=0 and -1<ρ<0 implies an ARMA Box/Jenkins class of models; (c) If b=0 and ρ=0 implies 
a difference stationary (DS) model where Y variable is integrated with degree one. The null 
hypothesis for this test is that the series contain unit roots
106
 and the result for ADF test is 
reported in table 5.4.2 below.  
 
 
                                                          
106
 The data should have a constant mean, variance, and autocorrelation through time (Chatfield, 1984). 
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Table 5.4.2 
TEST FOR STATIONARITY
107
 
VARIABLES ADF TEST 
 LEVEL 
t 
1
st
  
DIFFERENCE 
t 
2
nd
 
DIFFERENCE
108
 
t 
GDP_CYCLE -6.70**   
POP -7.37**   
I -7.49**   
D -1.57 -9.43**  
GE  
7.77 
 
-2.36 
 
-17.36** 
TO -6.30***   
PI -8.03**   
GC -8.62**   
EU -0.66 -9.38**  
REGT -4.08**   
PHON -0.05 -2.05 -9.09** 
Notes 
Estimation with intercept and trend for the level and intercept for the first differences. Lag order is 
determined using AIC with a maximum of 8 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance of rejection of the Null hypothesis of non stationarity at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
The ADF test shows that most variables are stationary
109
 at level; a few become 
stationary either at first or second difference
110
. So the variables in the equation (4) are in 
fact integrated of order.  
To test for heteroscedasticity is the next task. In estimating OLS regression models, as 
in the current study, it is assumed that the variance of the error term is constant. Ordinary 
                                                          
107
 Variables whose means and variance change over time are known as non-stationary or unit root variables 
and sometimes their estimation in a regression might give misleading inferences; that is due to possible 
existence of structural breaks. A series or data often contain a structural break due to a change in policy or 
international disasters or even sudden shocks in the economy (i.e. the Asia Minor events in 1922, World War 
II in 1940 etc).  Structural breaks can be determined through an F –test (Chow test): for example a structural 
break exists in the period that World War II started, in 1940, (F-stat- 2, 34 p. F (7, 67) = 0.336). Thus, by 
following recommendations by Perron and Qu (2006; 2007), structural breaks need to be addressed more 
thoroughly in a future research. 
108
 Second differences in time series have been used in the literature before. See for example Hamilton, 1989; 
Al –Yousif, 2002; Mishra et al, 2009; Adamopoulos, 2010. 
109 For more about unit roots in macroeconomic data and their characteristics see: Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 
Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock, 1992; Libanio, 2005; among others.  
110
 The idea of differencing was developed by Box and Jenkins (1976). 
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least squares estimates are consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity, but the 
conventional standard errors are no longer valid. This assumption of homoscedasticity is 
frequently violated. An explanation lies to the fact that low incomes countries, like Greece, 
adopt more extensively unstable and unreliable policies than higher income countries. 
Thus, in a model where economic cycle is the dependent variable, the error variances 
associated with Greece, which is a low income country, may be much higher. If this is the 
case, then heteroscedasticity exists and appropriate correction for the problem is called for. 
Furthermore, many economic time series are non –linear in nature and a non linear type of 
process that arises in such type of data is the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity –
ARCH- process (Goering and Pippenger, 1994). A number of tests
111
 (like the Durbin -
Watson) followed so as to identify existence of non linearity. Another common used test is 
Engle’s (1982) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test which can be used to detect non linearity in 
the data. Thus, the LM
112
 test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
was employed
113
. A rule of thumb to be followed is to check the p- value of the squared 
residuals if it is significant
114
. The LM test shows that the p-value is 0.0005 (table 6.3) 
which means that we shall reject the null hypothesis that there is no serial autocorrelation, 
thus there is definitely an arch effect. The White Test, the Breuch Pagan test and the Arch 
test, which detect heteroskedastisity and the ARCH effect, are shown in the table 5.6.1 
below. All tests show that we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasity.  
 
                                                          
111
 The discussion of the tests can be found in Appentix III. 
112
 Engle's (1982) Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH-LM) test is the 
undisputed standard test to detect ARCH. 
113 The Box-Ljung Q test is a much better test to check for autocorrelation. 
114 If the p-value is <.05 we cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation. Here the p-value is highly significant 
so the residuals of our model are high correlated. 
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5.5 Estimation of the Model 
This chapter uses the PARCH model by following Higgins and Berra (1992), and 
Ding et al. (1993) proposition of a class of models which allows the optimal power 
transformation to be estimated, so as to investigate the properties of the time series data 
(economic cycles) in Greece. Since Engle's (1982) paper, many extensions and 
generalizations of the ARCH model have appeared
115
. These additions to the family 
endeavored to improve both the mean and variance equations to better capture the stylized 
features of high frequency data (Ding et al, 1993). Higgins and Bera (1992) (and as 
extended by Ding et al. (1993)) suggested a model which expands the ARCH class of 
models to analyzing a wider class of power transformations than simply taking the absolute 
value or squaring the data as in the conventional models. The conventional ARCH models 
focus on absolute or squared features in the data (or the conditional variance is related to 
lagged absolute or squared residuals and lagged conditional standard deviations or 
variances).This class of models is called power ARCH (PARCH). Additional features of 
those models are that they are closely related to the ARCH model introduced by Ding and 
Granger (1996) and the integrated GARCH introduced by Baillie et al. (1996).  
Since Engle's (1982) and Bollerslev's (1986) work, ARCH
116
 models have been 
widely used in the analyses of financial markets (i.e. stock prices, interest rates, or 
exchange rates).An ARCH (autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic) model is a model 
                                                          
115 For more see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992); Bera and Higgins (1993); and Bollerslev, Engle and 
Nelson (1994). 
116 Yet, there currently exists an actual family of ARCH models integrating the original ARCH model of 
Engle, the generalised ARCH (GARCH) model of Bollerslev (1986) as well as a host of other models (see 
Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson (1994) or Bera and Higgins (1993) for a survey). A further recent development 
in the ARCH literature devoted to the power term by which the data are transformed known as PARCH 
(Power ARCH) introduced by Ding et al. (1993).  
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for the variance of a time series.  The ARCH models are used to describe a changing, 
possibly volatile variance.  Although an ARCH model could possibly be used to describe a 
gradually increasing variance over time, most often it is used in situations in which there 
may be short periods of increased variation. However, the ARCH models have been applied 
also in macroeconomics (not only in finance and risk analysis); even though their usage is 
less frequent
117
 (Hamilton, 2008).  The original ARCH model
118
 speculates the existence of 
a relationship between past squared deviations of the observations and their existing 
conditional variances (Fornari and Mele, 1997). Hence, Engle (1982) recommends the 
ARCH model, in the cases where the conditional estimated variance depends on past 
information, in order to overcome the uncertain hypothesis of one-period estimated error.  
Under ARCH, maximum likelihood estimates are more efficient than those of OLS. Engle 
(1982) presumes that the conditional variance is a positive function of the values of the 
lagged squared error terms instead of a fixed constant. In other words, the conditional 
variance, below represented in equation (3), depends on p lags of squared errors, and the 
ARCH (p) model is specified by: 
                                                                   (3)                                                                                   
 Where α0 >0,  αi ≥0 (i=1,…,p) to avoid negative variance.  
Here  is the conditional variance at time t, α0 is a constant parameter, and αi is the ARCH 
coefficients. Since  is the conditional variance its value must always be positive. In order 
to ensure that the equation is meaningful, all the coefficients in the right hand side of the 
                                                          
117 Examples of papers which used ARCH, GARCH  & PARCH models in macroeconomic applications are: 
Lee, Ni, and Ratti, 1995; Grier and Perry, 2000; Servén, 2003; Elder and Serletis, 2006; Fountas and 
Karanasos, 2007; Campos and Karanasos, 2008. 
118 Bollerslev, 1986; Nelson, 1991; Glosten et al., 1993 ;) and others have generalized the basic ARCH 
model in various directions, for both finance and economics. 
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equation, namely αi are required to be non-negative. Since the conditional variance is 
affected by the past squared errors , and αi are non-negative the present volatility is 
positively correlated with the past error terms
119
. Furthermore, Pagan and Sabau (1987) 
highlight that an incorrect functional form of the ARCH process for the errors of a 
regression model can result in inconsistent maximum likelihood estimators of the 
regression parameters which is the case for the Greek data under the ARCH(1) model. 
Although Engle (1982) focused on the convenient linear ARCH model, he acknowledged 
that ‘it is likely that other formulations of the variance model may be more appropriate for 
particular applications’ (p. 993). Therefore, as aforementioned, the ARCH family of models 
was extended beyond the specification of the initial ARCH model of Engle (1982) and the 
GARCH model of Bollerslev (1986). Ding et al. (1993) argue that the use of a squared term 
is probably quite restrictive and maybe other power terms might be more efficient. As such 
extended specifications were proposed which allows the optimal power transformation (at 
the variance equation). The general asymmetric power ARCH model introduced by Ding et 
al. (1993) specifies t as of the form: 
  
                             (4) 
Where: the αi and βi are the standard ARCH and GARCH parameters, the γi are the 
leverage parameters and d>0 is the parameter for the power term. In this chapter the 
restrictions made are
120
: αi =1 for i>1, d
121
= from 0.7 (estimation 1 in table 5.5.1) to 0.82 
(fixed) and, and βi = 0, γi = 0 (results are presented in table (5.5.1) below): 
                                                          
119 The arch test for the current chapter showed N*R2=13.17 with a p-value=(0.0003).  
120
 The restrictions made in this chapter are similar to the ones proposed by Higgins and Bera (1992). 
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Table 5.5.1 
ESTIMATION RESULTS -PARCH -GREECE 1919-2008 
Dependent variable 
GDP_CYCLE 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
C 
0.015 
(2.35)** 
0.003 
(0.77) 
0.01 
(1.77) 
0.002 
(0.92) 
POP 
 
0.74 
(1.99)** 
0. 89 
(2.56)** 
0.82 
(2.51)** 
0. 87 
(2. 59)** 
GE 
 
-0.005 
(-0.86) 
0.01 
(1.56) 
0.007 
(2.24)** 
0.002 
(1.98)* 
I 
 
-0.02 
(-1.43) 
-0.05 
(-0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.73) 
-0.004 
(-8.28) 
TO 
 
0.05 
(6.13)** 
0.04 
(2.68)** 
0.06 
(3.77)** 
0.02 
(3.54)** 
D 
-0.0001 
(-0.42)    
PI 
 
-0.002 
(-0.90) 
-0.003 
(-1.98)** 
-0.003 
(-2.12)** 
-0.004 
(-2.24)** 
GC 
 
-0.003 
(-3.49)** 
-0.002 
(-0.71)*  
-0.003 
(-1.86)* 
EU 
 
0.0012 
(0.30) 
0.003 
(0.058) 
-0.001 
(-0.002)  
PHON 
 
6.66 
(1.40) 
5.22 
(0.56) 
3.21 
(0.54)  
REGT 
 
-0.03 
(-5.12)** 
-0.008 
(-1.87)* 
-0.02 
(-3.61)** 
-0.02 
(-4.51)** 
R2(122) 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 
N 87 87 87 87 
D-W stat 1.58 1.59 1.57 1.58 
Arch Test 
N*R2=0.04 
p-value=(0.91) 
N*R2=0.62 
p-value=(0.43) 
N*R2=0.71 
p-value=(0.98) 
N*R2=0.65 
p-value=(0.79) 
α0 
0.02 
(2.93)** 
0.03 
(6.60)** 
0.02 
(4.12)** 
0.02 
(2.93)** 
α1 
0.92 
(4.74)** 
0.73 
(4.65)** 
0.85 
(4.84)** 
0.89 
(4.74)** 
d 0.7 0.82 0.82 0.82 
F-stat
123
 
            5.17 
         (0.010)* 
1.81 
(0.458) 
4..61 
(0.010)* 
4.82 
(0.010)* 
z-statistics is reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. 
αi is the ARCH parameter and α0 the constant and d the power from (4). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
121
 By following recommendations made by Campos et al.(2012) the heteroskedacity parameter d is fixed 
ranging from 0.7 to 0.82.  
122
 The low R
2
 is a result of firstly poor measurement of labour (population growth rates) and secondly due to 
missing variable ‘capital/fixed assets’ result of non availability of data for Greece.  
123 F-statistics or likelihood ratio statistic tests whether the unrestricted model shall be rejected when 
compared with the restricted one. In our estimation, we specify the unrestricted model as one without the 
restriction of power d in estimation, and the restricted model as one with the restriction of power d at a value 
presented in the Table 5.5.1. Our estimation shows, (with exception in column 2, that the unrestricted model, 
as null hypothesis indicates that should be rejected so that the specified power d in the restricted estimation or 
model is statistically justified) that the PARCH model with restricted d is better fitted in the current chapter’s 
analysis.      
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The results for this chapter are essentially summarized in the table (5.5.1). Table 5.5.1 
above, shows that significant and positive (procyclical
124
) effects on economic cycles in 
Greece are: trade openness and population (proxy for labor force). Negative 
(countercyclical) effects on economic cycles cause: the governmental expenditure
125
, 
inflation, PI, regime type1 (proxy for democracy), and the governmental changes. Acyclical 
are debt
126
, EU and phones (a proxy for infrastructure). 
To start with, the population growth
127
 (used as proxy for labor) has a positive and 
significant effect on economic cycle. That result is consistent with the Simon-Steinmann 
Economic Growth Model
128
 (even though no clear cut generalizations can be made for all 
the countries around the globe). Hence, Simon (1987) noted that in the long run the 
population growth has a positive net effect on economic growth. A rapidly growing 
population implies a fast increase in a country’s labor force. A large proportion of young 
people in the labor force ease the technological adjustments and economic growth through 
their greater flexibility and mobility. Hence, it encourages productive advances such as 
technological progress, efficient and wise usage of natural resources, which may increase 
saving and thus, economic growth. Moreover, the population growth in Greece thrived 
through strong governmental health care and social policies especially after the 1950s. 
                                                          
124 A variable is procyclical if the contemporaneous statistically significant correlation coefficient between 
the variable under study and output is positive. The opposite, countercyclical relates to negative correlation 
and insignificant coefficient leads to acyclical relationship.  
125
 In Greece the increase in public expenditure after the 1950s, (especially salaries and wages) resulted at an 
increase in the public debt since the biggest part of the Greek governmental spending was financed by 
national borrowing. When the variable debt is not included in the regression national expenditure become 
procyclical due to different direction (development) of monetary resources for developmental purposes.   
126 See Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999 for a literature survey on public debt.  
127
 The impact of population growth can be dated from Thomas R. Malthus's era (with his work ‘An Essay on 
the Principle of Population’ 1803; reprint, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1971). 
128
 The basic idea to the theory introduced by Julian Simon and Gunter Steinmann is that the greater the total 
population, the greater the level of technological growth yielding greater per capita income. Simon (1987) 
also refers to the above theory as the ‘Population Push’ model. 
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Moreover, larger population density has particular advantages for the provision of 
education, transportation, and sanitation. The aforementioned makes the result consistent 
with the fact that in regression (1), table 5.5.1, the proxy for infrastructure (phones) is 
affecting the Greek economy in a positive way.  
An interesting finding is that the governmental changes index has a significant negative 
effect which makes it countercyclical to growth cycles. The obvious conclusion is that the 
effects from the multiparty democratic regimes and the different policies which stem from 
the different political party boost the economy. The negative impact of political instability 
on boosting economic growth is consistent with the previous literature
129
 (which 
investigates case studies) and it is been associated with both violent and less violent 
governmental changes (political instability
130
 and governmental changes). Greeks have a 
passionate and somehow obsessed interest for politics. The multi -party system in Greece is 
a possible reason which directs to social unrest or ideological conflicts
131
 into the society. 
According to Esteban and Ray (2008) the intensity of conflict or unrest is closely 
associated with the degree of party fractionalization. And that the above relationship is 
reverse. This is the case for this research also since in Greece the number of parties 
correlates with the social unrest indices, which negatively affects economic growth cycles. 
Another explanation stems from what Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) describe as 
poor governance in countries which they built strong national political parties with 
inefficient political representatives who care only for their personal career, especially in 
                                                          
129 For empirical evidence that supports this claim, see: Asteriou and Syriopoulos, 2000; Asteriou and Price, 
2001; Ghura and Mercereau, 2004; Campos and Karanasos, 2008; among others.  
130
 The indicators that have been used in PCA are shown in Appendix II.  
131
 For more about the relation of party fractionalization and conflict see Esteban and Ray, 2008.  
154 
 
developing countries (such as Greece).  All the above seems to cover the political arena in 
Greece over the last 90 years.  
The governmental spending indicator is insignificant in (1) and (2) (no effect on the 
economic cycles). The main reason behind that is that politicians and policy makers in 
Greece followed the governmental expansion policies concept. In other words, they 
consider that through the governmental spending will provide enhanced public goods (i.e. 
infrastructure and education or health) and higher salaries (especially for the public 
servants). However, this governmental spending over the years (especially when there was 
no proper income for the government) led to inefficient usage of productive resources, 
constant tax reforms, budget deficits and higher interest rates which led to an almost 
bankrupt nation. Hence, according to La Feber (1980), USA
132
  controlled the Greek 
economy (taxes, budget, foreign exchange and credit) and the national political affairs 
(after the Civil War -1946-1949 the Greek government was divided and could not control 
the internal unrest effectively), after World War II. Hence, in the governmental expenditure 
the defense expenditure are included, which as can be seen from the table 5.2.3 
comparatively are very high. 
Furthermore, the debt indicator is countercyclical which is consistent with the previous 
literature
133
. On the contrary many researchers
134
 support the fact that debt can be 
procyclical to economic cycles. This means that fiscal policy should be procyclical only in 
recessions, when the government wants to borrow but the economic situation prohibits 
                                                          
132
  In 1947 England stopped the military –economic aid to Greece and America interfered with the Truman’s 
doctrine which came into action and affected both the economic and political arenas in Greece for more than a 
decade (1947-1960). 
133
 See Kumar and Woo (2010); Aghion and Marinescou (2008); Barro (1979),  among others.  
134
 For further discussion of the debt’s procyclicycality see Alesina and Tabelini (1990) and Alesina et al. 
(2008) among others. 
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creating more debt. An alternative explanation describes a procyclical fiscal policy as the 
effect of the political agency problem
135
. However, this is not the case of Greece. The 
governmental spending was not used principally to build up national public capital or to 
improve the inflation policies, but it was used mainly for defense and security reasons. 
Furthermore, many times throughout the economic Greek history, the payment of interest 
rates was not manageable to pay and the tax revenues were not enough to cover the Greek 
governmental expenses. Thus, the debt was increasing and a solution through stabilizing 
financial policies were not occurred which led to the current economic crisis.    
Interestingly the indicator of democracy (regime_type1 indicator) has a negative effect 
on economic growth (countercyclical) in Greece. The main reason is that the governmental 
policies in Greece, throughout the 20
th
 century, were following a trend towards 
redistribution and not towards growth. A second reason is that the political system in 
Greece was dominated by a group of elite politicians who also dominated the decision 
making area by using ‘political resources according to their own personal interests, and the 
political authority is largely exercised based on clientelist traditions. Both indicators of the 
EU integration and as a result EU influence in the Greek affairs, and the infrastructure, 
have an insignificant (acyclical) effect on the Greek economy as expected by economic 
theories. Trade openness
 136
 is positively (procyclical) and inflation
137
 affects the economy 
negatively (countercyclical) which are consistent with the existing findings from 
literature
138
 that small open economies are profoundly influenced by the terms of trade. 
                                                          
135
 For more information see Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
136
 For more information see Knütter and Wagner, 2011.  
137
 For an analysis of inflation and the business cycles see Bajada, 2002.  
138
 For more see Apergis and Panethimitakis (2006).  
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To sum up, Greece had to fight a number of costly wars and participate as an unequal 
partner in the EU under powers such as UK, France, and Germany. Previous literature refer 
to the dependence of Greece in external funds without mentioning that the majority of loans 
were used by the government not to enhance the private sector (investment) but to finance 
the governmental spending and most probably previous debts which created a vicious cycle 
in both the economic the political foreign dominant arenas. 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The 20
th
 century was dominated by an unstable political and economic environment. 
The relationship between political stability and economic performance elevated a 
continuous debate in both the economic and the political economic literature in the past 
decades. The common scholarly perception is that an essential condition for economic 
growth is a stable political environment. The previous research focused both in a global and 
in a regional context, emphasized that political instability creates uncertainties in both 
political and economic environment. That in turn distorts economic decisions (i.e. 
investment, production etc.) which reduce long –run economic growth.      
 The venture of this chapter was to investigate the effect of political instability and debt 
on economic cycles in modern Greece. Greece was a poor country, from the beginning of 
its existence as a free nation. It was an underdeveloped country until the late 1950s, with 
low productivity in agriculture and a very weak industrial sector (a situation partly 
accredited to the Civil War between1944 - 1949). The result of the Greek Civil War was 
the defeat and banning of communists and the establishment of a political system which 
added anti-communism to Greek party politics. In the meantime international forces (i.e. 
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USA) and the army had become imperative forces in Greek politics. Both Civil war and the 
failure of the right wing governments to push forward a concrete industrialization program 
drove Greece once again to depend in external funding.  
Furthermore, the findings show that, in a historical context, the growth was booming 
through the investment in human capital, the openness to trade and infrastructure 
(procyclical movement of the variables). The unstable political environment (captured in 
the current chapter with two indexes –political instability and governmental changes) 
created busts in the Greek economy (countercyclical movement of the above variables). 
The national expenditure was also busting the economy but the question which remains is 
whether this spending was driven in the right direction (e.g. investment and support of the 
business activities) and the resources of these revenues for spending, since Greece was 
depending for a long time on foreign funds and loans. 
 The European integration variable seems acyclical which means that has no effect on 
the Greek economic cycles. What is interesting though is that the democracy indicator 
(regime_type1) is countercyclical to GDP cycles which mean that it eventually busts the 
economy.    
Previous literature (e.g. Passas and Labrinidis, 2011) state that the current situation 
(high rates of debt and instability) in Greece are the outcomes of the policies made in the 
mid 1970s and 1980s (the government did not achieve structural changes, or adjust the 
banking system, the capital markets, the tax collection system which on line with huge 
amounts of governmental spending, resulted in economic imbalances and budget deficits). 
However, I strongly believe that the problem existed since 1830s the year of Greek 
independence. Many reasons drove the current stagnation in Greece e.g. inflation, public 
158 
 
debt, irrational management of public resources and extensive funds’ waste. There is a need 
in the current era not only to alleviate the public debt with other loans but to place it in a 
downward trajectory in the long run.  
In short, for the Greek case a valid reality is that for many decades (especially after the 
Revolution of the Colonels in 1964) politicians focused too much in the notion of the 
democratic ideology and to promote and establish democracy rather than economic 
development of the country. This ideology dominated the attention on governmental 
policies that can inevitably be paid by the price of poor economic growth, which ultimately 
caused the current economic crisis.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
6.1 Summary  
What is the connection between political regimes, political instability and economic 
growth in a country? The link between these three phenomena occupied scholars and 
politicians for many decades. However, this continuum of scholarly concern, related to the 
role of politics and the development of nations, concluded in three different replicas: first, 
the political regimes generate development and thus economic growth by keeping the 
people happy and therefore supportive, second, a country’s economic growth determines 
the basis of its political system and depending on the level of the growth the reactions of 
the people vary and third the political regimes (and its channel –political instability) have 
no association with economic growth in a country.  
The previous literature (e.g. Lipset (1959), Huntington (1968), Bueno de Mosquita and 
Downs (2005), Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin (2004, 2005), Przeworski and Limongi 
(2000), among others), explicate most of the determinants of growth which would justify 
any possible connection between growth and political regimes in a country and as extend 
the people’s reaction. Still, most of the previous literature referred to mainly the democratic 
regimes as either the regime which generates economic growth or as the regime which 
result from growth. To name a few arguments, Huntington states that ‘few relationships 
between social, economic, and political phenomena are stronger than that between the level 
of economic development and the existence of democratic politics’ (2003: 97). Przeworski 
et al. (2003) examines the conditions which determine the prevailing of democratic or 
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authoritarian regime in a country. Specifically, Przeworski et al. (2003) identify and 
evaluate development as the main factor associated with the political regimes in a country 
(among other factors such as the history, political culture institutions etc). 
In recent years, the transitions to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America, 
and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and in ex-Soviet Union, have given new 
impulse to the debate concerned the role of the political regimes and their institutions, and 
especially the democratic ones, in generating economic growth. By understanding the way 
political regimes affect economic growth is fundamental for both theoretical and practical 
reasons. Not only there is an intrinsic value in knowing how politics affects development, 
but also is crucial in understanding the policy decisions under the above relationship.   
Through reviewing the literature of political economy of development, economics and 
politics and the studies of key intellectuals such as Lipset, Huntington, De Mosquita and 
Downs etc., this thesis showed that although there are patterns and theoretical explanations 
related to the connection between economic growth, political instability and political 
regimes, in the case of Western European countries only a mixture of these explanations 
suit. In order to explain these theoretical links and patterns between democracy and 
economic growth this thesis discussed the key political and economic theories associated 
with the above relationship and their theoretical explanations. Then, it empirically 
described and tested the theories to conclude that there is a link between the political 
regimes and economic growth with reference to Western European countries. Finally, this 
thesis tested both the theory and the results draw from the previous chapters, in a country 
case study, Greece, as a means of ‘complementarity of [a] single-unit and cross-unit 
research designs… with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units’(Gerring, 
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2004:341). Thus, the combination of the above two methods ‘of analysis offers the most 
valuable tool for policy makers as well as for researchers’ (Isaksson and Hee Ng, 2006:iii). 
That led to the discovery that the analytical perspective of the democratization process 
is not the same in every country in the world and that some cases such as the Greek one 
should be reconsidered and re-understand the controversy over development and the regime 
type by taking into consideration the historical events and the country’s culture and 
political structure.  
 
6.2 The relation between political regimes and economic growth- discussion  
Development and economic competitiveness have become an important objective for 
many nations. However, despite attempts to achieve long-term economic growth, it has 
evaded from many countries. The concern of whether the political regimes promote 
economic growth or the economic well being is a precondition to the regime type goes back 
to 1950s. Much ink has been spent on trying to explain, to analyze and test cases over 
whether the economic growth leads to democratic regime or not. Some economies have 
grown rapidly over the last decades, while others have languished, subjecting a large 
portion of their populations to grinding poverty. What explains this wide variance in 
economic performance? Economists have as yet only explained roughly half of the story. 
Having recognized that traditional models only account for half of the variance, research 
began to centre on political factors. By examining the results of all the previous literature, 
one will observe that they were inconclusive and they left space to be continuing. 
Even though they reached some conclusions such as that there are some indicators i.e. 
per capita income, property rights, pressures for immediate consumption etc. most 
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researchers concluded that the political regime and in particular democracy, is related to 
economic development and that the existence of non-democratic regimes lead countries to 
poverty: ‘The more well to- do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy. . . .’ (Lipset, 2003: 56). The fact is however, that ‘the conclusion is that social 
scientists know surprisingly little’(Przeworski and Limongi, 1993:51); thus each case 
should be researched under cautious moves and by considering the history, culture and the 
specific needs of each state or region. Moreover, there should be a clear understanding on 
this point of what a regime type is and what is its distinction to the state; ‘the regime type 
refers to the form of government and the way decisions are made [whilst] a key function of 
the state is to promote economic growth and deliver developmental outcomes’ (Menocal, 
2007).  
As said by Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens there were two research traditions 
which dealt with whether social or economic conditions favor a political regime and 
especially democracy: ‘cross-national quantitative studies and comparative historical work’ 
(1993: 71). Lipset published an essay in 1959, in cross –national quantitative research, by 
using a range of aggregate data on development and democracy and he observed that there 
was actually a positive connection between development and democracy and gave the 
stimulus and opened the way for the other researchers in this topic. Lipset (1959) used the 
modernization theory as his theoretical interpretation, a conception in which society, 
economy and the political regime are related.  Furthermore, according to Huber, 
Rueschemeyer and Stephens ‘the interpretation of [Lipset’s] results …put primary 
emphasis on the spread of communication and education and the growth of the middle 
classes, all of which were supposed to lead to greater political interest…thus creating the 
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behavioral basis for democratic governance’ (1993: 72). Lipset’s result was questioned by 
intellectuals of comparative historical studies, and the most prominent example was the 
work of Moore, The social origins of Dictatorship and Democracy in 1966. Moore’s work 
and other’s such as O’ Donnell (1973), talked about the chances of democracy as 
capitalistic economic development spread around the world. Those intellectuals’ analysis 
was built on political economy’s approach and came to the conclusion, as Moore wrote, 
that ‘the route that ended up in capitalist democracy…was itself a part of history that 
almost certainly will not be repeated’ (Moore, 1966: 5).  
In the 20
th
 century issues such as democracy, dictatorship and totalitarianism were fore 
fronted. Historically, the 20
th
 century created the need to research the development of a 
country under specific political regimes such as democracy and dictatorship, and tried to 
explain and analyze the connections among those objectives. Many papers, books and 
conferences have documented the fact that there is a close relationship between a country’s 
political regime and its development (Hadenius, 1992; Midlarsky, 1997). However, 
parameters such as the political culture of a country, the political learning of a country’s 
people and a country’s history require further research.  
 
6.3 Contribution  
From the post-war years to the present, the US and major Western European 
countries such as Britain and France and even the Federal Republic of Germany and later 
the reunified Germany and Italy, (previously a Fascist and a Nazi country), have 
established the parliamentary democracy as their political system. A justification lies to that 
this phenomenon depends on the economic prosperity and social stability that the European 
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Western countries achieved in that era (even though they experienced sporadic economic 
recession and social turmoil). Another explanation could be that the above success was 
accomplished by their constant efforts in which they reallocated resources in their 
economic, social, and industrial policies and they changed the role of the state (e.g. 
extensive economic planning and systematic government intervention) in so flexible a way 
that they might successfully respond to the changing economic and political conditions.  
The sustained, high economic growth in Western Europe during the post-war period and up 
to 1973 led to remarkable changes in the region but drastically everything changed 
thereafter. In recent years, the liberalization of international trade has clearly demonstrated 
that European industry can not compete with the Asian industry.  Most European countries 
have suffered high and remarkably constant unemployment and the growth rates were less 
than 2% in a yearly basis. The above historical events captivated the interest to undergo 
with the current research.  
The question which this thesis investigated was the effects of political regimes and 
instability on economic growth (whether the changing political environment affected the 
economic area and vice versa) in the Western world.  To do so, a broad set of political 
indicators were used and a more clear measure of democracy (civilian regimes) so as to 
avoid stretching of its definition (see introduction for more information).  
Another significant input of this thesis is the endogeneity test between political 
instability and economic growth which has not been tested and presented empirically (at 
least not to my knowledge). Previous research presumed the existence of endogeneity based 
on previous literature and as such researchers were trying to take endogeneity (between the 
above two variables) into account into their calculations. Additionally, the previous 
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research was measuring political instability either with individual indicators or by 
contacting factor analysis (e.g. Jong a Pin, 2009; Fielding, 2003) among variables that have 
used by previous research. This thesis, by following the political theory of political unstable 
systems and instability (Gupta, 1990), explained the reasons behind the chosen variables 
and their implication in the political system. Furthermore, this thesis constructed an index 
of political instability by contacting PCA so as to capture the effects of each individual 
political indicator into the index.   
A very interesting finding and input at the same time, is the implication and effects of 
the sovereign debt in relation with the defence expenditure, into the booms and busts of the 
Greek economy. By contacting a historical research from 1919 until 2008 this thesis shed 
light into the problematic Greek economic situation by revealing that part of the Greek debt 
is due to high defence expenditure and misallocation of the governmental resources. The 
investigation of the sovereign debt in relation with the violent and non-violent citizenry’ 
behaviour and their effects on the economic booms and busts, was not examined that 
thoroughly before (to my knowledge).  
 
6.4 Policy Implications 
This thesis investigated the relationship between politics and economics. In particular 
it examined the direct and indirect effects of political institutions on economic growth in 
developed countries. The political institutions in question are the political regimes and the 
political instability which is related to governmental and societal stability and policy 
uncertainty. This thesis, further, captured the effects of politics on long-term trends on 
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economic growth, rather than short-run factors (e.g., transitional crises, external shocks). 
Thus, the outcome variable is the long-term yearly rate of economic growth.  
Policy uncertainty is one of the most important issues related to economic growth. It 
causes problems by lowering investment, increasing inflation and in turn by increasing 
people’s discontent. People’s discontent leads to political instability which is a major 
outcome of policy’s failure to provide security and happiness to the people. As a result of 
that, violence, demonstrations and a high turnover rate in government leads to the inability 
to develop policy consensus. The above, consecutively leads to the governmental inability 
to adopt a consistent long-term growth policy by ending in handicapping economic growth. 
A profound conclusion of this thesis is that good governance
139
 (the way that government 
exercise their power and the decision made) matters for both people’s happiness and the 
polity’s stability which are profoundly related to economic growth.  
Consequently, governance and especially good governance ‘have permeated 
development discourse and especially research agendas and other activities funded by 
public and private banks and bilateral donors’ (Weiss 2000: 796).  The need for change the 
way governments operate, was signaled by the 1997 World Development Report (The State 
in a Changing Word) which argues that a successful and efficient state is fundamental for 
the setting the rules for the production of good and services, the institutions’ agendas, the 
way markets work and progress which lead to people’s happier lives. It is generally 
accepted that a way to progress is to change (to develop) and that change needs to be in line 
with a state’s culture and structure. Therefore, a way to achieve sustainable growth is to 
                                                          
139
 Good governance, according to the UNDP, is the way a state deals with its political, economic and 
administrative affairs through the mechanisms, processes and institutions and by allowing the citizens to 
pursue their interest and exercise their legal obligations.  
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reform both institutions and the way governments exercise their power. The basic concern 
should not be anymore the competition between states for power but the people’s happiness 
and security otherwise their discontent will lead to policy failures and underdevelopment.  
Currently, the world undergoes a major economic crisis. The question which arose in 
the past couple of years is what led the whole world to fail economically especially after 
the third way of democratization. My question is how we will be able to overcome this 
failure which seems to be not a societal failure but the outcome of wrong governmental 
decisions. It is clear that there is a gap in policy reforms. The answer lies to the past: wealth 
sharing and redistributive policies made possible the boost of economic growth. 
Additionally, the rise of welfare state and progressive taxation smoothed the integration of 
capitalism and democracy in today developed countries, and that that fiscal treaties and 
agreements was achievable in the context of specific internal and external threats. The role 
of the state should be to create the conditions for a stable political and legal environment 
and the role of political institutions should be to facilitate socio-political interactions to 
mobilize the people to participate in economic, social and political decisions. That will 
increase the possibility of sustained growth and help the European countries to overcome 
the current situation.   Thus, a clear suggestion, especially for Western Europe, is to start 
thinking about which policies and institutions are suitable to provide help and legitimize the 
gaps that have been left in policies, and about which supranational (EU) and domestic 
governance changes are required to estimate the political conditions that unremitted the 
permutation between growth and social progress in successful cases. 
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6.5 Future research 
‘This democracy thing: would it really matter if it withered in the world’s vines in 
the coming years?’ (Keane, 840: 2010). This question needs a further examination 
especially during the current economic crisis. How can the existing political institutions 
help the world to overcome this economic crisis and avoid another Great Depression? In a 
world that power can be gained with many ways (even in democratic polities) such as 
backroom agreements, the investigation of democracy as a global value and not a Western 
ideal needs further examination by account the current economic crisis and the people’s 
revolts. 
Another interesting topic which needs to be addressed further is the relationship 
between the sovereign debt and the high defense expenditure with reference to the Greek 
case. The findings reveal that this relationship is partly one of the causes of the current 
economic troubles in Greece. The fear of another Turkish invasion and the instability in the 
Balkans lead Greece to spend enormous amounts of money for security and locate 
governmental recourses to that direction instead of supporting private investment and 
private enterprises. Future research needs to address the above relationship and imply 
policy resolution measures.  
Lastly, future research needs to further analyze the politico-economic map (figure 
2.6.3) that this thesis formed by empirically testing it into both developed and developing 
countries. The above will give us a better understanding of the situation of each individual 
country related to both their political and economic systems so as to form policy 
recommendations of economic growth.      
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APPENDIX I 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES DEFINITION 
VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
 
GRGDPCH Growth Rate of RGDPCH (GDP)  
Employment rates 2A Employment, general level (Thousands)-LABORSTA 
Labour Statistics Database 
Debt  National Statistic Service of Greece (Statistical Yearbooks 
different volumes 
Defense  
National Defense Expenditure is calculated from National 
Government Expenditure and the ratio National Defense 
Expenditure/National Government Expenditure (data in per 
capita form) SIPRI Yearbooks different volumes. 
 
Governmental Investment  
Government Expenditure 
 
 
The component shares of real GDP for 1996 are obtained 
directly from a multilateral Geary aggregation over all the 
countries. Shares will not add up to 100 because the 
denominator includes the net foreign balance. 
Inflation   
 
Openness to trade: OPENC 
Exports plus Imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a 
percentage of GDP. The export and import figures are in 
national currencies from the World Bank and United Nations 
data archives. 
Real GDP per capita (Constant 
Prices: Laspeyres): RGDPL 
RGDPL is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, 
government and exports, and subtracting imports in any 
given year. The given year components are obtained by 
extrapolating the1996 values in international dollars from the 
Geary aggregation using national growth rates. It is a fixed 
base index where the reference year is 1996, hence the 
designation "L" for Laspeyeres. 
POP: Population Population (in thousands)-from Penn World tables and 
Madison.  
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POLITICAL VARIABLES DEFINITION 
VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
Antigovernment 
Demonstrations 
 
Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the 
primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations 
of distinctly anti foreign nature. 
Assassinations 
The average number of political assassinations per year per 
million populations. 
Average Years of Schooling Years of schooling, population aged 15 to 64. 
Cabinet Changes 
The number of times in a year that a new premier is named 
or 50 percent of the cabinet posts is occupied by new 
ministers. 
Constitutional Changes 
 
The number of basic alterations in a state’s constitutional 
structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a new 
constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the 
various branches of the government. 
Coups d’état 
The number of extra constitutional or forced changes in the 
top government elite or its effective control of the nation’s 
power structure in a given year. Unsuccessful coups are not 
counted 
Effexec  
 
Refers to the individual who exercises primary influence in 
the shaping of most major decisions affecting the nation's 
internal and external affairs. The "other" category may refer 
to a situation in which the individual in question (such as the 
party first secretary in a Communist regime) holds no formal 
governmental post, or to one in which no truly effective 
national executive can be said to exist. 
                   (1) Monarch 
                   (2) President 
                   (3) Premier 
                   (4) Military 
                   (5) Other 
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Ethnic fractionalization 
Ethnic fractionalization index. 
EU influence Dummy variable (1=years since Greece joined EU 
0=otherwise) 
General Strikes 
 
Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that 
involves more than one employer and that is aimed at 
national government policies or authority. 
 
Governmental crises  
Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of 
revolt aimed at such overthrow. 
 
 
Guerrilla Warfare 
Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed 
at the overthrow of the present regime. 
 
Head state  
Head of State 
(1) Monarch.  Chief of state is a monarch (either hereditary 
or elective) or a regent functioning on a monarch's behalf. 
(2) President. Chief of state is a president who may function 
as a chief executive or merely as titular head of state, in 
which case he will possess little effective power. The 
presiding officer of a legislative assembly or state council 
may qualify for the coding, even though the formal title may 
be that of "chairman". 
(3) Military.  A situation in which a member of the nation's 
armed forces is recognized as the formal head of 
government. In case of conflict between (2) and (3), coding 
is determined on the basis of whether the incumbent’s role is 
intrinsically military or civilian in character. 
(4) Other.  This category is generally used when no distinct 
head of state can be identified; it also includes individuals 
not included in (1-3), such as theocratic rulers, as well as 
nonmilitary individuals serving in a collegial capacity. 
 
Legislative elections 
 The number of elections held for the lower house of a 
national legislature in a given year. A limited number of by-
elections are included, but most are not. 
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Party fractionalization index  
Is a party fractionalization index, based on a formula 
proposed by Douglas Rae in "A Note on the 
Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems", 
Comparative Political Studies, 1 (October 1968), 413-418. 
The index is constructed as follows: 
                                                            m 
                                                F = 1 - Σ (ti)
2 
                                                           i=i 
                                               where ti = the proportion of 
members associated with th ith party in the lower house of 
the legislature (where there are no parties, a zero is entered). 
In calculating the Index entries, independents are disregarded 
and legislative changes between elections are not taken into 
account. It should also be noted that sources vary on the 
distribution of seats (and even the overall number of seats) 
for many countries; thus figures calculated by different 
researchers may vary.    
 
Phones 
Proxy for infrastructure - all telephone entries , including 
cellular. 
Polity2  
Revised Combined Polity Score (The POLITY score is 
computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the 
DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from 
+10 (strongly democratic) to !10(strongly autocratic)). It 
modifies the Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual 16 
combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple 
treatment, or ““fix,” to convert instances of “standardized 
authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional 
polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). 
Purges 
Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of 
political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the 
opposition. 
Regime type 
(1) Civilian. Any government controlled by a nonmilitary 
component of the nation's population. 
(2) Military-Civilian. Outwardly civilian government 
controlled by military elite. Civilians hold only those posts 
(up to and including that of Chief of State) for which their 
services are deemed necessary for successful conduct of 
government operations. An example would be retention of 
the Emperor and selected civilian cabinet members during 
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the period of Japanese military hegemony between 1932 and 
1945. 
(3) Military. Direct rule by the military, usually (but not 
necessarily) following a military coup d'état. The governing 
structure may vary from utilization of the military chain of 
command under conditions of martial law to the institution 
of an ad hoc administrative hierarchy with at least an upper 
echelon staffed by military personnel. 
(4) Other.  All regimes not falling into one or another of the 
foregoing categories, including instances in which a country, 
save for reasons of exogenous influence, lacks an effective 
national government. An example of the latter would be 
Switzerland between 1815 and 1848. 
Revolutions 
Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any 
attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful 
armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
government. 
Riots 
Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens 
involving the use of physical force. 
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LIST OF COUNTRIES  
(used in Chapter 3-Chapter 4) 
 
 
Austria 
 
 
 
Luxembourg 
Belgium  Malta 
Denmark  Netherlands 
Finland  Norway 
France  Portugal 
Germany (west Germany before 
the 1990) 
 Spain 
Greece  Sweden 
Iceland  Switzerland 
Ireland  Turkey 
Italy  United Kingdom 
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APPENDIX II 
In addition to the direct use of measurements, it has been employed Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) as a mean to identify unobserved common factors –in the stability of the 
regime in this case. The use of PCA is been employed in order to orthogonize possible 
regression problems (multicolinearity in this case) by replacing a set of highly correlated 
indicators by their Principal Components (PCs) or as there are known by artificial 
variables. According to Hotteling (1933) PCs are a smaller set of primary uncorrelated 
variables that determine the value of the original variables. In short, PCs are mathematical 
linear derivatives from the original variables.  
The main purpose of the PCA is to reduce the number of the correlated variables (in this 
case the political events) by choosing their PCs (uncorrelated variables) which they explain 
most of the variation in all the original variables. That way an alternative and much simpler 
description of the data (than the original data) will be obtained. It is notable here that PCA 
focus on variances without ignoring covariance and correlations (the full analysis of the 
PCA is below).    
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TABLE  -PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS (PCA) 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY INDEX 
PCA COMPONENTS 
Chapter 3 
VARIABLES EIGENVECTORS 
(Scoring 
Coefficients) 
VARIABLES EIGENVECTORS 
(Scoring 
Coefficients) 
ANOMIC 
VIOLENCE 
   
VIOLENCE 0.62   
ANTIGOVERNMENT 
DEMONSTRATIONS 
0.62   
GENERAL STRIKES 0.48   
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.79 
  
INTERNAL WAR    
 
ASSASINATIONS 
 
0.71 
 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
VIONENT 
GUERILA WARFARE 0.71 ANOMIC 
VIOLENCE 
0.60 
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.13 
INTERNAL 
WAR 
0.61 
ELITE VIOLENCE  ELITE 
VIOLENCE 
 
0.51 
COUP D’ ETAT 0.71 Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.45 
PURGES 0.71   
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.19 
  
 
CHANGES IN 
GOVERNMENT 
   
GOVERNMENTAL 
CRICIS 
0.54   
LEGISLATIVE 
ELECTIONS 
0.46   
CABINET CHANGES 0.66   
CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES 
 
0.26 
  
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.70 
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TABLE  -PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS (PCA) 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT 
PCA COMPONENTS 
Chapter 4 
VARIABLES EIGENVECTORS 
(Scoring Coefficients) 
 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT 
 
GOVERNMENTAL CRICIS 0.54 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 0.46 
CABINET CHANGES 0.66 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES  
0.26 
Component1-eigenvalue  
1.70 
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TABLE -PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS (PCA) 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY INDEX 
PCA COMPONENTS 
Chapter 5 
VARIABLES EIGENVECTORS 
(Scoring 
Coefficients) 
VARIABLES EIGENVECTORS 
(Scoring 
Coefficients) 
ANOMIC 
VIOLENCE 
   
RIOTS 0.61   
ANTIGOVERNMENT 
DEMONSTRATIONS 
0.39   
GENERAL STRIKES 0.69   
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.36 
  
INTERNAL WAR    
 
ASSASINATIONS 
 
0.71 
 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
VIONENT 
GUERILA WARFARE 0.71 ANOMIC 
VIOLENCE 
0.71 
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.13 
INTERNAL 
WAR 
0.71 
ELITE VIOLENCE  ELITE 
VIOLENCE 
 
0.71 
COUP D’ ETAT 0.71 Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.43 
PURGES 0.71   
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.30 
  
 
CHANGES IN 
GOVERNMENT 
   
GOVERNMENTAL 
CRICIS 
0.61   
LEGISLATIVE 
ELECTIONS 
0.32   
CABINET CHANGES 0.63   
CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES 
 
0.35 
  
Component1-
eigenvalue 
 
1.87 
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APPENDIX III 
Table Summary statistics of Data –Chapter 4 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Effective 
legislature  
1081 2.758557 .5853009 0 3 
GDP growth rate  1039 2.950597 3.463136 -12.46 24.52 
Employment 
growth rates 
527 .009284 .0325564 -.0756829 .6091398 
Governmental 
investment 
growth rates  
1038 .0588154 .1075279 -.7018256 .4364912 
 Governmental 
expenditure 
growth rates 
1040 .0339506 1.043107 -33.54177 .3590215 
 Inflation   849 8.242792 12.38918 -.8809975 110.1732 
Openness to 
trade  
1059 70.15325 44.50892 3.11 288.74 
Assassinations   1070 .1757009 .9382069 0 15 
 General strikes  1070 .1878505 .6292244 0 6 
Revolutions   1069 .0533209 .3541629 0 9 
Antigovernment 
demonstrations  
1069 .5285313 1.409033 0 14 
  Coups d’état  1083 .0083102 .0908229 0 1 
 Purges   1073 .0904007 .4386112 0 5 
 Constitutional 
changes  
1081 .0249769 .1561268 0 1 
Cabinet changes  1081 .4292322 .6031064 0 4 
 Legislative 
elections  
1081 .2710453 .4509083 0 2 
Polity2   935 8.396791 4.453398 -9 10 
Regime type  1081 1.016651 .1481374 1 3 
Governmental 
crises   
1070 .3093458 .6978562 0 5 
  Ethic 
fractionalization 
index  
935 .2171546 .1744347 .0396           .575165 
 Guerilla warfare  978 .1707566 .7326873 0 13 
Defense 
expenditure  
572 6943.056 8783.163 0 48648 
Head of state  985 1.664975 .6176944 1 4 
Effective 
executive  
985 1.99797 .2851257 1 3 
Party 
fractionalization 
index 
985 6439.218 1991.196 0 8811 
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APPENTIX IV 
The table below shows the variables used in chapter 5 and the missing values they 
contained (plus the percentage of the missing values). The variables which had missing 
values more than 21% have been dropped by the model since the large amount of variables 
can also influence the data missing problem (the likelihood of missing values is being 
increased) (McKnight et al, 2007).  
     
TABLE -MISSING VALUES 
Chapter 5 
     Variable Missing Total Missing/Total 
gdppercapita 5 90 .055556 
         pop 5 90 .055556 
     assasin 1 90 .011111 
 generstikes 1 90 .011111 
    guerwarf 1 90 .011111 
governcrises 1 90 .011111 
      purges 1 90 .011111 
       riots 1 90 .011111 
 revolutions 1 90 .011111 
antigovdem~s 1 90 .011111 
  partyfranc 21 90 .233333 
  regimetype 0 90 0 
       coups 7 90 .077778 
constitcha~s 0 90 0 
 headofstate 0 90 0 
     premier 0 90 0 
typeeffexe~t 0 90 0 
electeffex~t 0 90 0 
cabinetchang 0 90 0 
 legislelect 0 90 0 
defenceper~a 34 90 .377778 
nationexpe~a 19 90 .211111 
propofworl~e 19 90 .211111 
     deptgdp 45 90 .5 
    ginicoef 62 90 .688889 
natexpedpe~a 19 90 .211111 
percentlit~e 7 90 .077778 
       count 0 90 0 
   popgrowht 5 90 .055556 
   gdpgrowth 9 90 .1 
     polity2 1 90 .011111 
       major 8 90 .088889 
     threats 8 90 .088889 
      social 1 90 .011111 
      unrest 1 90 .011111 
citizendis~t 1 90 .011111 
     changes 8 90 .088889 
  government 8 90 .088889 
politicali~y 8 90 .088889 
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socialunrest 8 90 .088889 
governchan~s 8 90 .088889 
    regtype1 0 90 0 
    regtype2 0 90 0 
    regtype3 0 90 0 
interregim~e 9 90 .1 
       trade 0 90 0 
     defence 0 90 0 
          pf 0 90 0 
nationalex~d 0 90 0 
    literacy 0 90 0 
polinstabi~y 0 90 0 
        dept 0 90 0 
 popgrowrate 6 90 .066667 
 gdpgrowrate 10 90 .111111 
       gdpgr 0 90 0 
       popgr 0 90 0 
socialunre~s 0 90 0 
goverchanges 0 90 0 
growthnati~p 19 90 .211111 
natexpgrrate 0 90 0 
     grtrade 1 90 .011111 
     lntrade 0 90 0 
    ln2trade 2 90 .022222 
      gtrade 2 90 .022222 
importsper~a 19 90 .211111 
exportsper~a 19 90 .211111 
tradeperca~a 19 90 .211111 
   opentrade 0 90 0 
    tradegdp 9 90 .1 
     tradeop 0 90 0 
Acronyms: gdpgr: growth rate of GDP; trade: openness to trade; popgr: growth rate of population; regtype,  1 
for the civilian regimes, 2 for military-civilian regimes and 3 for military regimes; trade: the proportion of world 
trade (imports and exports); defence: the ratio of national defense expenditure to total national expenditure; 
literacy: literacy data, calculated, wherever possible, on the basis of non-literates, 15 years of age and over; 
nationalexpediture:National Government Expenditure assassin: the average number of political assassinations 
per year per million populations;  genstrikes: general strikes which involve workers against governmental 
policies; riots: any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force; 
revolotions: any illegal or forced change in the top government elite; antigovdemonstrations: any peaceful 
public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority; coupsdetat: the number of extra constitutional or forced changes in the top 
government elite or its effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year; purges: any systematic 
elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition; 
constchange: the number of basic alterations in a state’s constitutional structure; governcrises: any rapidly 
developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime; parfranc: party fractionalization 
index; defense: national defense expenditure; legelect:  the number of elections held for the lower house of a 
national legislature in a given year; cabinetchange: the number of time in a year that a new premier is named 
and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are assumed by new ministers. 
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APPENDIX V 
 
 
 
 
Ho: Political Instability does not Granger cause Economic growth (and the other way 
round) 
According to the p –value in both cases we cannot reject the Null Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests -Chapter 4 
 
Sample: 1950 2004  
   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     POLITICALINSTABILITY does not Granger Cause GRGDPCH  906  4.13276 0.0163 
 GRGDPCH does not Granger Cause POLITICALINSTABILITY  7.31308 0.0007 
    
    
224 
 
APPENDIX VI 
Table 1-PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST 
 PESARAN UNIT ROOT TEST INCLUDING TREND AND INTERCEPT 
 Pesaran test Fisher test 
 
GDP Growth rate per capita -17.875**  
GDP (LEVEL) 
  73.9013** 
POPULATION   -19.5082** 
GOVERNMENTAL_ EXPENDITURE   
 -1.331*  
GOVERNMENTAL_INVESTMENT  
 -7.164**  
TRADE_OPENESS 
 -1.589*  
SCHOOLING 
 62.45**  
INFLATION 
-4.727**  
EMPLOYMENT 
-4.577**  
REVOLUTIONS 
  -11.6161** 
CABINET CHANGE 
 -20.895**  
ASSASINATIONS -6.322**  
GENERAL STRIKES -16.273**  
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES  -17.9026** 
LEGISLATIVE_ELECTIONS -21.167**  
COUP D’ETAT  -11.3736** 
PURGES  -17.0821** 
GOVERNMENTAL CRICES -17.664**  
EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION  -3.4147** 
GUERILLA WARFARE  -3.093**  
RIOTS -12.820**  
HEAD OF STATE  -1.6690* 
PARTY FRACTIONALIZATION 
INDEX -3.231**  
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE -3.723**  
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION 
INDEX  -4.1231** 
CIVILIAN_REGIME 
  -1.7024* 
POLITY2   -1.5516* 
z values are reported. 
** =5% significance, * =1% significance 
 
